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Abstract 
Background: The modifiability of anxiety, combined with the extraordinary worldwide 
growth in the prevalence of dementia, have motivated previous research which suggests 
anxiety may be a predictor of cognitive ageing. The aim of this PhD investigation is to extend 
the published research with new data, pool results with a fresh meta-analysis, and examine 
methods with a view to recommending strategies for future research. 
Method: The two, primary research questions, are: (1) Is anxiety a risk factor for the rate of 
age-associated, cognitive decline; and, (2) Is anxiety a risk factor for age-associated, incident, 
cognitive impairment? From published evidence on neuropsychological mechanisms, I 
developed “The Diathesis-Anxiety Heuristic of Cognitive Ageing”. This model suggested a 
causal relationship between long-term anxiety and cognitive ageing and introduced the 
possibility of neuropsychological feedback loops which may serve as a control mechanism. 
My systematic review and meta-analysis updated previously published, pooled results. This 
statistical investigation was extended by drawing on new data from the Personality And Total 
Health (PATH) Through Life, dataset. PATH is an Australian, population based, prospective 
cohort study over four waves of data, at four-yearly intervals. Participants were aged 60 to 64 
years at baseline, with sample size of 2,390. Analyses included multilevel modelling with 
stratifications and alternative temporal treatments, and testing for current and delayed effects 
of anxiety. 
Results: For anxiety as primary predictor, the only significant, meta-analysis result was for 
dementia as outcome, based on five studies: relative risk ratio (RR) = 1.81 (95% confidence 
Interval (CI): 1.22–2.70), p = 0.003, dispersion (I2) = 78.6%. From PATH, the only fully 
adjusted association found was for participants who consumed anxiolytics at baseline (n = 
126). Anxiety symptoms were associated with working memory, with coefficient: 0.215 (CI: 
0.001–0.429), p = .049.  
 v 
Discussion: For the meta-analysis, the dispersion percentage reflected high levels of 
methodological or sample differences between studies, and the result was, therefore, 
inconclusive. The result from PATH, for the anxiolytics stratification, was examined for the 
meaning of the direction of change, and for effect size among other criteria, and was found to 
be of marginal credibility. Analytical methods adopted in past research and in the 
operationalisation of anxiety, were likely to have contributed to the inconclusive nature of 
these results. Recommended future developments of methods are discussed to resolve these 
limitations. Additionally, all previous studies, including PATH, were observational. To 
establish causation, randomised control studies would be necessary, using treatment 
interventions, to determine if reversal of the risk factor is protective.  
Conclusions: A predictive association between anxiety and cognitive ageing has not been 
established. A strategic approach is recommended for future research which should include: 
(A) development of a more valid operationalisation of anxiety; (B) Statistical analysis 
methods which account for long term effects of anxiety; (C) Further investigation of the 
biological mechanisms and the possibility of neurological feedback loops; and, (D) placebo 
controlled, randomised anxiety treatment intervention trials, establishing whether there is a 
causal link between anxiety and cognitive ageing.  
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CHAPTER ONE:  
Concepts, Constructs, and Theory 
 
Abstract 
As foundation for the investigations to follow, this opening chapter provides an overview 
of: the motivation and theory for the present research; the constructs available for the 
principal predictor, anxiety; and, the possible neuropsychological mechanisms linking anxiety 
to cognitive change. Also developed here are the primary research questions:  
1. Is anxiety a risk factor for the rate of age-associated, cognitive decline?  
2. Is anxiety a risk factor for age-associated, incident, cognitive impairment?  
These concepts guide the research to follow, and they provide important insights for the 
final chapter in which theory, limitations, and statistical findings are combined to shape a 
strategic approach to future research. 
  
 2 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 Background 
Although the evidence is not yet conclusive, anxiety has been posited as a risk factor for 
age-associated cognitive decline, mild cognitive impairment (MCI), and dementia (Gulpers et 
al., 2016). “Cognitive decline” refers here to the pre-impairment stages of age-associated 
decline in cognitive performance. “Cognitive impairment” is specifically MCI or dementia. 
These two stages, cognitive decline and cognitive impairment, are referred to collectively, as 
“cognitive ageing” which includes both normal and accelerated cognitive changes in older 
individuals. 
The research interest has been motivated by the modifiability of anxiety (a variety of 
treatments are available) together with the pervasive and devastating nature of dementia. 
Without intervention, worldwide dementia is expected to increase by 60% from 46.8 million 
cases in 2015 to 74.7 million in 2030, and by 281% between 2015 and 2050 to 131.5 million 
cases (Prince, 2015). The estimated global cost of dementia in 2015, was US$817.9 billion 
and was projected to rise to US$2 trillion by 2030 (Wimo et al., 2017). Because these 
numbers are large, even a small change in percentage terms could make an important 
difference financially and in the lives of many people. Additionally, even small 
postponements in onset of dementia could make substantial differences in overall disease 
burden. For example, delaying onset of Alzheimer’s disease by just 0.4 years could reduce its 
prevalence by 5% (Access Economics, 2004). The impact of pre-dementia cognitive decline 
has not been well defined or globally costed but would be additional to these statistics. 
Whether anxiety is a risk factor for cognitive ageing has emerged in the research 
literature as a complex question. This is so, both in terms of the neuropsychological 
mechanisms, and in the challenges in designing and interpreting the research into statistical 
associations. To begin with a less encumbered observation, there was an established 
 3 
elementary association between anxiety and MCI. Anxiety was approximately three times 
more prevalent among individuals with MCI than among similarly aged people without MCI 
(Forsell, Palmer, & Fratiglioni, 2003; Geda et al., 2008). However, such correlations were 
based on cross-sectional studies, which cannot demonstrate an association over time and, 
therefore, can say nothing about whether one variable predicts, or can be a risk factor for, 
another. It is as valid to speculate that mild cognitive decline would trigger anxiety, as it is 
that anxiety may bring about cognitive changes. Singer and Willett (2003) explained also that, 
“cross-sectional studies confound age and cohort effects . . . and are prone to selection bias”. 
By contrast with such cross-sectional studies, evidence that anxiety predicted cognitive 
ageing was provided by a recent review and meta-analysis of longitudinal studies. With a 
census date of January 2015, Gulpers et al. (2016) found anxiety predicted progression from 
cognitively healthy to MCI, and from cognitively healthy to dementia. However, the study 
was unable to pool results for cognitive decline. And, for progression from cognitively 
healthy to cognitive impairment, the analysis was limited by the small number of accepted 
studies, just four for progression to MCI, and six for progression from cognitively healthy to 
dementia. Further, when adjustment for depression (an important confounder discussed 
below) was taken fully into account (by rejecting studies that had not controlled for this 
variable), the refined MCI result was based on only two studies, and the other association was 
attenuated. Thus, the research so far has been inconclusive. 
1.1.2 Key Research Principles 
The complexity of causal relationships mentioned above, and the influence of 
confounding variables such as depression, are just two of the many issues influencing 
research design which, if not well considered, can render research results of reduced validity 
or, at least, of less usefulness. Clarity is necessary. In the published literature, the need for 
brevity has typically obviated more than a minimal discussion of such strategies underlying 
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the description of methods. However, with the space and opportunity to discuss the research 
design in this dissertation, this opening chapter provides an outline of the more important 
principles. 
1.1.2.1 Normality of cognitive ageing. 
Associations between anxiety and subsequent cognitive ageing, need firstly to be 
distinguished from questions of normality. If anxiety does indeed increase the risk of 
cognitive ageing, then a logical expectation might be that anxiety would cause accelerated 
cognitive ageing. However, accelerated or abnormal cognitive decline is not clearly 
distinguished from normal rates of age-associated cognitive change (Fjell, McEvoy, Holland, 
Dale, & Walhovd, 2014). Additionally, abnormal decline does not necessarily lead to MCI or 
dementia; nor does normal decline necessarily exclude such impairment (Fjell et al., 2014). If 
anxiety can be demonstrated to add risk over time to the probability of cognitive ageing, then 
this is sufficient (and parsimonious) without factoring in characteristics of normality. The 
research literature appears not to have discussed this point. Articles have addressed questions 
of normality, only to establish a “normal” baseline. However, apparently, all past research has 
adopted this perspective. 
1.1.2.2 Causal relationships. 
1.1.2.2.1 Temporal Associations. 
If anxiety is found to be a risk for cognitive ageing, then it must at least predict cognitive 
ageing. This temporal question can be difficult especially when dealing with Alzheimer’s 
disease (which is the dominant disease within the cluster of dementia types) with a prodromal 
period of 17 years or more, and a specific memory impairment phase of 2.5 to 4.5 years 
before onset of Alzheimer’s disease (Villemagne et al., 2013). So, for quite long periods, the 
incipient impairment could be a source of worry and anxiety. In such circumstances, the 
prodromal cognitive impairment would be a risk factor for anxiety rather than the other way 
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around. With or without impairment, cognitive ageing has a complex temporal relationship 
with anxiety. Such questions have not always been well considered or included in study 
design strategies. In others, the temporal issues have been carefully evaluated, most notably 
by Petkus, Reynolds, Wetherell, Kremen, and Gatz (2017) who investigated the “Temporal 
dynamics of cognitive performance and anxiety across older adulthood”, and found a 
bidirectional association between anxiety and both cognitive decline and cognitive 
impairment. 
1.1.2.2.2 Randomised Control Trials. 
A related complication is that all studies so far have been observational. Such studies 
cannot determine cause. Randomised control trials (RCTs) to test direct associations between 
anxiety and cognitive decline or cognitive impairment would not be possible, simply because 
potentially harmful anxiety could not be ethically assigned. Additionally, assignment of long-
term anxiety conditions would be impractical. However, ascertaining causality may be 
possible using RCTs for intervention of anxiety treatment (S. Mulhall, personal 
communication, 2017), while measuring the efficacy of treatment as well as any influence on 
subsequent cognitive decline and cognitive impairment. Although the design of such RCTs 
might be straightforward, apparently none has been undertaken (no such RCT was reported 
by the recent intervention reviews on cognitive ageing: Kane et al., 2017; Leshner, Landis, 
Stroud, & Downey, 2017; Livingston et al., 2017).  
1.1.2.2.3 Confounds. 
Without an RCT, there may remain an unresolved cluster of potential effects possibly 
confounding the influence of anxiety on cognitive ageing and the interpretation of findings. 
These confusions could mask alternative possible causes, which are principally: (1) 
Confounding variables (rather than, or as well as, anxiety) directly causing cognitive ageing. 
For example, depression is highly comorbid with anxiety (Burton, Campbell, Jordan, Strauss, 
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& Mallen, 2013) and predicts cognitive ageing (Diniz, Butters, Albert, Dew, & Reynolds, 
2013), so may be a confounding variable; (2) Cognitive decline (such as memory loss) may 
cause increased anxiety (the reverse effect); and (3) Anxiety may also be present either as a 
symptom or marker of prodromal dementia. As presented below, the research literature has 
sometimes either overlooked, or chosen to avoid, some of the critical issues of confounding 
variables. 
1.1.2.2.4 Theory Suggesting Causality. 
Despite the clear need for causal investigation, an RCT will not be attempted here. On 
the other hand, theory suggesting anxiety is a direct cause of cognitive ageing will be 
considered in this chapter as part of a wider overview of the relevant neuropsychological 
mechanisms. If a case can be made for the theory that anxiety causes cognitive ageing then 
evidence for anxiety as a predictor can be interpreted to infer anxiety is potentially, also a risk 
factor. Without direct evidence for causality, the theory, therefore, occupies an important 
place in this investigation. 
1.1.3 Research Questions 
The primary research questions can now be identified but further consideration will be 
required to qualify how they might be operationalised and interpreted. As part of this further 
development of the primary research questions, additional, subordinate questions will be 
added (Chapter Three). The two primary, research questions are:  
(1) Is anxiety a risk factor for the rate of age-associated, cognitive decline? 
(2) Is anxiety a risk factor for age-associated, incident, cognitive impairment?  
The primary research questions nominate cognitive decline and cognitive impairment as 
the prognostic outcomes, but these are broad-level terms. They need to be delineated into 
categories. For example, cognitive decline can be categorised by cognitive domain, and for 
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cognitive impairment there are types of MCI and dementia. For each category, there may be 
different associations with anxiety. This issue will be examined further, below. 
1.1.4 Sequence of the Balance of this Chapter 
I will next examine the meaning of anxiety and related constructs such as stress. A brief 
description will follow, of the relevant categories of cognitive decline and cognitive 
impairment. These understandings will then support an exploration of the neurological and 
psychological mechanisms linking anxiety to cognitive ageing, in which causality will be 
examined. Conclusions from these considerations will inform a strategy adopted in following 
chapters for the investigations of evidence presented by the literature, and new data available 
to this PhD study.  
1.2 Anxiety 
1.2.1 The Nature of Anxiety  
Anxiety is worry, apprehension, fear of the future or some perceived threat, and is 
associated with uncertainty, indecision, inability to concentrate, vigilance, avoidant 
behaviour, and autonomic arousal such as muscle tension, rapid heartbeat, trembling, and 
sweating (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Gross & Hen, 2004; Grupe & Nitschke, 
2013; Mah, Szabuniewicz, & Fiocco, 2016; VandenBos, 2006). In its milder forms, transient 
anxiety is adaptive (Endler & Kocovski, 2001; Spielberger, 2010), allowing the individual to 
be more observant about prospective threats and to be physically ready to respond. Intense, 
chronic anxiety (long term, clinical levels) or even low-level but enduring anxiety, without a 
corresponding likelihood of real risk, is not adaptive and can harm the individual 
psychologically and physiologically, and can interfere with relationships and daily activities 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Mah et al., 2016; Rosen & Schulkin, 1998). In the 
absence of real threat, the inability to relax can be a debilitating condition. 
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Anxiety can be experienced as clinical disorders or in milder forms. Four anxiety 
disorders have been described by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
fifth edition (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). They are, Generalised 
Anxiety Disorder, Panic Disorders, Social Phobia, and Specific Phobias. Of these, 
Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) is most commonly referred to in the research on 
associations with cognitive ageing. GAD is described by the DSM-5 as “Excessive anxiety 
and worry … occurring more days than not for at least 6 months”; Worry is distressing, 
excessive, hard to control, and is typically about everyday life circumstances; symptoms 
cause clinically significant impairment in important aspects of life such as psychosocial 
functioning. “The intensity, duration, or frequency of the anxiety and worry is out of 
proportion to the actual likelihood or impact of the anticipated event”. Three or more of six 
symptoms are required to be present for at least six months, with at least some present on 
more days than not. The symptoms are: 
1. “Restlessness or feeling keyed up or on edge. 
2. Being easily fatigued. 
3. Difficulty concentrating or mind going blank. 
4. Irritability. 
5. Muscle tension. 
6. Sleep disturbance”. 
Diagnosis of GAD according to the DSM-5, requires also that “The anxiety, worry, or 
physical symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, 
or other important areas of functioning” (Criterion D; American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). 
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Researchers interested in identifying anxiety can use either formal diagnosis or self-
report or informant-report questionnaires. For illustration, three commonly used, self-report, 
anxiety questionnaires are:  
• Spielberger state-trait anxiety inventory (STAI; Spielberger & Gorsuch, 1983): Two 
questionnaires representing state and trait anxiety. Each provides 20 questions on a 
Likert scale: 1 – Almost Never; 2 – Sometimes; 3 – Often; 4 – Almost Always. 
Examples of the “State” questions are: I feel calm; I feel secure: I am tense; I feel 
Strained”. Examples of the “Trait” questions are: I feel pleasant; I feel nervous and 
restless; I feel satisfied with myself; I feel like a failure”.  
• Hospital anxiety and depression scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983): The anxiety 
component of the HADS consist of seven questions, each of which is scored from zero 
to three. Thus, the maximum score is 21. Examples of these questions are: 1 – I feel 
tense or wound up; 2 – I get a sort of frightened feeling as if something bad is about to 
happen; 3 – Worrying thoughts go through my mind; 4 – I feel restless and have to be 
on the move. 
• Goldberg Anxiety and Depression scales (GAS and GDS; Goldberg, Bridges, Duncan-
Jones, & Grayson, 1988): Nine anxiety questions are offered with yes/no answers, 
referring to the participant’s experiences within the last four weeks. Administration of 
the questionnaire, according to its originators, was to ask the first four questions 
initially, and then if there are “Yes” responses to two or more of these four, then the 
remaining five questions are administered. The scale was based on GAD diagnosis 
criteria. Individuals returning anxiety scores of five have a 50% chance of having a 
clinically important disturbance. Examples of the first four questions are: 1 – Have you 
felt keyed up, on edge? 2 – Have you been worrying a lot? Examples of the remaining 
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five questions are: 5 – Have you been sleeping poorly? 6 – Have you had headaches or 
neck aches? 
The common attribute of all these scales is that they report levels of anxiety, not merely a 
binary indicator (as the result of diagnosis). Both GAS and HADS provide depression scales 
but these are separated from the anxiety scales. The only scale to estimate separately, state 
(incident or short term) and trait (long-term or lifetime) anxiety is the STAI. There are 
similarities and dissimilarities between the items in the various scales. Whether they measure 
the same construct is an open question. This is an important question because deployment of 
the various questionnaires in research operationally defines the construct of anxiety. 
Even beyond the dissimilarities in measurement instruments, there is disagreement about 
the meaning of anxiety. These disagreements are mostly about ambiguities between the 
constructs of anxiety, fear, stress, and depression. Notably, Mah et al. (2016), in their review 
of brain damage caused by anxiety, argued anxiety is not distinct from fear or stress. They 
noted these conditions have overlapping neurocircuitry, and common arousal and 
neuroendocrine mechanisms. Mah et al. contended the terms anxiety, fear, and stress are 
often interchangeable, and distinguishable only by virtue of the nature of the circumstances. 
The considerable research literature available on the impact of stress on cognitive 
performance (e.g., Gianaros et al., 2007; Lupien, Maheu, Tu, Fiocco, & Schramek, 2007; 
Sweis, Veverka, Dhillon, Urban, & Lucas, 2013) may, therefore, be just as relevant to 
anxiety. To comprehend the nature of anxiety and to evaluate mechanisms correctly that may 
explain links between anxiety and cognitive performance, it becomes necessary to consider in 
greater depth, the equivalences, and differences between the three constructs. I will also 
review the potential overlap with depression. This is because, again, there are ambiguities 
between the constructs, and because it emerges from the research that depression is an 
important confounding variable. 
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1.2.1.1 Anxiety versus Fear. 
Fear is defined by the DSM-5 as, “An emotional response to perceived imminent threat or 
danger associated with urges to flee or fight”. The APA Dictionary of Psychology 
(VandenBos, 2006) is more descriptive, but essentially agrees. This latter definition includes 
a note on the distinction between fear and anxiety that, “fear has an object (e.g., a predator, 
financial ruin) and is a proportional response to the objective threat, whereas anxiety typically 
lacks an object or is a more intense response than is warranted by the perceived threat”. 
According to Grupe and Nitschke (2013), the key difference between fear and anxiety is 
the presence of uncertainty, greater uncertainty applying in the anxious condition. The 
American Psychiatric Association (2013) comprehended the difference differently, asserting 
persistent worry is a common feature of anxiety but not of fear.  
There is neurological evidence for the differences between fear and anxiety. In both 
conditions, signals are sent to the brain stem and hypothalamus but the sources of those 
signals are different; signals originating from the amygdala result in fear, and from the stria 
terminalis result in anxiety (Davis, Walker, Miles, & Grillon, 2010). A further distinction is 
available from the fact that anxiolytics influence anxious behaviour but not fear responses 
(Graeff, 1994; Gray & McNaughton, 2003). Finally, Etkin and Wager (2007) identified 
(using functional magnetic resonance imaging [fMRI]) differences in active brain regions 
engaged in fear and two anxiety disorders: social anxiety, and specific phobia. See Figures 
1.1 and 1.2. These images do not show comparisons with regions activated in GAD. But the 
point is made on this evidence there are substantial dissimilarities between fear and two of the 
potential four anxiety disorders. On the other hand, these figures also illustrate there are 
differences in hyperactivation between the two anxiety disorders, thus leaving as unexplained 
whether differences between fear and anxiety could be typified by such fMRI results unless 
all known forms of fear and anxiety were examined and compared.  
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Despite the identified distinctions between anxiety and fear, Perusini and Fanselow 
(2015) argued neither fear nor anxiety have consistent definitions, that the distinctions are 
subjective and that there is no agreed differences in terms of their causes or outcomes. 
Perusini and Fanselow described the neurocircuitry general to fear and anxiety, which they 
outlined in their figure reproduced here as Figure 1.3. In summary, they described fear and 
anxiety as executing similar connections between the hippocampus, prefrontal cortex, 
amygdala, dorsal raphe nucleus, stria terminalis, and periaqueductal gray.  
Further complicating the questions of similarities and distinctions between fear and 
anxiety is that neurologically, there is a case to be made for more than one type of fear. 
Klumpers, Kroes, Baas, and Fernández (2017) found, under fMRI examination, that electric 
shock anticipation and shock confrontation were associated with predominant activity of the 
bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (BNST) and amygdala, respectively. They noted the BNST 
has been previously associated with responses to uncertain conditions and the amygdala to 
acute danger. However, the experimental procedure by Klumpers et al. did not introduce 
uncertainty, only a short time delay for the “anticipation” condition. Thus, the BNST may 
have been less reflective of uncertainty (and, therefore, anxiety) and more indicative of a sub-
category of fear. These authors discussed the ambiguities, noting “little is known about 
potential differential contributions of the BNST and amygdala”. 
In sum, there is disagreement about whether fear and anxiety are clearly distinguished, 
and these constructs have yet to be fully defined neurologically.  
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Figure 1.1. “Clusters in Which Significant Hyperactivation or Hypoactivation Were Found in 
Patients With PTSD, Social Anxiety Disorder, and Specific Phobia Relative to Comparison 
Subjects and in Healthy Subjects Undergoing Fear Conditioninga.” 
a Results are shown for the amygdala (A) and insular cortices (B). Note that within the left amygdala 
there were two distinct clusters for PTSD, a ventral anterior hyperactivation cluster and a dorsal 
posterior hypoactivation cluster. The right side of the image corresponds to the right side of the brain.” 
Reproduced with permission from Etkin and Wager (2007). 
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Figure 1.2. “Significant Clusters of Hyperactivation or Hypoactivation in Medial Prefrontal 
Regions for Patients with PTSD, Social Anxiety Disorder, and Specific Phobia, and in 
Healthy Subjects Undergoing Fear Conditioning.”  
Reproduced with permission from Etkin and Wager (2007): 
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Figure 1.3. Circuit diagram depicting a general model of neural circuitry of fear and anxiety. 
(Reproduced with permission from Perusini and Fanselow (2015) and Cold Spring Hector Laboratory 
Press.) 
 
“Circuit diagram depicting a general model of neural circuitry of fear and anxiety. The basolateral 
amygdala (BLA) gathers sensory information from both thalamic and auditory cortical regions, both 
involved in relaying CS (e.g., tone) information, as well as from the hippocampus for contextual 
information. The BLA projects to the central nucleus (CeA) both directly and indirectly, via the 
GABAergic intercalated cell (ITC) masses that lie between these two regions. The CeA output to the 
periaqueductal gray (PAG) and bed nuclei of the stria terminalis (BNST) drive fear responding. 
Ascending projections from the brainstem and midbrain to the amygdala, such as from the dorsal 
raphe nucleus (DRN) projects to the dorsal PAG and to the amygdala in a manner that modulates 
defensive behaviors. Descending projections from the medial prefrontal cortex also differentially 
modulate the behavioral outputs of this circuit—the prelimbic (PL) cortex projects to the BLA 
possibly to enhance fear responding while the infralimbic cortex (IL) indirectly projects to the CeM 
via ITC to mediate extinction. Green arrows represent glutamatergic projections, red arrows represent 
GABAergic projections, and black arrows represent neuromodulatory projections (e.g., DRN to BLA 
is serotonergic).” 
 
1.2.1.2 Anxiety versus Stress. 
The DSM-5 described stress as “the pattern of specific or nonspecific responses a person 
makes to stimulus events that disturb his or her equilibrium and tax or exceed his or her 
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ability to cope.” A stressor is, “Any emotional, physical, social, economic, or other factor that 
disrupts the normal physiological, cognitive, emotional, or behavioural balance of the 
individual” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). By the definitions so far, one 
distinction between anxiety and stress is that anxiety emphasises anticipation of stressors, but 
stress is a response to stressors.  
Despite the conceptual differences, operationally there is not necessarily a clear 
distinction in measurement scales. For example, the Perceived Stress Questionnaire 
(Levenstein et al., 1993) asks how often the individual has the following experiences: (1) 
many worries (2) being irritable or grouchy (3) having trouble relaxing. Similarly, the 
Goldberg Anxiety Questionnaire (Goldberg et al., 1988) includes the questions: (1) Have you 
been worrying a lot? (2) Have you been irritable? (3) Have you felt keyed up or on edge? 
Thus, on these questions, there is clear overlap between these stress and anxiety scales. There 
is also no distinction (between these two measuring instruments) on the criteria mentioned 
above about anticipation or response to stressors. Some other questions also could be 
interpreted as referring to similar underlying constructs. For example, the stress questionnaire 
asks how often, “you are afraid for the future”. Fear of the future is a symptom of anxiety. 
The stress questionnaire asks how often, “You feel tense”. Tension is a symptom of anxiety. 
There appears to be no analysis available in the literature on the convergent and discriminant 
validity of these two questionnaires. There can be considerable ambiguity between constructs 
as applied by measuring instruments such as these scales.  
The HADS questionnaire for anxiety (described above at Section 1.2.1) does question 
whether there was worry about the future (with item 2, “I get a sort of frightened feeling as if 
something bad is about to happen”), but some other instruments do not. Therefore, the choice 
of instruments appears to be an important element of study design on this point. However, the 
choice of instruments is unlikely to resolve a further ambiguity between anxiety and stress 
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questionnaires, which rests on the examination of whether the individual’s response is 
disproportional to the threat. A disproportion in the response to threat is implied in most 
definitions or descriptions of anxiety. More specifically, most studies that specify a category 
of anxiety for their investigation, designate GAD, or they imply this by choice of self-report 
instrument such as GAS. Diagnosis of GAD requires “excessive . . . worry”, or their estimate 
of the threat is “out of proportion to the actual likelihood or impact of the anticipated event”. 
Without embarking upon an exhaustive examination, by this PhD study, of relevant self-
report instruments, the questionnaires that have been examined here can be safely described 
as not attempting to make this distinction. Further, it would be difficult to conceive of a way 
to capture self-report data which, reliably and validly, acknowledges such disproportion, 
when the distortion is probably hidden from the individual who is required to declare it. 
Diagnosis appears to be the only reliable method for capturing this information. 
Finally, both stress and anxiety are implicated in the production of cortisol (Boudarene, 
Legros, & Timsit-Berthier, 2002; Lenze et al., 2012; Mah et al., 2016; Mantella et al., 2008; 
Rosnick, Rawson, Butters, & Lenze, 2013; Thompson et al., 2007) and therefore also in long 
term hippocampal atrophy and consequent memory decline (Boudarene et al., 2002; 
Landgraf, Wigger, Holsboer, & Neumann, 1999; Lenze et al., 2012; Lupien et al., 2007; Mah 
et al., 2016; Mantella et al., 2008; McEwen, 1999). Mah et al. (2016) described the impact of 
chronic stress on fear neurocircuitry as augmenting amygdala flight/fight responses and 
(through the mentioned hippocampal atrophy) inhibiting hippocampal/prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
control over the stress response. Cortisol triggers a cascade of changes including the 
fight/flight response and inhibitory feedback from the hippocampus to the amygdala and 
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis at various points. There is no definitive distinction 
between stress and anxiety in these cortisol-related mechanisms. 
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The observations and interpretations above support the proposition argued by Bystritsky 
and Kronemyer (2014) that stress and anxiety are complementary and overlapping constructs 
for which definitions are not categorically different. 
1.2.1.3 Anxiety versus Depression. 
Because of the high comorbidity of anxiety and depression (Burton et al., 2013), 
difficulties have arisen in differentiating between their respective associations with cognitive 
ageing (e.g., Gallacher et al., 2009). This comorbidity has been speculated to derive from 
GAD and depression sharing a genetic aetiology (Kendler, 1996; Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 
1998; Zimmerman & Chelminski, 2003), suggesting a degree of overlap between the two 
conditions. Also, there is evidence linking anxiety and depression through inflammatory 
conditions as a possible predictor of both (Duivis, Vogelzangs, Kupper, de Jonge, & Penninx, 
2013; Koyama et al., 2012). Grupe and Nitschke (2013), observed measurement of anxiety 
could be confusing the differentiation with depression because the originating (and still often 
used) state-trait anxiety inventory, developed by Spielberger and Gorsuch (1983) has been 
associated equally with anxiety and depression (Nitschke, Heller, Imig, McDonald, & Miller, 
2001).  
On the other hand, effective differentiation of measurement instruments for the two 
constructs (anxiety and depression) has been reported, demonstrating convergent and 
discriminant validity (Watson et al., 1995), and some studies have reported successful 
differentiation in the associations of each with cognitive ageing (Beaudreau & O'Hara, 2008). 
Progress has also been demonstrated in establishing their independent and interactive 
associations with cognitive ageing (Sinoff & Werner, 2003).   
Considering the differences at a conceptual level, the constructs for anxiety and 
depression can be distinguished on their different perceptions of threat. For anxiety, future 
threat is uncertain; for depression, future threat is inevitable, and leads to hopelessness; and 
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finally, comorbid anxiety and depression, are characterised by perception of the threat as 
uncertain while experiencing helplessness about control over impending events (Abramson, 
Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Alloy, Kelly, Mineka, & Clements, 1990; Garber, Miller, & 
Abramson, 1980; Grupe & Nitschke, 2013; Watson et al., 1995). These distinctions warrant 
consideration in the design or redesign of the relevant measurement instruments. For 
example, The Goldberg anxiety and depression scale (Goldberg et al., 1988) is a frequently 
used scale which makes no such distinction; it focuses on past and current experiences. There 
is no reference to any future threat, except as implied by the question, “Have you been 
worrying a lot?”, where “worrying” may be interpreted as worrying about some impending 
threat. Notwithstanding these interpretations of the items, confirmatory factor analysis on the 
Goldberg scale typically describes two oblique factors, one for anxiety and one for 
depression, and these factors conform with the delineation of the items for anxiety and 
depression (e.g., Christensen et al., 1999; Goldberg, Bridges, Duncan–Jones, & Grayson, 
1987).  
The overall status of the distinctions between anxiety and depression is clearer than for 
the other two sets of ambiguities (anxiety with fear, and with stress). Yet a degree of 
ambiguity remains with depression, at least regarding the application of the mentioned state-
trait anxiety inventory. 
In summary, the boundaries between anxiety and the three constructs of fear, stress, and 
depression, are ambiguous, to varying degrees. These ambiguities have mostly been ignored 
in studies of anxiety as a predictor of cognitive performance.  
Next, a description of the prevalence of anxiety will provide dimension to its importance 
as a disorder. 
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1.2.2 Prevalence of Anxiety 
Prevalence estimates have ranged widely for anxiety disorders, from 2.4% to 15% of the 
general population (Bryant, Jackson, & Ames, 2008). When sub-clinical anxiety was 
included, estimates were as high as 24% (Bryant et al., 2008). From the Australian national 
survey of mental health and wellbeing (NSMHWB), and using a modified version of the  
world mental health survey initiative version of the composite international diagnostic 
Interview (WMH-CIDI), McEvoy, Grove, and Slade (2011) reported the 12-month 
prevalence of any anxiety disorder was 11.8%. This included 1.9% for GAD. The any-
anxiety-disorder (12-month) was greatest at 35 to 54 years of age (14.7%) reducing to 5.2% 
for 65 to 74-year-olds, and 2.3% for 75 to 85-year-olds. Women were more likely to exhibit 
anxiety than men. For example, at 65 to 74 years, 4.7% of men experienced any anxiety (over 
12 months); while the female prevalence was 5.7%. 
Estimates in epidemiological studies have been based variously on professional 
diagnoses, and a variety of symptom scales with cut-point scores to indicate a clinical level of 
the disorder (Murphy, 2002). Under these diverse arrangements, prevalence estimates have 
varied with methodological differences.  
Additionally, the literature is inconsistent with respect to whether late-life anxiety differs 
from anxiety in younger people and, therefore, whether it should be measured differently 
(Bryant et al., 2008; Gould et al., 2014; Kogan, Edelstein, & McKee, 2000; Lenze & Butters, 
2016; Osman et al., 2012; Pachana et al., 2007). Of these reports, particularly notable are 
Pachana et al. (2007) who developed the Geriatric Anxiety Inventory, and Miloyan and 
Pachana (2015) who advocated specialised measurement for aged individuals. Miloyan and 
Pachana demonstrated self-reported worry was of less utility than frequency of physical 
symptoms, for identifying GAD in later life. This contrasts with emphasis on worry by the 
DSM-5. Thus, the identification of anxiety symptoms that are more relevant to ageing 
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individuals may account for some of the inconsistencies in anxiety prevalence according to 
age.  
Despite these questions about measurement, most estimates conclude anxiety is less 
common as age progresses after the forties. However, among older individuals experiencing 
MCI or early stages of dementia, the prevalence of anxiety is higher than in the general 
population of older adults (Beaudreau & O'Hara, 2008). For example, anxiety diagnosis was 
associated cross-sectionally with MCI with odds ratio (OR), 3.6 (95% CI 1.1–6.1) compared 
to those without MCI (Forsell et al., 2003). Similarly, anxiety (by informant questionnaire for 
neuropsychiatric inventory) was associated cross-sectionally with MCI with an OR 3.0 (95% 
CI 2.0–4.5) compared to those without MCI (Geda et al., 2008). More women than men 
experience anxiety into old age although, again, estimates vary widely (Bryant et al., 2008). 
Prevalence of anxiety symptoms in geriatric institutions is estimated to be as high as 44% and 
these organisations are often excluded from general population estimates (Bryant et al., 
2008). However, it has also been observed within institutions, for residents with dementia, 
anxiety levels declined over time (Wetzels, Zuidema, Jansen, Verhey, & Koopmans, 2010). 
Although some of these reports do not provide prevalence estimates in percentage terms, they 
can be collectively interpreted as indicating that anxiety reduces in older age except for 
individuals experiencing MCI. Further, these same individuals experiencing increased anxiety 
while afflicted with MCI, subsequently experience a decline in anxiety as the impairment 
progresses to dementia. 
Comorbidity with depression, adds another dimension of uncertainty to the prevalence 
statistics. Braam et al. (2014) found for community dwelling Europeans aged 65–104 years, 
that prevalence of three or more anxiety symptoms (regarded as a clinical level of anxiety) on 
the geriatric mental state examination scale, was 32% when there was no depression present, 
67% when there was a sub-clinical level of depression, and 87% for those with a clinical level 
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of depressive symptoms. Depression has thus been recognised as an important confounding 
variable, pointing to the need to take careful account of comorbidity. These statistics have 
also indicated much higher prevalence of clinical levels of anxiety than found by other studies 
mentioned above (noteably, Bryant et al., 2008), underlining even further the wide range of 
prevalence estimates based on a diversity of measurement instruments. 
Having described some of the ambiguities of the meaning of anxiety and then the 
uncertainties about its prevalence, the next step is to consider categories of anxiety. These 
categorisations will provide additional meaning to each of these terms and serve to introduce 
how the constructs are operationalised and how they relate within a causal model for 
cognitive decline.  
1.2.3 Categories and Dimensions of Anxiety 
Notwithstanding the ambiguities in the definition and uses of the term anxiety, the 
meaning has been developed and explored in another ways. Previously mentioned categories 
of anxiety were the disorders (listed at Section 1.2.1). But other opinions have been expressed 
about categories and dimensions of anxiety. 
1.2.3.1 State and Trait Anxiety. 
Spielberger (1972) introduced the categorical distinction between state and trait anxiety. 
State anxiety was defined as a transient emotional condition of apprehension and activation of 
the autonomic nervous system. Trait anxiety was regarded as a relatively stable condition, 
reflecting the individual’s perception of a wide range of situations as unsafe (Spielberger, 
1972), and has sometimes been referred to as a personality trait (e.g., Devier et al., 2009). 
Trait anxiety underlies state anxiety by providing the internal reference system by which 
incidental, external or internal stimuli are interpreted as threatening (Spielberger, 1972). A 
single measure of current or recent anxiety may reflect either a transient condition or an 
underlying condition. Without verification by follow-up observation (or retrospective report), 
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the applicable condition (state or trait) may remain unknown. There can be ambiguity. 
Therefore, it is worth noting that studies have demonstrated on average, state anxiety is not a 
stable condition and that trait anxiety is relatively stable (Hong, 1998; Usala & Hertzog, 
1991). These results were not influenced by the age of the participants. Thus, these two forms 
of anxiety are sufficiently different not to accept one to stand for the other. Studies relying on 
state anxiety measures as an indication of long-term anxiety, may be in error. 
The Spielberger state-trait anxiety inventory (Spielberger & Gorsuch, 1983) attempted to  
distinguish between the short-term and longer-term experiences of anxiety symptoms by 
providing symptom counts separately for state and trait conditions. Items exploring state 
anxiety addressed current feeling states with statements (to rate on a Likert scale) such as, “I 
am worried”. Items exploring trait anxiety address feelings experienced day-to-day, with 
statements such as, “I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter”. These 
distinctions between current and ongoing experiences are useful. However, as described 
above (Section 1.2.1.3), the Spielberger scale introduced ambiguities between anxiety and 
depression. There may be a more effective way to describe the types, levels, and duration of 
anxiety. 
1.2.3.2 Clinical Staging: Duration, Frequency, and Intensity of Anxiety.  
The terminology of state and trait anxiety provides only a preliminary attempt to 
distinguish between the experiences of short- and long-term symptoms. Anxiety can vary also 
in frequency of episodes, intensity, and persistence over a lifetime (Endler & Kocovski, 
2001). For example, GAD is both intense and of moderate to long duration. There can also be 
periods of greater or lesser intensity. Panic episodes are perhaps more intense but of short 
duration; a pattern of episodes may continue indefinitely; and they can be more or less 
frequent. Variations in duration, frequency, intensity, and persistence occur also in sub-
clinical anxiety. Such observations suggest anxiety should be regarded as a dimensional 
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construct rather than a categorical disorder, so that sub-clinical conditions or sub-clinical 
periods of anxiety are not overlooked (Miloyan, Byrne, & Pachana, 2014). To address some 
of the omissions in methodologies for reporting anxiety symptoms, a clinical staging model 
of anxiety disorders in the elderly was proposed and discussed by Oude Voshaar, Beekman, 
and Pachana (2015). This diagnostic model was comprised of four stages of intensity, 
frequency, and duration of anxiety. Stage 1 represented sub-clinical symptoms; stage 2, first 
episode of a clinical level syndrome; stage 3, ongoing impairment with chronic symptoms 
and frequent relapses; and stage 4, represented constant, severe disorder. The reasoning of 
Oude Voshaar et al. (2015) was based in part on earlier work by McGorry et al. (2014). The 
staging model would be similar to existing models for some non-mental-health conditions 
such as Parkinson’s disease. This model, or a similar approach to distinguishing stages of 
anxiety, may be more useful than the simple labels of state and trait, particularly when 
attempting to identify long-term associations such as with cognitive performance. This 
observation will contribute to strategic planning for future research but also serve to underline 
how little is known about anxiety conditions in epidemiological studies, which use coarser 
instruments of measurement and evaluation.  
Having considered categories of anxiety, this will be a convenient point to consider also 
the categories of cognitive change. These combined understandings will underpin the 
subsequent development of a theoretical model for possible causal connections between 
anxiety and cognitive change. 
1.3 Categories of Cognitive Decline and Cognitive Impairment 
Cognitive Decline is reducing cognitive ability, over time. It includes both normal, age-
associated decline, and accelerated decline due to additional influences of physical or mental 
health and environmental stressors. Instruments, which test cognitive abilities, do so either at 
a global level such as Intelligence Quotient, or within cognitive domains such as memory, 
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attention, and processing speed. Examples of instruments designed to measure cognitive 
abilities within specific domains, are set out in Table 1.1. These variables will be used in the 
empirical parts of this thesis. 
Table 1.1 
Examples of Instruments for Testing Cognitive Ability within Specified Domains 
Cognitive Domain Test 
Cognitive Processing Speed Symbol Digit Modalities Test. Participant has 90 seconds to pair 
specific numbers with given geometric figures; (Smith, 1982).  
Immediate & Delayed Recall Californian Verbal Learning Test. Immediate & delayed recall 16 
words to recall, same words provided in immediate & delayed recall 
test). Measures episodic memory; (Delis, Kramer, Kaplan, & Ober, 
1987). 
Verbal Intelligence Spot the Word. 60 items, pairs of words with one real and one 
made up. The task is to select the real word (Baddeley, Emslie, & 
Nimmo‐Smith, 1993) 
Working Memory Wechsler Memory Scale. Five items, each with two questions, 
repeating backwards a string of digits, ranging from 3 to 7 digits. 
Scores range from 0 to 10. (Wechsler, 1945). 
Executive Function Trail Making Test B. Speed and accuracy test for tracing a path 
through numbers or letters on a page. (Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen, 
2006) 
 
As mentioned, cognitive impairment refers either to MCI or to dementia. MCI is an early 
level of impairment experienced during prodromal dementia but the impairment is not 
sufficiently significant to interfere with daily activities (Langa & Levine, 2014). MCI can be 
either amnestic (usually associated with prodromal Alzheimer’s disease), or non-amnestic. 
The non-amnestic type is more typically associated with the prodrome of dementias other 
than Alzheimer’s disease and is diagnosed on the basis of cognitive measures in multiple 
domains. Of the dementia types, Alzheimer’s disease is the most common, with a prevalence 
of about 70–75%, relative to all dementias (Ebly, Parhad, Hogan, & Fung, 1994; Ott et al., 
1995). Other dementia types include: vascular dementia; dementia with Lewy bodies; and, 
Frontotemporal dementia.  
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1.4 Genetics and Neuropsychological Mechanisms 
Having outlined the categories of both anxiety and cognitive decline & cognitive 
impairment, the next consideration is the set of neuropsychological mechanisms which 
provide a theory for associations between them; that is, between predictor (anxiety) and 
prognostic outcome (cognitive ageing). To begin, I will examine the aetiology of anxiety then 
link this to the neuropsychological mechanisms of association with decline in cognitive 
performance. 
To serve an earlier context, some information on the neuropsychological mechanisms 
underlying anxiety, appear above at Sections 1.2.1.1 and 1.2.1.2. 
1.4.1 Aetiology of Anxiety 
A natural question to ask of anxiety is why some people have greater or lesser 
experiences of anxiety. In describing the aetiology for anxiety, Gross and Hen (2004) referred 
to an established diathesis model, meaning anxiety is the product of both genotype and 
environmental stressors. They noted estimates for the proportional effects were 30–40% of 
the variance between individuals due to genetic differences and 5% environmental, with the 
balance most likely due to interaction between the two. Prior to this large interaction, genetics 
appear to be the dominant influence. 
A variant of the 5-HTT gene (serotonin transporter protein) influences anxiety by 
modulating fear circuits (Gross & Hen, 2004). Another gene identified as influencing anxiety 
is the catechol-o-methyltransferase (COMT) gene, otherwise known as the warrior-worrier 
gene (Montag et al., 2008; Stein, Newman, Savitz, & Ramesar, 2006). At codon 158 of the 
COMT gene, variants are valine (VAL) and methionine (MET) alleles. Under conditions of 
stress, individuals with VAL alleles exhibit warrior performance. MET alleles are related to 
worrier strategies, inefficient neurotransmission, and poorer performance generally except for 
better memory and attention (Stein et al., 2006). For further information, possible 
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mechanisms to explain the differences in performance between individuals with these two 
polymorphisms are discussed by Stein et al. (2006) and Montag et al. (2008).  
1.4.2 Mechanisms Relating Anxiety to Cognitive Performance 
1.4.2.1 Earlier theories. 
To begin with the earlier concepts, I describe Eysenck’s attentional control theory 
(Darvishzadeh, Aguilar-Vafaie, & Moradi, 2012; M. W. Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & 
Calvo, 2007), which is a development of the processing efficiency theory (M. W. Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992). This theory was built in part upon the tripartite working-memory model of 
Baddeley (1986). Eysenck proposed that anxiety compromises goal-directed attentional 
mechanisms of the central executive by impairing the inhibition function, and thus allowing 
diversion of cognitive resources to distracting threats.  
Similar to the attentional control theory, is the hypothesis that poor working memory 
might be revealed directly by the additional cognitive load represented by anxious experience. 
Owens, Stevenson, Hadwin, and Norgate (2014) found, in adolescents, an interaction between 
trait anxiety and low working memory. High anxiety was negatively associated with cognitive 
performance in those with low working memory.  
A different example of the effects of anxiety is from Bierman, Comijs, Rijmen, Jonker, 
and Beekman (2008) who concluded anxiety predicts a short term improvement in cognition. 
They reported an inverse, U-shaped curve, describing the relationship between state anxiety 
and cognitive performance. In this relationship, cognitive performance was highest when a 
moderate level of state or incident anxiety existed and lowest when anxiety symptoms were 
either at low or high levels. This inverse, U-shaped-curve finding corroborated a previous and 
similar theory by Yerkes and Dodson (1908), which demonstrated an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between stress and performance. As noted above at Section 1.2.1, such 
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conclusions in the considerable literature on stress and performance, might in fact, have been 
based on measures of anxiety.  
These observations might appear to explain mechanisms for the influence of anxiety on 
cognitive performance. However, neither the diversion of attention, nor anxiety overloading 
low cognitive resources, nor improved cognition as a short-term effect of moderate levels of 
anxiety, reveal anything about the prospect that anxiety could act as an agent over time 
(months, years, or decades) to contribute to the age related causes of ongoing decline in 
cognitive skill. Immediate and long-term effects are conceivably different. Thus, longer-term 
impact of anxiety opens the prospect for categorically different cognitive responses.  
1.4.2.2 Alternative, contemporary approaches. 
The central body of theory on mechanisms relating anxiety to cognitive ageing is 
outlined in the next Section (1.4.2.3) but others have been hypothesised. These alternative 
theories are: (1) Anxiety associated inflammatory responses, through increased cytokine 
levels, and subsequent memory decline and Alzheimer’s disease (Duivis et al., 2013; Furtado 
& Katzman, 2015; Koyama et al., 2012; Reichenberg et al., 2001); (2) Anxiety related 
somatic responses such as blood pressure and heart rate, may lead to cardiovascular disease 
and vascular dementia (Tully, Cosh, & Baune, 2013); and, (3) Anxiety may be a symptom or 
marker of prodromal dementia, rather than a causal factor (Kassem, Ganguli, Yaffe, Hanlon, 
Lopez, Wilson, & Cauley, 2017). 
These alternative hypotheses may emerge as providing stronger arguments and evidence 
at some point, or they may be identified as additional mechanisms.  
1.4.2.3 The central, neuropsychological theory.  
This central theory for how anxiety influences cognitive ageing, embraces a collection of 
mechanisms. These mechanisms are principally: allostatic load; glucocorticoid regulation; 
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neuroendocrine breakdown; atrophy of the HPA axis, hippocampus, and PFC; and feedback 
loops.  
In their literature review, Mah et al. (2016) brought together the neurological 
explanations for mechanisms linking anxiety directly with progressive decline in cognition, 
and neurological mechanisms explaining anxiety itself, particularly how it arises and declines. 
The latter were necessary in explaining the former. These authors described firstly, how 
anxiety is regulated in tandem by top-down and bottom-up, neurological processes, or more 
formally the dorsal and ventral neural systems. Balance of the two processes is called 
allostasis, which represents stable emotional regulation. Imbalance is called allostatic load. 
Figure 1.4 illustrates these relationships. Figure 1.4 is an original illustration for this thesis, 
drawing mostly on the theory as presented by Mah et al. (2016). The dorsal neural systems 
(blue and green segments of Figure 1.4) are initiated by cognitive (voluntary) appraisal by the 
PFC for prospective or salient threat. This top-down threat appraisal is followed by inhibition 
by the PFC (when required) of the autonomic system. The autonomic system is linked to the 
amygdala and HPA which comprises part of the limbic, sub-cortical regions. The ventral 
neural system (involuntary) processing of threat arousal is shown in the yellow and green 
segments at Figure 1.4. The green segment is the amygdala, which is central to the entire 
process, and is integral to both the expression of fear and to the learning of cues that predict 
threat. Conscious and voluntary distraction or suppression of emotion, and threat re-appraisal 
are supported by the dorsal systems. Automatic, unconscious, involuntary responses and 
autonomic reactions are mediated mostly by interactions between the amygdala and PFC. 
  
 30 
 
 
Figure 1.4. Dorsal/Ventral neural model of anxiety 
PFC = Prefrontal cortex; 
Other limbic sub-cortical regions are: hypothalamus, pituitary & adrenal glands (HPA); 
periadequeductal grey; insula; and ventral regions of: striatum, and the anterior cingulate cortex. 
 
Anxiety disorders are characterised by an impaired ability to achieve allostasis and by 
amplified sensitivity to threat (Mah et al., 2016). Allostatic load has been demonstrated to 
result from a hyperactive response by the amygdala (bottom-up) and a hypoactive response 
by the prefrontal cortex and hippocampus (top-down; Mah et al., 2016). The allostatic load 
has also been identified with the physiological breakdown of the neuroendocrine systems, 
which, in turn, have been implicated in cognitive ageing (Mah et al., 2016; Seeman, McEwen, 
Rowe, & Singer, 2001). 
Dorsal Neural System 
(Top-down Processing) 
Hippocampus PFC 
Ventral Neural 
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The hyperactive amygdala function is enhanced by chronic stress, which also impairs 
neurogenesis of the hippocampus and causes structural deterioration of the prefrontal cortex 
(Mah et al., 2016). The consequences of this structural breakdown include emotional 
deregulation and generalisation of fear across stimuli. This impaired discrimination has been 
associated also with hippocampal atrophy (Mah et al., 2016). Memory functions of the 
hippocampus also regulate emotion by contextual extinction during fear conditioning while 
the amygdala responds more directly to threat. Without extinction of fear conditioning, the 
bottom-up process prevails to habituate the threat response. This reduced extinction control 
by the compromised hippocampus leads to reinstatement of previously conditioned fear, and 
is likely to be an element within the mechanism for the development of anxiety disorders 
(Ansell, Rando, Tuit, Guarnaccia, & Sinha, 2012; Kim et al., 2013; Liston, McEwen, & 
Casey, 2009; Mah et al., 2016). 
Acute stress increases cortisol levels (influenced by the HPA), leading to autonomic 
reactions which, among other things, focus attention on the perceived threat. Effects of 
cortisol can be counterbalanced by dehydroepiandrosterone and dehydroepiandrosterone 
sulphate (collectively referred to here as DHEAS; Boudarene et al., 2002; Hartaigh et al., 
2012; Kamin & Kertes, 2017; van Niekerk, Huppert, & Herbert, 2001). These same studies 
together describe the complimentary roles of cortisol and DHEAS. Cortisol and DHEAS are 
both adrenal steroids, which have been implicated as antagonistic products of the HPA during 
responses of anxious individuals to stressful circumstances. DHEAS were shown to provide a 
calming effect offsetting the impact of cortisol. Individuals with higher anxiety scores, when 
placed in the same stressful circumstances as those with lower scores, demonstrated higher 
plasma cortisol levels. Individuals with lower trait anxiety scores exhibited higher DHEAS 
blood content. When cortisol levels are not balanced by DHEAS, chronic HPA activation 
predicts hippocampal atrophy, decreased brain derived neurotropic factor (BDNF), and 
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decreased hippocampal neurogenesis (referred to as the "neurotoxicity hypothesis" and 
formerly termed the "glucocorticoid cascade hypothesis"; Lupien, McEwen, Gunnar, & Heim, 
2009). These deficits have been associated with anxiety disorders (Mah et al., 2016; Mantella 
et al., 2008). 
1.4.3 Diathesis-Anxiety Heuristic of Cognitive Ageing 
The Diathesis-Anxiety Heuristic of Cognitive Ageing (Figure 1.5) is an original model 
and illustration for this thesis. It represents an overview of mechanisms (from within the 
central neuropsychological theory) explaining predictive associations between anxiety and 
cognitive ageing. The model provides an overview of endogenous effects and natural 
environmental stressors. In this heuristic, vulnerability to anxiety is predicated upon both 
genetics and environmental stressors (Gross & Hen, 2004). Mechanisms linking anxiety to 
cognitive ageing, include: (1) Allostatic load (imbalance of dorsal and ventral neural 
mechanisms [details at Figure 1.4]); (2) Imbalance of cortisol and DHEAS; atrophy of the 
prefrontal cortex (PFC), hypothalamus, pituitary & adrenal glands (HPA) axis, and 
hippocampus (plus decreased BDNF, and decreased hippocampal neurogenesis); and, (3) 
Physiological breakdown of the neuroendocrine systems (Mah et al., 2016; van Niekerk et al., 
2001). Collectively, these are the theoretical, intermediate mechanisms describing a causal 
flow from anxiety to cognitive ageing, and are linked by the blue arrows in Figure 1.5. There 
are also links back the other way, the amber arrows, representing a hypothetical causal flow 
in the direction from cognitive ageing to anxiety, and including some of the intermediate 
mechanisms. 
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Figure 1.5. Diathesis-Anxiety Heuristic of Cognitive Ageing. 
Blue arrows represent implicated causal links between anxiety and cognitive ageing via 
neurobiological mechanisms. Amber arrows represent reciprocal links back to anxiety; Allostatic load 
= imbalance between top-down and bottom-up processing of anxiety, as overviewed in Figure 1.4; 
DHEAS = dehydroepiandrosterone sulphate; PFC = prefrontal cortex; HPA = Hypothalamus, pituitary 
& adrenal glands; cognitive ageing = Cognitive decline plus cognitive impairment; Functions 
represented by the box headed, “Atrophy”, include also, decreased brain-derived neurotropic factor, 
and decreased hippocampal neurogenesis.  
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The specific, reciprocal effect that cognitive ageing predicts anxiety (outer amber arrow 
on the right hand side of Figure 1.5), was one of the main findings of Petkus et al. (2017), in 
their study of “Temporal dynamics of cognitive performance and anxiety across older 
adulthood”.  This reciprocal effect may not be the result of neurological functions but simply 
a conscious fear arising from the recognition of failing, cognitive ability. And, there may then 
be consequential behavioural responses not presented within the heuristic. For example, self-
medication to modify anxiety could take the form of excessive alcohol consumption, or 
reliance on other drugs to alter affect. Responses could also take the forms of denial, or 
avoidance of anxiety inducing experiences such as challenging social situations. Such 
cognitive-behavioural implications of the reciprocal effect represented by the right-most 
upward arrow of Figure 1.5 are many and potentially complex and their delineation is, 
therefore, not attempted within the heuristic. On the other hand, these same implications do 
need to be carefully considered when designing the statistical research into associations 
between predictors and outcomes, as they are in later chapters of this thesis. 
The excess of cortisol over DHEAs (Figure 1.5, box labelled “Imbalanced 
cortisol/DHEAS”) was associated not only with atrophy and decreased neurogenesis of the 
hippocampus, plus imbalance of the hippocampus/amygdala connection, but also increasing 
anxiety (Mah et al., 2016). The dominance of the amygdala in its partnership with the 
hippocampus was associated with increased anxiety (Mah et al., 2016; Phelps & LeDoux, 
2005). Finally, atrophy of the PFC, HPA, and hippocampus, were implicated as influencing 
anxiety (Mah, Binns, & Steffens, 2015; Mah et al., 2016).  
Researchers have generally not interpreted these bidirectional arrangements (blue and 
amber arrows combined) as feedback loops, using this term. Just two “feedback loops” have 
been mentioned in the literature in context of the psychology or neurology of anxiety. Firstly, 
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anxiety causes increased threat attention leading to increased perception of threat (termed, 
interpretation bias) which in turn increases the symptoms of anxiety (Grupe & Nitschke, 
2013). This loop can escalate (an outcome of positive feedback) to catastrophic interpretations 
(M. W. Eysenck, 1997). Secondly, (as described at Section 1.2.1.2), Mah et al. (2016) noted 
the HPA axis and cortisol regulation provide negative feedback mechanism to inhibit the 
stress response. The first feedback loop illustrates growth in anxiety by interpretation bias but 
not through neurological mechanisms and does not form a part of Figure 1.5. The second 
feedback loop is neurological, resulting in inhibition of stress and, therefore, possibly 
reduction of anxiety. Such a mechanism would fit into the link from “Imbalanced 
Cortisol/DHEAS” to Anxiety (in Figure 1.5), and would provide a negative feedback 
component, helping to bring anxiety to rest. Beyond this second neurological feedback loop, 
the term appears not to have been used in a systematic way to characterise the return links 
between anxiety and cognitive ageing. 
The term, feedback loop, has an important meaning. Engineered systems use feedback 
loops extensively, in the control of complex systems (Zeigler & Praehofer, 2000), and 
controlled feedback loops are common in biology (to achieve homeostasis). A positive 
feedback loop refers to a mechanism, which increases the intensity of the process. A negative 
feedback loop decreases the intensity (Zeigler & Praehofer, 2000). And in biology, a 
homeostatic feedback mechanism maintains an appropriate balance, such as for constant 
temperature of the body. The Dorsal/Ventral neural system for anxiety regulation may be 
such an example of a controlled feedback loop that maintains balance when in a normal or 
healthy state. By this logic, enduring anxiety might be described as a consequence of a 
sustained positive feedback loop. 
The possibility has not been suggested in the literature that any of the feedback loops in 
Figure 1.5 might be responsible for stabilising or destabilising the overall effect on anxiety or 
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cognitive ageing. Further research is required to establish whether unstable feedback loops, as 
potential secondary effects of allostatic load, amplify the decline in cognitive function, and, if 
so, by what neuropsychological mechanisms. If clinical anxiety is the product of 
dysfunctional feedback control, then such biological mechanisms may be revealed in due 
course.  
There is a further limitation of the heuristic in Figure 1.5. It is important to underline this 
is a hypothetical model. It suggests causal links based on theory which itself is drawn from a 
combination of human, observational, and some neurological studies, as well as animal 
studies.  
1.4.4 Influence of Anxiolytics  
Having deliberated upon the heuristic at Figure 1.5, anxiolytics are relevant to consider 
now as a potentially confounding influence on the associations between anxiety and cognitive 
ageing. Three main classes of anxiolytics are: benzodiazepines for rapid therapy, selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRI) for slow therapy involving plastic changes in the brain; 
and two specific serotonin–norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors (SNRI), venlafaxine, and 
buspirone (Gross & Hen, 2004). Benzodiazepines have been associated longitudinally with 
dementia, and the association is stronger with greater exposure to these drugs (Billioti de 
Gage et al., 2012; Billioti de Gage et al., 2014). However, because benzodiazepines are 
prescribed for both depression and anxiety (each associated with cognitive ageing), the 
independent causal effects of benzodiazepines remain speculative (Billioti de Gage et al., 
2014). The SSRI appear not to present such risk. SNRI may also be relatively risk free but 
cognitive effects are not well reported (Rosenblat, Kakar, & McIntyre, 2016). Consumption 
of benzodiazepines, whether prescribed for depression or anxiety, threatens to confound 
apparent associations between anxiety and cognitive ageing. Therefore, where possible, 
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statistical analyses for predictors of cognitive ageing should be adjusted for benzodiazepine 
consumption.  
1.5 Summary 
The main conclusions above have been: 
A. The constructs for anxiety, fear, stress, and depression, are not well defined 
and there are overlapping definitions between anxiety and each of the other 
three constructs. 
B. Categories and dimensions, identified for the construct of anxiety, appear to be 
inadequate for contemporary research into the associations and mechanisms 
relating anxiety to cognitive performance. 
C. The prevalence of anxiety has not been well measured. This may be a result of 
the diversity of measurement and diagnostic methodologies, and construct 
definitions for anxiety. 
D. Neurologically, anxiety can be understood as a short- or long-term imbalance 
(allostatic load) of top-down (dorsal) and bottom-up (ventral) neural systems. 
See Figure 1.4. Anxiety disorders are characterised by an impaired ability to 
achieve balance between top-down and bottom-up systems (allostasis) and by 
amplified sensitivity to threat (Mah et al., 2016). 
E. The Diathesis-Anxiety Heuristic of Cognitive Ageing at Figure 1.5 is based on 
genetic and environmental conditions as well as neuropsychological 
mechanisms for anxiety and its influence on cognitive performance. The 
heuristic represents a hypothetical causal model that includes feedback loops. 
Additional to these observations, it was also noted investigation of longitudinal 
associations between anxiety and cognitive ageing, would need to: 
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a) Be confined, parsimoniously, to the direct association without reference to 
constructs or calculations of normal rates of cognitive decline, or normal 
incidence of cognitive impairment. 
b) Observe the possibility of temporal confounding by prodromal cognitive 
impairment preceding chronic, clinical anxiety. 
c) Control for other confounding variables, notably sex, age, education, 
depression, and consumption of benzodiazepines. 
The primary research questions derived above were:  
(1) Is anxiety a risk factor for the rate of age-associated, cognitive decline?  
(2) Is anxiety a risk factor for age-associated, incident, cognitive impairment?  
To be specific about the possible associations, these prognostic outcomes, cognitive 
decline and cognitive impairment, should be categorised respectively, into cognitive 
domains and impairment types.  
1.6 Conclusion 
Associations between anxiety and cognitive decline are problematic to investigate for a 
variety of reasons explored above, but notably: ambiguities in the construct and 
operationalisation of anxiety and anxiety measurement; and complex temporal relationships 
between anxiety and cognitive ageing. These observations, and others about 
neuropsychological mechanisms, will shape interpretation and evaluation of the literature 
(Chapter Two) and provide foundation for forming a methods strategy (Chapter Three) for 
statistical analysis of new data available for this PhD study.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis  
 
Abstract 
Background: The research concepts and theoretical basis for this dissertation were discussed 
in Chapter One. The present Chapter evaluates the published evidence regarding associations 
between anxiety and cognitive ageing.  
Methods: Thirty-seven articles, published between January 2002 and July 2017, were 
accepted into a systematic review. Of the 37 articles, seven, providing ten relevant studies, 
were suitable for meta-analysis of associations between anxiety and cognitive impairment. 
These studies comprised five for association between anxiety and progression from 
cognitively healthy to MCI, and five for association between anxiety and progression from 
cognitively healthy to dementia. Studies examining association of anxiety with rates of 
cognitive decline, were not suitable for meta-analysis because of excessive heterogeneity of 
methodologies and results. Results from this meta-analysis were compared with results from 
the most recent, published meta-analysis (with census date of January 2015), relating to 
similar associations. 
Results: From the selected studies for an updated meta-analysis, the adjusted association 
between anxiety and progression from cognitively healthy to MCI, was relative risk (RR): 
1.07 (95% confidence interval [CI]: 0.90–1.26), and for association with progression from 
cognitively healthy to dementia, was RR: 1.81 (95% CI: 1.22–2.70). These results were 
inconsistent with those of the most recently published meta-analysis, due to different methods 
and some differences in the studies examined. 
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Conclusions: The present meta-analysis results, adjusted for key confounds, were not 
significant for association of anxiety with incident MCI. Anxiety appears to add about 81% to 
the risk of progression from cognitively healthy to dementia, although this is open to 
interpretation about levels and duration of anxiety. The wider literature review, including 
analysis of the recently published meta-analysis, identified critical limitations of the research 
to date.  
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2.1 Introduction 
The title of this dissertation nominates the research goal which is to discover whether 
anxiety is a risk factor for cognitive ageing. Chapter One expatiated upon implications of this 
goal, to derive two, primary, research questions (Section 1.1.3), which were:  
(1) Is anxiety a risk factor for the rate of age-associated, cognitive decline?  
(2) Is anxiety a risk factor for age-associated, incident, cognitive impairment?  
In the literature review to follow, and meta-analysis, published evidence for these two 
research questions will be investigated and evaluated. In the process, conclusions will be 
formed about how well the literature supports examination of associations between anxiety 
and the important cognitive categories within cognitive decline and cognitive impairment, 
discussed in Chapter One (Section 1.3). In summary, the relevant categories for cognitive 
decline were cognitive domains such as memory and attention; and for cognitive impairment 
were amnestic and non-amnestic MCI, plus Alzheimer’s disease, and other dementias. 
The following structure is firstly to consider a general review of evidence provided by 
relevant articles published between 2002 and July 2017; and secondly to provide a meta-
analysis of selected studies in this same time frame. This updated, meta-analysis will be 
compared with the most recent published meta-analysis (Gulpers et al., 2016) for which the 
census date was January 2015. 
2.2 Methods 
This Section is divided into two parts: methods for a general systematic review of the 
literature, and then methods for a meta-analysis of a subset of studies from the general 
review. This arrangement allows the general review to consider important studies even 
though they do not meet criteria for meta-analysis.  
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2.2.1 General Systematic Review 
Longitudinal studies examining associations between anxiety and cognitive decline, 
MCI, or dementia, were identified through a search of PsycINFO and PubMed for peer-
reviewed, human studies, English language articles, published between January 2002 and July 
2017. Search terms were: anxiety AND (longitudinal OR predict OR prospective OR “risk 
factor”) AND (“cognitive aging” OR “cognitive decline” OR “neurocognitive disorder” OR 
“cognitive impairment” OR dementia OR Alzheimer’s). The results are summarised at Figure 
2.1. Of 568 studies identified from this search, 37 were retained after excluding duplications, 
cross-sectional and animal studies, and investigations of carer and other irrelevant participant 
groups.  
Data were extracted from these studies for: recruitment source; sample size; sample age-
range, mean and standard deviation of ages; characteristics of specialised samples such as 
depressed participants; whether the measured anxiety was identified as state (or chronic) 
anxiety; whether anxiety was assessed by symptom count or diagnosis; baseline cognitive 
status; prognostic outcomes relevant to the present study (detailed below); whether 
association was confirmed or disconfirmed against each prognostic outcome; limitations 
against a key list (details below); and any unusual features of the study design. 
The prognostic outcomes were: MCI (and whether amnestic or non-amnestic, or not 
specified), dementia (and whether Alzheimer’s disease or other type, or not specified); and 
cognitive decline by domain. The specific cognitive domains measured, were extracted, and 
whether the results were significant.  
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Figure 2.1 Study selection flow diagram. 
*Note: Two articles each provided meta-analysis studies for both MCI and dementia. One other article 
for MCI (only) provided two (MCI) studies. In total, 7 articles provided 10 studies. This is better 
understood by inspecting Tables 2.5 and 2.6.  
PsychInfo 
121 
PubMed 
447 
Additional 
References 
From articles: 11 
Full text articles assessed for 
eligibility: 87 
Articles eligible for review/ 
meta-analysis: 37 
Excluded articles 
 Duplicates: 85 
Other patient group or study 
focus: 407 
Excluded articles 
Other patient group, or study focus: 50 
Total found & screened on 
title and abstract: 568 
Studies suitable 
for meta-
analysis of 
Dementia: 5* 
 
(Drawn from 5 
Articles) 
Studies suitable 
for meta-
analysis  
of MCI: 5* 
 
(Drawn from 4 
Articles) 
Articles included in literature review 
but excluded from meta-analysis: 30 
 
Cognitive decline only^: 11; 
Overlapping population: 0; 
Cognitive impairment at baseline: 8; 
Results unadjusted: 7 
Results reported in forms unsuitable 
for meta-analysis: 4 
 
(Balance of Articles included in the 
meta-analysis: 7 [providing 10 
studies]) 
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^Articles or studies based on cognitive decline were excluded because the heterogeneity of methods 
was not able to be accommodated in a meta-analysis. 
 
 
The key limitations identified for each article, were:  
A. Whether the statistical analysis was adjusted for at least the main confounds of sex, 
age, education, and depression;  
B. Whether the sample was specialised (such as a clinical group of people all with 
apolipoprotein E [APOE] e4 genes) or clearly biased in any way such as including 
only one gender;  
C. Whether only a proxy for anxiety was obtained (such as worry);  
D. Whether associations were adjusted for consumption of benzodiazepines;  
E. Whether or not the method for collecting data on anxiety either identified state 
anxiety directly or by inference from data collected over time; and  
F. Whether there were temporal confounds such that the precedence of anxiety before 
cognitive ageing would be seriously compromised. An important example is that 
many studies investigated if anxiety was associated with progression from MCI to 
dementia. For individuals in such a sample, baseline memory difficulties (or 
challenges with activities of daily living) would have been likely to cause anxiety. 
Thus, anxiety could no longer be assumed to precede cognitive decline, and the 
temporal prerequisite for anxiety to predict cognitive performance, would be 
confounded.   
2.2.2 Meta-Analysis 
2.2.2.1 Background.  
The only recent meta-analyses offering results applicable to the scope of the present 
study, was Gulpers et al. (2016). In the updated meta-analysis here, there will be points of 
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comparison with Gulpers et al. The first such comparison point is about methods. One of the 
analyses by Gulpers et al. considered anxiety as a predictor of progression from MCI to 
dementia. As noted in the previous paragraph at point F, progression studies with MCI at 
baseline, overlook critical, temporal, confounding effects. Therefore, such associations are of 
no greater value that cross-sectional correlations. So, this category of the meta-analyses will 
not be pursued, here. The principal remaining analyses by Gulpers et al. were for progressions 
from cognitively healthy to MCI and cognitively healthy to dementia. Each provided useful 
information for comparison the present review. The general systematic review described 
above (Section 2.2.1) considered categories of MCI and dementia as more specific prognostic 
outcome variables. However, the updated meta-analysis here, will consider only the broader 
outcome categories of MCI and dementia because the small number of studies accepted into 
the meta-analysis does not permit such categorisation into even smaller sub-analyses. 
Similarly, the small number of studies accepted by Gulpers et al. did not permit this further 
categorisation of meta-analysis.  
Meta-analysis of association between anxiety and cognitive decline, for individual 
domains (such as attention or memory), were not possible for the data available. Gulpers et al. 
(2016) were unable to pool results within such categories of cognition, for any suitable 
combination of studies. For the updated meta-analyses reported below, the same conclusion 
applies. The heterogeneity of results and methods has not facilitated meta-analysis for 
cognitive decline.  
Since the census date (January 2015) for the meta-analysis by Gulpers et al. (2016), 
relevant new studies have been published. These contribute to the meta-analyses to follow. 
2.2.2.2 Study selection. 
Of the 37 articles rated as suitable for the literature review, 30 were excluded from meta-
analysis for one or more of the following reasons:  
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1) Results were only for cognitive decline (which has been excluded from this meta-
analysis because the heterogeneity of methods was not able to be accommodated);  
2) The baseline sample included participants with cognitive impairment;  
3) The results were unadjusted for key confounds (particularly depression); or  
4) Results were presented in the article in a form that was unsuitable for inclusion in 
the meta-analysis (e.g., important parameters were missing) and suitable 
information could not be obtained directly from the authors.  
Among these exclusions were studies presenting results in the form of hazard ratios (HR) 
rather than odds ratios (OR) or relative risk (RR). Meta-analysis requires conversion of ratios 
to one type. Here, the type chosen was RR, while noting conversion from OR to RR is 
straight forward. However, conversion of HR to RR is not valid. Firstly, Stare and Maucort-
Boulch (2016) explained many studies have used RR and HR interchangeably, but there 
appears to be no derivation to support this assumption of equivalence.  
Explanation of differences between RR and HR are available from Kaewkungwal (2018) 
and Stare and Maucort-Boulch (2016). Put simply, RR is a function of the cumulative events 
over the observation period, while HR is a function of the rate of such events within the 
observation period. HR could be understood also as the slope of the survival curve. Stare and 
Maucort demonstrated approximate equivalence (between RR and HR) would apply only in 
the special, combined conditions of: identical time frames; small hazard ratios; and, small 
probabilities. Further, given that time is treated differently for each of RR and HR, inclusion 
of time-varying predictors and outcome variables in regression models, would seem, in my 
opinion, to add confusion to any proposition of equivalence.  
If RR and HR are not equivalent, the next logical question is whether one can be 
transformed to the other. However, I searched the literature and found no published derivation 
of a transformation between RR and HR. The lead author of Stare and Maucort-Boulch 
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(2016), advised me that it was unlikely an equation would be available for conversion from 
HR to RR (Janez Stare, personal communication, May 29, 2019). The Australian National 
University Statistical Consulting Unit expressed the same view (Marijke Welvaert, personal 
communication, May 30, 2019).  
Thus, there is no suitable transformation available, and I have chosen not to introduce an 
unknown degree of error by simply declaring equivalence, without theoretical foundation. 
2.2.2.3 Data extraction. 
In addition to data extracted for the wider literature review described above, data 
extracted for the meta-analysis was: The odds ratios, relative risks, p values, the covariates, 
baseline cognitive status, inclusion and exclusion criteria, impairment definition or cognitive 
scale, anxiety scale or diagnosis criteria, follow-up criteria and metrics, loss to follow-up 
description and analysis, and conclusion of the study. 
2.2.2.4 Assessment of methodological quality. 
The method for assessing quality of the studies was adapted from methods recommended 
by Altman (2001) and Hayden, Côté, and Bombardier (2006), and partially modelled on these 
methods as deployed by Gulpers et al. (2016). The resulting summary framework for quality 
assessment is described at Table 2.1. This framework included additional criteria for the key 
limitations identified above (Section 2.2.1). Each of the 25 items at Table 2.1 was rated 
between zero and one and aggregated for each study then converted to a mean with value 
lying between zero and one. 
 
Table 2.1 
Framework for Quality Assessment 
Category Item # Item 
Study sample 1 Selection explained 
 2 Inclusion & exclusion criteria described 
 3 Sample size 
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Category Item # Item 
 4 Diagnostic criteria described 
 5 Relevant characteristics described 
 6 Representative of the general population 
Length of study 7 Study length suitable, relative to temporal confounding from 
prodromal effects 
Follow-up 8 Follow-up at regular intervals 
 9 Number of follow-ups 
 10 Follow-ups included re-measurement anxiety 
 11 Reasons for loss to follow-up 
 12 Analysis of loss to follow-up, examining differences in 
characteristics 
Outcome 13 Defined 
 14 Objective unbiased 
 15 Measured for all participants, or a high proportion 
Prognostic outcome 16 Defined 
 17 Measured precisely 
 18 Valid method 
 19 Measured for all participants, or a high proportion 
 20 All results described 
Predictor variables 21 Defined 
 22 Appropriate category for the study (e.g., “trait anxiety”) 
Analysis 23 Appropriate analysis method 
 24 Adjusted for key confounds 
 25 Temporal issues explained and analysed appropriately 
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2.2.2.5 Statistical analysis. 
The software for this meta-analysis was Stata, version 15.0 (StataCorp, College Station, 
Texas USA), using the metan command for meta-analysis with random effects (Borenstein, 
Hedges, & Rothstein, 2009; DerSimonian & Laird, 1986). This software was used to calculate 
pooled RR with 95% CI. Reported OR were converted to RR. Only fully adjusted  results 
were included in the analysis, except where noted in the tables. 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 General Systematic Review  
Table 2.2 summarises the 37 studies in this review and reports key limitations which 
many of these studies had in common. Aggregates of the numbers of studies with limitations 
in each of the limitation categories (A to F; See Section 2.2.1), are indicated in the final row 
of Table 2.2. These aggregates of limitations ranged from 14% (of all 37studies), for 
Limitation C — “not anxiety” (meaning a proxy was measured in place of anxiety), to 86% 
for Limitation E — “not trait anxiety” (meaning state anxiety was measured, rather than trait 
anxiety, or more typically the category of anxiety was not specified or described). Sample 
sizes ranged from 44 to 16,351. The total sample size for the 37 studies was 56,098. This 
figure was corrected for duplicated recruitment sources among the studies. The total is a 
notional figure only, because of the methodological diversity of these studies, and is not 
relevant to meta-analysis. The duration of studies ranged from 1 to 28 years. The minimum 
ages of participants were typically at least 60 years but the study with the lowest minimum 
age included participants from 41 years. Results for these 37 studies are indicated in Tables 
2.3 and 2.4, for cognitive decline and cognitive impairment, respectively. Of the 37 studies, 
27 (73.0%) reported (at least one result) that anxiety predicted either cognitive decline or 
cognitive impairment. 
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2.3.1.1 Anxiety and cognitive decline. 
Table 2.3 summarises 16 longitudinal studies which reported associations between 
anxiety (or a proxy such as worry) and cognitive decline. These are results within nominated 
cognitive domains. Study duration ranged from 1 to 28 years. Sample sizes ranged from 44 to 
16,351 participants. The total sample for all studies was 26,349 (corrected for sample 
duplications). Of the 16 studies, seven measured anxiety by means of diagnosis and therefore 
accounted for anxiety as a binary variable. Thirteen measured anxiety by symptom count and 
included sub-clinical levels. Four studies used both methods. The table summarises results 
across cognitive domains, allowing studies to be compared vertically in the table. Fifteen 
studies examined association with memory and learning, with association found in eight. 
Similarly, nine studies examined association with attention. Of these, two found an 
association. Further such aggregated results are at the bottom of the table. The domain for 
which the greatest number of studies examined association with anxiety, was memory and 
learning. The domain for which the highest proportion of significant results were obtained, at 
71%, was executive function, with five studies out of seven finding association. Most of the 
studies listed in Table 2.3 used a variety of analytical techniques. Among these, the common 
methods for testing longitudinal association were multilevel linear regression or logistic 
regression (e.g., S. J. Banks et al., 2014; Bierman et al., 2008; DeLuca et al., 2005; Petkus et 
al., 2016; Pietrzak et al., 2014; Pietrzak et al., 2012; Wilson, Begeny, Boyle, Schneider, & 
Bennett, 2011). Some studies (e.g., Bierman, Comijs, Jonker, Scheltens, & Beekman, 2009; 
de Bruijn et al., 2014; Sinoff & Werner, 2003) used linear regression where repeated 
measures of the outcome variable were not an issue (of independence of repeated 
measurements) by the simple expedient of using a single calculation of cognitive decline 
(between baseline and a single follow-up). Some used two or three groups or control group 
comparisons by defining groups with different levels of baseline anxiety (e.g., Brodaty et al., 
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2012; Kassem, Ganguli, Yaffe, Hanlon, Lopez, Wilson, & Cauley, 2017; Pietrzak et al., 2015; 
Pietrzak et al., 2012; Sinoff & Werner, 2003).  
Of the 16 studies, nine were notable because of their methods or findings. These were:  
• Three studies, Sinoff and Werner (2003), Bunce, Batterham, Mackinnon, and 
Christensen (2012), and Petkus et al. (2017), all analysed the associations using 
structural equation modelling (SEM), among other methods. Sinoff and Werner found 
that anxiety predicted cognitive decline (as measured by MMSE), and was partially 
mediated by depression, with a resultant, standardised (beta) path coefficient of 0.203 
(p < .05). Similarly, multiple linear regression demonstrated anxiety explained 20% of 
the variance in cognitive decline. The relative risk ratio for the presence of anxiety in 
relation to cognitive impairment was 3.96 (95% CI 1.69-9.08). Bunce et al. took SEM 
a step further to examine latent growth curves for effects of anxiety and depression, 
both over four time-points. No association was found for anxiety. Petkus et al. (2017) 
provided a comprehensive temporal analysis which is outlined at the last dot point 
below. 
• Brodaty et al. (2012), grouped their sample into categories of baseline levels of 
anxiety. These authors measured anxiety as a component of a neuropsychiatric 
inventory (NPI) and categorised the results into presence or absence of a score. 
Cognitive, outcome variables were also dichotomised, for each cognitive domain, into 
impaired or not impaired, according to whether the level of decline exceeded 1.5 SD. 
The results for anxiety-associated-decline in executive function were: OR 3.04 (1.3–
9.9). Results for decline in other cognitive domains were not significant. Results were 
adjusted for gender, age, and education but not for depression. The regressions for 
anxiety and depression as predictors were run in separate models. 
 52 
• Pietrzak et al. (2012) conducted mediation analysis on associations between worry (as 
proxy for anxiety) and cognitive decline by domain. They found working memory 
fully mediated the association between worry symptom levels and visual learning, and 
memory performance. They also found worry symptoms remained stable over the two 
years of the study and that worry was independently associated with reduced 
processing speed. The authors speculated worry symptoms might be more accurately 
related to cognitive decline, than would be the broader measures of anxiety. 
• Pietrzak et al. (2014) and Pietrzak et al. (2015), both used data from the Australian 
Imaging, Biomarkers and Lifestyle (AIBL) study, finding higher anxiety levels 
moderated the predictive association of beta-amyloid status with rates of decline in 
cognitive performance. The earlier study (2014) found moderation effects for episodic 
and verbal memory but executive function was associated with anxiety independently 
of beta-amyloid. In the second study (2015), the moderation effect was found for 
global cognition, verbal memory, language, and executive function.  
• Kassem, Ganguli, Yaffe, Hanlon, Lopez, Wilson, and Cauley (2017) categorised 
levels of baseline, state anxiety symptoms into three levels: none; mild; and moderate 
to severe. The sample was men only. Executive function was tested, using Trails B, at 
baseline and at a three-year follow-up. By comparison to the no-anxiety group, the 
odds of the mild anxiety group ending in the worst decile of change, were: OR 1.41 
(CI 1.03–1.93). Comparing the moderate to severe anxiety group with the no-anxiety 
group, the odds of ending in the worst decile of change were: OR 1.35 (0.81–2.27). 
The categories of anxiety level used by Kassem et al. were determined according to 
symptom levels measured by the Goldberg Anxiety Scale (GAS) which is a nine-item 
questionnaire, reporting symptoms within the preceding four weeks. The anxiety 
categories deployed on this scale were: none = 0 symptoms; mild = 1 to 4 symptoms; 
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and moderate/severe = 5 to 9 symptoms. Goldberg et al. (1988) designed the scale so 
that a score of 5 represented a 50% probability of a clinical level of GAD. The 
important point to note from this analysis by Kassem et al. is that there was a stronger 
association with cognitive decline by individuals with mild anxiety (sub-clinical) than 
with stronger levels of anxiety. Various interpretations are available. The authors 
noted these findings violate dose-response expectations, suggesting anxiety was not a 
cause of cognitive decline and may be only a symptom or marker of prodromal 
dementia. The findings were declared independent of psychotropic medication but 
other anxiety treatments were not mentioned. 
• Petkus et al. (2017) analysed their data using bivariate dual-change score models. This 
method provided structural equation modelling of the bidirectional influence of two 
variables (anxiety and cognitive performance) on each other as they each varied over 
time. Anxiety and cognitive performance of participants were measured up to eight 
times in the 26-year period of the study. The models were adjusted for gender, 
baseline depression, and baseline physical health. Results demonstrated anxiety 
predicted greater decline in cognitive processing speed and attention, and that decline 
in non-verbal memory, working memory, processing speed, attention, and visuospatial 
ability, each predicted an increase in anxiety during the following three years. These 
results served to provide a temporal analysis confirming a bidirectional, predictive 
association between anxiety and cognitive decline. 
2.3.1.2 Anxiety and cognitive impairment. 
Table 2.4 summarises 24 studies examining association between anxiety and progression 
to MCI or dementia. These studies included progression from cognitively healthy at baseline 
to MCI or dementia, and progression from MCI to dementia. Study duration ranged from 1 to 
28 years, and sample size ranged from 132 to 13,568. Of the 24 studies, eight measured 
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anxiety by diagnosis, and 20 by symptom count; four used both methods. Eight studies 
examined MCI as the prognostic outcome. MCI results were broken down into results for 
amnestic MCI, non-amnestic MCI, and unspecified type of MCI. The unspecified category 
had the most results, six reporting an association and two indicating no association with prior 
anxiety. Twenty studies examined dementia as the prognostic outcome. For table 2.4, these 20 
dementia studies were broken down into Alzheimer’s disease, other than Alzheimer’s disease, 
and all dementia types (or unspecified). Of these 20, 14 (70%) found an association in at least 
one dementia type. Eight of the 20 studies considered progression from MCI to dementia 
rather than from cognitively normal. Seven (50%) of the dementia studies examining 
Alzheimer’s disease, found an association. One of two studies (50%) considering non-
Alzheimer’s disease dementia, found an association. Nine (82%) of studies looking at 
unspecified, or all dementia types, found an association. 
Despite a variety of methods, many studies shared common approaches. Thirteen studies 
(of the 24) used Cox Proportional Hazards regressions to calculate the risk of cognitive 
impairment based on earlier anxiety (e.g., de Bruijn et al., 2014; Geda et al., 2014; Mah et al., 
2015). The alternative, common method, deployed by 11 studies, was logistic regression 
based on MCI or dementia as a binary outcomes (e.g., Chan et al., 2011; Jessen et al., 2010; 
Ramakers et al., 2010). Control groups were used by two studies (Devier et al., 2009; Petkus 
et al., 2016), and case control was used by two (Burton et al., 2013; Zilkens, Bruce, Duke, 
Spilsbury, & Semmens, 2014). 
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Table 2.2. 
Summary of 37 Studies Accepted for Review. 
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Wetherell, 2002 Swedish Adoption 
Twin Study of Aging. 
9 704 (63.7, 
8.6) 
Cognitive 
performance by 
domain. 
X  X X   
Results not adjusted for depression or 
benzodiazepines. Neuroticism used as proxy 
for trait anxiety. 
Sinoff, 2003 HaGefen 
community-based 
geriatric assessment 
unit. Israel. 
3.1 100 ≥60 
(75.9, 
5.02) 
Cognitive 
performance by 
MMSE. 
 X  X X  
Baseline sample excluded depression. Anxiety 
measured by researcher’s own scale, no 
confirmation of trait anxiety Vs state. Anxiety 
measured at baseline only.  
DeLuca, 2005 Depressed patients 
recruited from the 
Mental Health 
Intervention 
Research Center for 
the Study of Late-
Life Mood  
Disorders. USA.  
4 79 ≥60 Cognitive 
performance by 
domain. 
X X     
Clinical sample, all with major depressive 
disorder and some with cognitive impairment 
at baseline. Therefore, adjustment for 
depression was not possible. Mixed linear 
effects model and comparison of two groups 
with and without anxiety (by diagnosis). 
Effect of benzodiazepines was not significant. 
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Palmer, 2007 Kungsholmen  
Project. Sweden. 
3.4 185 75–95 
(84.0, 
5.1) 
Dementia  
   X X X 
Progression study, MCI to dementia. Cases 
with and with MCI at baseline. Controls 
without. Anxiety + MCI doubled 3-year risk of 
Alzheimer’s disease with each anxiety 
symptom. No association unless MCI present. 
This was partly a study on progression from 
MCI to dementia. These results (for 
progression) were excluded from the meta-
analysis. Results for non-MCI participants 
were used for meta-analysis. 
Teng, 2007 UCLA Memory 
Disorders Clinic. 
USA. 
2 51 ≥50 Dementia  
 X  X X X 
Progression from MCI to dementia. Excluded 
from Meta-analysis. 
Bierman, 2008 Longitudinal Aging 
Study Amsterdam. 
9 2,351 ≥62 
(69.5, 
8.6) 
Cognitive 
performance by 
domain. 
    X  
Only association found was for immediate 
effects. But, this was equivalent to a multi-
level model without using lagged predictors. 
Anxiety measure was the Hospital Anxiety 
and Depression Scale. Does not identify 
trait/state anxiety. 
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Bierman, 2009 Patients with early 
stage Alzheimer’s 
disease, recruited 
from several general 
hospitals and 
mental 
health care 
institutes. 
Netherlands. 
1 44 (78.52, 
6.1) 
Cognitive 
performance by 
domain. 
 X   X X 
Small, clinical sample: all with early 
Alzheimer’s disease at baseline. Changes in 
medication may have influenced results 
which showed a small improvement in 
memory associated with anxiety. Anxiety was 
measured during cognitive decline thus 
confounding temporal effects. 
Cherbuin, 2009 PATH Through Life 
Study. 
Canberra, Australia. 
4 2,082 60–64 MCI  
   X X  
MCI outcome: no association. Small cell size 
for conversion to MCI.  
Devier, 2009 Memory Disorders 
Clinic, or the 
Center for Memory 
and Behavioral 
Disorders, Columbia 
University. 
USA. 
1-9 148 41–85 
(66.6, 
9.7) 
Alzheimer’s 
disease  
 X  X  X 
MCI patients. Progression to Alzheimer’s 
disease. Cox survival analysis. No association 
for state anxiety but trait anxiety was 
protective for Alzheimer’s disease. Unusual 
result. 
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Gallacher, 2009 Caerphilly 
Prospective Study. 
United Kingdom. 
17 755 48–67 MCI and 
Dementia 
 X  X   
Men only. Trait anxiety established. Baseline 
cognitive function was measured five years 
after baseline anxiety. Adjustment was for 
psychological distress (anxiety and 
depression) rather than for depression alone. 
Jessen, 2010 German Study of 
Aging. 
3 2,415 ≥75 MCI and 
Dementia  
  X X X X 
Worry about subjective memory, as proxy for 
anxiety. Worry about memory at baseline 
suggests worry follows prodromal dementia. 
Thus, temporal issues, and exclusion from 
meta-analysis. 
Ramakers, 2010 Maastricht Memory 
Clinic, Maastricht 
University hospital. 
Netherlands. 
10 263 (66.9, ) MCI, Alzheimer’s 
disease  
 X  X X X 
Progression from MCI to dementia. Not 
adjusted for depression. Anxiety found to be 
protective against dementia. Trait anxiety not 
identified. Survival analysis–not strictly 
longitudinal. 
Chan, 2011 Ethnic Chinese, 
randomly recruited. 
Hong Kong. 
2 321 ≥60 Alzheimer’s 
disease, Cognitive 
performance by 
domain. 
 X  X X X 
MCI at baseline. Measured progression to 
Alzheimer’s disease. Anxiety identified as 
component of neuropsychiatric symptoms.  
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Gallagher, 2011 “Memory clinic”. 
Location unstated, 
possibly in Ireland. 
2.25 161 52–88 
(73.7, 
7.1) 
Dementia  
X X  X  X 
Progression from MCI to dementia. 
Unadjusted for depression, but result was 
non-significant so adjustment would not have 
been meaningful. Temporal issue with 
duration of study < period of memory decline 
before dementia. 
Potvin, 2011 Study on Older 
Adults’ Health. 
Canada. 
1 1,942 65-96 MCI  
    X  
Adjusted for psychotropic drug use.  
Wilson, 2011 Memory and Aging 
Project, Rush 
University. 
USA. 
3.4 785 (80.7, 
7.4) 
Alzheimer’s 
disease, Cognitive 
performance by 
domain. X   X X X 
Not adjusted for depression. Anxiety 
identified as component of trait neuroticism 
scale. Cox proportional hazards for dementia 
outcomes and MLM for cognitive decline. 
Temporal issue with duration of study < 
period of memory decline before dementia. 
Recruited from retirement communities. 
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Brodaty, 2012 Sydney Memory and 
Ageing Study. 
2 630 70–90 MCI, dementia, 
Cognitive 
performance by 
domain. 
X   X X X 
Progression: Cognitively healthy to MCI and 
dementia, plus MCI to dementia. Results for 
baseline anxiety predicting dementia were 
unavailable due to small cell size. Sample 
included participants with and without 
cognitive impairment at baseline. Temporal 
issue with duration of study < period of 
memory decline before dementia.  
Description a little unclear but implies models 
were not adjusted for depression. 
Bunce, 2012 Canberra 
Longitudinal Study. 
12 836 70–97 
(76.55, 
4.94) 
Cognitive 
performance by 
domain. 
   X X  
 
Pietrzak, 2012 Recruited from 
greater Melbourne. 
2 263 50-86 
(61.6, 
7.0) 
Cognitive 
performance by 
domain. 
X X X X X  
Unadjusted for education, gender, or 
anxiolytics. Mild worry as a proxy for anxiety. 
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Wadsworth, 2012 Alzheimer’s disease 
Neuroimaging 
Initiative. 
USA. 
2.7 229 (76.0, ) MCI, Alzheimer’s 
disease. 
 X   X X 
Progression study to MCI and Alzheimer’s 
disease. Anxiety as a single question from a 
neuropsychiatric brief inventory. Participants 
included normal controls plus MCI and mild 
Alzheimer’s disease subjects. 
Burton, 2013 Consultations in 
Primary Care 
Archive. 
United Kingdom. 
2.7 400 ≥65 
(81.4, 
6.6) 
Dementia. 
   X X ? 
Cognitively healthy at baseline, progression 
to dementia. 400 cases; 1353 controls. 
Anxiety diagnosis reported in patients’ 
records. Anxiety associated with dementia.  
Okereke, 2013 Nurses’ Health 
Study. 
USA 
4.4 16,351 ≥70 
(74, ) 
Cognitive 
performance by 
domain. 
 X X X X  
Women only. Phobic anxiety assessed then 
10 years later a 4.4 year longitudinal study of 
cognition comparing associations with high 
and low anxiety levels. No sig. result. 
Rosenberg,2013 National 
Alzheimer’s 
Coordinating Center 
database, USA 
2.4 1,821 (75.3, 
9.3) 
Dementia 
X X  X X X 
Progression: MCI to dementia. Adjustment 
excludes depression 
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Somme, 2013 Recruited from the 
Memory Unit in 
Cruces Hospital. 
Spain. 
M=3.5 
±2.9 
132 (69.8, 
8.7) 
Dementia 
X X  X X X 
Progression: MCI to dementia. Anxiety as 
subscale of neuropsychiatric symptoms. 
Banks, 2014 Alzheimer’s disease 
Cooperative Study 
Prevention 
Instrument Project. 
USA 
4 417 75–93 
(79.52, 
3.62) 
MCI, dementia, 
Cognitive 
performance by 
domain. 
  X X X X 
Progression to MCI or dementia. 
Cognitively healthy at baseline. Separate 
home and clinic groups. Anxiety estimated 
from four questions in a broader survey 
adapted from other scales. 
Results not provided in form suitable for 
meta-analysis. Temporal issue with duration 
of study < period of memory decline before 
dementia. 
de Bruijn, 2014 Rotterdam Study. 
Netherlands 
11.8 2,317 (68.6, 
8.5) 
MCI, dementia, 
Cognitive 
performance by 
domain. 
   X X  
Fully adjusted  except for anxiolytics. Some 
specific results not published, e.g., cognitive 
decline for executive control. Adjusted for 
distress (including depression and anxiety). 
This is an additional confound. 
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Geda, 2014 Mayo Clinic Study of 
Aging. 
USA 
5 1,587 79.3 
(median) 
MCI 
   X X  
NPI therefore not specifically trait anxiety. 
Adjusted for depression 
Pietrzak, 2014 Australian Imaging, 
Biomarkers and 
Lifestyle. (AIBL) 
3 178 (71.5, 
7.4) 
Cognitive 
performance by 
domain.  X  X X X 
Baseline anxiety modified association of beta-
amyloid with decline in verbal and episodic 
memory. Also anxiety linked to decline in 
exec function. Detailed results unpublished or 
unsuitable for meta-analysis. 
Zilkins, 2014 Western Australian 
Data Linkage 
System, linked to 
state health-related 
data sets, and 
Hospital 
Morbidity Data 
Collection. 
10, 20 13,568 65–85 Dementia. 
   X X  
Case control. Anxiety present at least 10 
years before dementia diagnosis.  
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Mah, 2015 Alzheimer’s disease 
Neuroimaging 
Initiative. 
USA  
3 376 (75.0, 
7.26) 
Alzheimer’s 
disease 
X X  X X X 
Progression Study: MCI to Alzheimer’s 
disease 
Pankratz, 2015 Randomly selected, 
population-based 
sample of Olmsted 
County, MN. 
USA 
4.8 1499 70–89 MCI 
   X X  
Fully adjusted  except that medication were 
not specified. 
Pietrzak, 2015 Australian Imaging, 
Biomarkers and 
Lifestyle. (AIBL) 
4.5 333 60–89 
(70.0, 
6.8) 
Cognitive 
performance by 
domain. 
 X  X X X 
Pre-clinical Alzheimer’s disease at baseline. 
Anxiety modified association of Aβwith 
cognitive decline. 
Petkus, 2016 Swedish Adoption 
Twin Study of Aging. 
28 1082 ≥50 
(67.61, 
7.63) 
Dementia, 
Cognitive 
performance by 
domain. 
    X X 
State-trait questionnaire, but state anxiety 
component chosen without explanation. 
Adjusted for benzodiazepine; these were not 
associated with dementia but this finding had 
serious limitations. Baseline status not 
necessarily cognitively healthy. 
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Kassem, 2017 A Osteoporotic 
Fractures in  
Men Study. USA. 
3.4 2380 ≥65 
(76.1, 
5.3) 
Cognitive 
performance by 
domain. 
 X   X  
All men. Global cognition and executive 
function tested. Significant decline in 
executive function. Accounted for 
benzodiazepines. 
Kassem, 2017 B SOF data set. 
Community based 
listings. USA. 
Women 
5 1425 >65 
(82, 3.1) 
MCI, dementia, 
Cognitive 
performance by 
domain. 
 
    X  
All women. Anxiety predicted dementia but 
not MCI. Accounted for benzodiazepines. 
Petkus, 2017 Swedish 
Adoption/Twin 
Study of Aging. 
26 721 50–99 Cognitive 
performance by 
domain. 
   X X  
Bivariate, dual-change score (SEM) model for 
anxiety and cognitive performance. 
Comprehensive, temporal analysis. 
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Pietrzak, 2017 Imaging, Biomarkers 
and Lifestyle. 
Australia 
(AIBL) 
6 416 60-100 Cognitive 
performance by 
domain. 
 X  X X X 
Testing cognitive decline in preclinical 
Alzheimer’s disease. Association found 
between Aβ, cortisol and cognitive decline, 
were INDEPENDENT of anxiety. However, 
effects were also independent of APOE. It 
only means these biological links appear not 
to be involved with anxiety. [Or, perhaps that 
cortisol mediated effects of anxiety?] 
 
TOTAL 
PARTICIPANTS  
Duplications 
excluded from 
sample total 
 56,098   
8 20 5 29 32 7 
 
Notes.  
 
Key Limitations:  
A = unadjusted for depression and possibly other important 
confounds 
B = Specialised sample such as all one sex or all with MCI. 
C = Not Anxiety but a proxy such as neuroticism or worry. 
D = Benzodiazepines were not accounted for 
E = Not Trait Anxiety. But either state anxiety or an unknown 
mixture of the two. 
F = Temporal Issues: the temporal relationship between anxiety as 
predictor and cognitive ageing as outcome was distorted. For 
example, studies based on progression from MCI to dementia 
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introduced the prospect that baseline anxiety may have been 
caused by cognitive decline such as memory loss 
 
 
Disambiguation: Specific References for Tables 1.1 – 1.3 
Kassem 2017 A = Kassem, Ganguli, Yaffe, Hanlon, Lopez, Wilson, and Cauley (2017) [all male sample] 
Kassem 2017 B = Kassem, Ganguli, Yaffe, Hanlon, Lopez, Wilson, Ensrud, et al. (2017) [all female sample] 
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Results for Cognitive Decline over 16 Studies 
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Wetherell, 
2002 
  *  1 0 0 0 1 0  Visual memory, Working 
memory, Attention, Pro-
cessing speed, Visual 
reasoning, Intelligence, 
Executive function, 
Visuospatial, Verbal rea-
soning. 
Swedish Adop-
tion/Twin Study of 
Aging. 
9 704 (63.7, 8.6) 
Sinoff, 2003  *      1    Global Cognition (MMSE). HaGefen 
community based 
geriatric assess-
ment unit. Israel 
3.1 100 ≥60 
(75.9, 5.02) 
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DeLuca et al. 
(2005) 
 *   1 0  0    Memory, attention, Cog-
nition (MMSE); Dementia 
rating scale on five scales: 
conceptualisation, 
construction, 
initiation/perseveration. 
Depressed patients  
recruited from the 
Mental Health  
Intervention 
Research Center for 
the Study of Late-
Life Mood  
Disorders. 
USA. 
4 79 ≥60 
Bierman, 
2008  
 * *  0  0 1    Memory, Processing Speed, 
MMSE, Fluid Intelligence. 
Longitudinal Aging 
Study Amsterdam. 
9 2,351 ≥62 
(69.5, 8.6) 
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Bierman, 
2009 
 * *  -1     0  Episodic memory as Verbal 
Learning & Recall, Cognition 
(MMSE),. 
Patients with early 
stage Alzheimer’s 
disease, from 
several general 
hospitals and 
mental 
health care 
institutes. 
Netherlands. 
1 44 (78.52, 6.1) 
Wilson, 
2011 
  *  1  0 1  0  Working memory, Episodic 
memory, semantic memory, 
perceptual speed, 
visuospatial ability. 
Rush Memory and 
Aging Project, Rush 
University. 
USA 
3.4 785 (80.7, 7.4) 
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Brodaty, 
2012 
 * *  0 0 0 0 1 0  Memory, Attention, 
Processing speed, Global 
intelligence, Language, 
Executive function, 
Visuospatial 
Sydney Memory 
and Ageing Study. 
 
2 630 70–90 
Bunce, 2012   *  0   0  0  MMSE, memory, Processing 
speed, Executive function. 
Canberra 
Longitudinal Study. 
Australia 
12 836 70–97 
(76.55, 
4.94) 
Pietrzak, 
2012 
  *  0  1   0  Memory, Visual attention, 
Psychomotor speed. 
Recruited from 
greater Melbourne. 
Australia 
2 263 50–86 
(61.6, 7.0) 
Okereke, 
2013 
 *   0 0  0 0 0  General cognition, Memory, 
Verbal fluency, language, 
Executive function, 
Attention. 
Nurses’ Health 
Study. 
USA 
4.4 16,351 ≥70 
(74, ) 
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De Bruijn, 
2014 
 * *  0 0 0  0 0  Memory, Working memory, 
Attention, processing speed, 
Executive function, Verbal 
fluency. 
Rotterdam Study. 
Netherlands 
5.8 1115 
 
(75.5, 6.2) 
Pietrzak, 
2014 
  *  1 0   1   Memory, Attention, 
Language, Visuospatial, 
Executive function. 
Australian Imaging, 
Biomarkers and 
Lifestyle. 
Australia 
(AIBL) 
3 178 (71.5, 7.4) 
Pietrzak, 
2015 
  *  1 0  1 1 0  Verbal & Visual memory, 
Global cognition, Attention, 
Executive function, 
Language, Visuospatial 
ability. 
Australian Imaging, 
Biomarkers and 
Lifestyle. 
Australia (AIBL) 
4.5 333 60–89 
(70.0, 6.8) 
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Petkus, 2016   *  1 1 1   1  Nonverbal memory 
processing and perceptual 
speed, working memory, 
attention, visuospatial 
abilities. 
Swedish Adoption 
Twin Study of 
Aging. 
28 1082 ≥50 
(67.61, 
7.63) 
 
Kassem 
2017 A 
  *  0   0 1 0  Immediate and delayed 
memory, Global cognition 
with components for: 
orientation, concentration, 
language, praxis, &; 
Executive function. 
Osteoporotic 
Fractures in Men 
Study, USA 
3.4 2,380 ≥65 
(76.1, 5.3) 
Petkus, 2017   *  0 1 1   0  Working memory, nonverbal 
memory, Processing speed, 
attention, visuospatial ability 
Swedish 
Adoption/Twin 
Study of Aging. 
26 721 50–99 
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TOTALS   7 13  7A 
8NA 
2A 
7NA 
3A 
5NA 
4A 
6NA 
5A 
2NA 
1A 
11N
A 
  Total sample size 
excludes 
duplications 
 26,349  
Notes. 
Empty cell = association not reported. 
 0 = association examined but not found 
 1 = significant association found 
-1 = evidence found for a reverse association;  
         anxiety at baseline was related to subsequently 
         reduced frequency of MCI or dementia.  
 MCI = Mild Cognitive Impairment 
 M = Mean 
SD = Standard Deviation  
Under: “Anxiety determined by”, an * indicates whether the 
method was diagnosis or symptom count by questionnaire. 
Under: “Associations Found …”, ‘0’ indicates association was 
tested but not found significant; ‘1’ indicates association with 
cognitive decline was significant; ‘-1’ indicates a negative 
association (greater anxiety predicted less cognitive decline); a 
space indicates no association was tested. 
Totals: These are counts, except for the total sample size which 
aggregates all unique samples sizes (duplicates are excluded). 
Within the counts,  
A = association found 
NA = no association  
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Results for 24 Studies Reporting Association between Anxiety and Cognitive Impairment 
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Sample 
Size 
 
 
Participant 
ages 
(M, SD) 
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e 
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t 
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d
 
Palmer, 2007   *      0, 1^  
 
   Kungsholmen 
Project. Sweden 
 3.4  185  75-95 
(84.0, 5.1) 
Teng, 2007   *      0^    UCLA Memory 
Disorders Clinic. 
USA 
 2  51  ≥50 
Cherbuin, 2009   *    0      PATH Through Life 
Study. 
Australia 
 4  2,082  60-64 
Devier, 2009   *      -1^  
 
   Memory Disorders 
Clinic, or the 
Center for Memory 
and Behavioral, 
Columbia University. 
USA 
 1-9  148  41-85 
(66.6, 9.7) 
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Author, year 
(Chronological 
then 
alphabetical) 
 
 Anxiety  Cognitive Impairment  
Recruited from 
 
 
Study 
duration 
years 
 
 
Sample 
Size 
 
 
Participant 
ages 
(M, SD) 
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Gallacher, 2009   *    1    1  Caerphilly 
Prospective Study. 
United Kingdom 
 17  755  48-67 
Jessen, 2010   *      1 1 1  German Study of 
Aging. 
Germany 
 
 3  2,415  ≥75 
Ramakers, 2010    *      -1^, 0^ 
for 5 & 
10 
year 
follow-
ups 
   Maastricht Memory 
Clinic, Maastricht 
University hospital. 
Netherlands 
 10  263  (66.9, ) 
Chan, 2011   *        0^  Ethnic Chinese, 
randomly recruited. 
Hong Kong 
 2  321  ≥60 
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Author, year 
(Chronological 
then 
alphabetical) 
 
 Anxiety  Cognitive Impairment  
Recruited from 
 
 
Study 
duration 
years 
 
 
Sample 
Size 
 
 
Participant 
ages 
(M, SD) 
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Gallagher, 2011   *      0^    Recruited from “a 
memory clinic”. 
Location unstated, 
possibly in Ireland. 
 2.25  161  52-88 
(73.7, 7.1) 
Potvin, 2011 
 
 * *  0, 0 
Wo-
men, 
Men 
0, 1 
Wo-
men, 
Men 
0, 1 
Wo-
men, 
Men 
     Study on Older 
Adults’ Health. 
Canada 
 1  1,942  65-96 
Wilson, 2011   *      1    Rush Memory and 
Aging Project, Rush 
University. 
USA 
 3.4  785  (80.7, 7.4) 
Brodaty, 2012  * *  1# 0     0  Sydney Memory and 
Ageing Study.  
 2  630  70-90 
Wadsworth, 2012   *      0    Alzheimer’s disease 
Neuroimaging 
Initiative. USA 
 2.7  229  (76.0, ) 
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Author, year 
(Chronological 
then 
alphabetical) 
 
 Anxiety  Cognitive Impairment  
Recruited from 
 
 
Study 
duration 
years 
 
 
Sample 
Size 
 
 
Participant 
ages 
(M, SD) 
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Burton, 2013  *         1  Consultations in 
Primary Care 
Archive. 
United Kingdom 
 3  400  ≥65 
(81.4, 6.6) 
Rosenberg, 2013   *      1^  1^  National Alzheimer’s 
Coordinating Center 
database. 
USA 
 2.4  1,821  (75.3, 9.3) 
Somme, 2013   *        1  Memory Unit in 
Cruces Hospital. 
Spain 
 ≤10  132  (69.8, 8.7) 
Banks, 2014    *    1    1  Alzheimer’s disease 
Cooperative Study 
Prevention 
Instrument Project. 
USA 
 4  644  75-93 
(79.52, 
3.62) 
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Author, year 
(Chronological 
then 
alphabetical) 
 
 Anxiety  Cognitive Impairment  
Recruited from 
 
 
Study 
duration 
years 
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Size 
 
 
Participant 
ages 
(M, SD) 
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De Bruijn, 2014   * *      0    Rotterdam Study. 
Netherlands 
 11.8  2,708  (68.6, ) 
Geda, 2014  *     1      Mayo Clinic Study of 
Aging. 
USA 
 5 
(median) 
 1,587  79.3 
(median) 
Mah, 2015   *      1^    Alzheimer’s disease 
Neuroimaging 
Initiative. 
USA 
 3  376  (75.0, 7.26) 
Zilkens, 2014  *       0 0 1  Western Australian 
Data Linkage System, 
linked to state 
health-related data 
sets, and Hospital 
Morbidity Data 
Collection. 
Australia 
 10, 20  
 
13,568  65-84 
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Author, year 
(Chronological 
then 
alphabetical) 
 
 Anxiety  Cognitive Impairment  
Recruited from 
 
 
Study 
duration 
years 
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Size 
 
 
Participant 
ages 
(M, SD) 
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Pankratz, 2015   *    1      Randomly selected, 
population-based 
sample of Olmsted 
County, MN. USA 
 4.8  1,499  70-89 
Petkus, 2016   *         1  Swedish Adoption 
Twin Study of Aging. 
 28  1,082  ≥50 
(67.61, 
7.63) 
Kassem, 2017 B  * *    1    1  Recruited from 
community-based 
listings in USA. 
 5  1,425  >65 
(82, 3.1) 
TOTALS  8 20  1A 
2NA 
1A 
2NA 
6A 
2NA 
 7A 
7NA 
1A 
1NA 
9A 
2NA 
     34,980   
Notes. 
Empty cell = association not reported. 
 0 = association examined but not found 
 1 = significant association found 
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-1 = evidence found for a reverse association;  
         anxiety at baseline was related to subsequently 
         reduced frequency of MCI or dementia.  
 ^ = progression from MCI to dementia 
 # = amnestic multi-domain MCI 
MCI = Mild Cognitive Impairment 
 M = Mean 
SD = Standard Deviation  
Under: “Anxiety determined by”, an * indicates whether the 
method was diagnosis or symptom count by questionnaire. 
Under: “Associations Found …”, ‘0’ indicates association was 
tested but not found significant; ‘1’ indicates association with 
cognitive decline was significant; ‘-1’ indicates a negative 
association (greater anxiety predicted less cognitive decline); a 
space indicates no association was tested. 
Totals: These are counts, except for the total sample size which 
aggregates all unique samples sizes (duplicates are excluded). 
Within the counts,  
A = association found 
NA = no association  
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Four studies offered specific insights meriting further description:  
• Gallacher et al. (2009) identified trait anxiety and tested whether baseline symptom 
levels predicted MCI or dementia, 17 years later. They used a piecewise linear 
logistic regression, testing the association between anxiety score and cognitive 
impairment. The knot point was at the 30th centile of anxiety level, representing the 
point at which risk of conversion to either MCI or dementia began, and continued in 
roughly a linearly increasing size of effect. Thus there was implied a non-effect for 
low levels of trait anxiety and a dose-response relationship above the knot point. 
Among the limitations were that the models were not adjusted for depression and the 
authors considered the study under-powered. 
• Another study of interest is Potvin, Forget, Grenier, Préville, and Hudon (2011) 
which investigated gender differences, whether anxiety symptoms or disorders were 
associated differently, and whether there were different associations for amnestic and 
non-amnestic MCI. “Anxiety symptoms” included sub-clinical levels. They found 
significant anxiety disorders in men and anxiety symptoms for women were 
associated with MCI. They found also that the associations were stronger for men 
when linked to non-amnestic MCI, and stronger for women when linked amnestic 
MCI. 
• Burton et al. (2013) found anxiety was independently more strongly predictive of 
dementia than depression and that comorbid anxiety and depression was not more 
strongly predictive of dementia than anxiety alone. 
• Kassem, Ganguli, Yaffe, Hanlon, Lopez, Wilson, Ensrud, et al. (2017) found, in a 
sample of women only, that mild anxiety was predictive of dementia but for 
moderate to strong levels of anxiety the association was attenuated. This is similar to 
the findings of Kassem, Ganguli, Yaffe, Hanlon, Lopez, Wilson, and Cauley (2017) 
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as described above, that for men, the association of mild levels of anxiety with 
cognitive decline, were stronger than for moderate to severe anxiety. 
Although these illustrations of results offer useful information, the overall literature, as 
summarised in Tables 2.2 to 2.4, suggest the results for longitudinal associations of anxiety 
with cognitive ageing are diverse and conflicting.  
2.3.2 Meta-Analysis 
Meta-analysis now needs to be explored, to draw on all suitable data including those 
delivering non-significant results, and thus to investigate the prospect of some coherence 
between studies. Studies included in this meta-analysis were divided into two categories 
according to their prognostic outcomes, either MCI or dementia. As noted previously, meta-
analysis is not possible for the studies of association between anxiety and cognitive decline, 
because of the heterogeneity of methods and results.  
Five studies accepted into the meta-analysis for MCI as outcome, are listed at Table 2.5 
and five studies for dementia, at Table 2.6. Two articles (Gallacher et al., 2009; Kassem, 
Ganguli, Yaffe, Hanlon, Lopez, Wilson, Ensrud, et al., 2017) are represented in both tables 
because they contributed to both the MCI and dementia analyses. At Table 2.5, one article 
(Potvin et al., 2011) provided two studies, dividing the total sample into male and female. 
Overall, there was a total of seven articles for 10 meta-analysis studies. 
2.3.2.1 Anxiety and Mild Cognitive Impairment. 
Four papers provided five sets of results (Table 2.5) for pooled association between 
anxiety and MCI. Meta-analysis results were:  
RR = 1.07 (95% CI: 0.90–1.26), z = 0.77, p = 0.440, I2 = 70.8%, where I2 is a descriptive 
statistic, indicating the dispersion was due to real rather than spurious differences between 
studies (Borenstein et al., 2009). However, for association between anxiety and progression 
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from cognitively healthy to MCI, these pooled results were non-significant. The forest plot is 
displayed in Figure 2.2. 
2.3.2.2 Anxiety and Dementia. 
Five studies provided results (Table 2.6) for pooled association between anxiety and 
progression from cognitively healthy to dementia. Results were: RR = 1.81 (95% CI: 1.22–
2.70), z = 2.94, p = 0.003, I2 = 78.6%. Thus, for association between anxiety and progression 
from cognitively healthy to dementia, the pooled results indicate approximately an 81% 
increase in risk of progression, for individuals with anxiety compared to those who do not 
have anxiety. This result was significant. The forest plot for these dementia studies is at 
Figure 2.3. The 78.6% dispersion is due to real differences between studies, such as age 
differences in the samples or methodological differences in the measurement of anxiety or 
cognitive performance (Borenstein et al., 2009). These differences are demonstrated at Table 
2.7, by a diversity of sample and methods characteristics. Meta-regression was unavailable 
(for such a small sample of studies) to verify effects of important variables such as sex, age, 
education, depression, and major differences in methodology such as length of study.  
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Table 2.5 
Results for Adjusted Association between Anxiety and Progression from Cognitively Healthy to Mild Cognitive Impairment  
Author, 
Year Setting Recruited From 
Sample 
Size 
Participant 
ages 
(M, SD) 
Anxiety 
Scale or 
Diagnosis 
MCI 
Cognitive Scale 
or Diagnosis 
Results for 
Adjusted 
Associations 
(95% CI) 
Method-
ological 
Quality 
Meta-
analysis 
weight 
% 
 
Cherbuin, 
2009 
 
Community 
 
PATH Through 
Life Study. 
Australia 
 
2,082 
 
60–64 
 
Goldberg 
 
Diagnosis 
 
OR 0.98 (0.79–
1.21) ,  
p = 0.8 
 
0.80 
 
50.46 
Gallacher, 
2009 
Community Caerphilly 
Prospective 
Study. UK 
755 48-67 STAI 
(trait) 
Cambridge 
Cognitive 
Examination of 
the Elderly 
OR 2.98 (1.20–
7.38,  
p = 0.019 
0.80 3.56 
Potvin, 
2011 
Community Study on Older 
Adults’ Health. 
Canada 
1,942 65-96 Diagnosis MMSE<15 
percentile 
Female OR 0.42 
(0.06–3.18), 
p=0.40; 
Male OR 6.27 
(1.39–28.29),  
p = 0.02. 
0.74 1.32 
1.61 
Kassem 
(B), 2017 
Community Community based 
listings in USA 
1,425 >65 
(82, 3.1) 
Goldberg Diagnosis OR 1.07 (0.78–
1.47) ,  
p = 0.663 
 
0.92 43.05 
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Table 2.6 
Results for Adjusted Association between Anxiety and Progression from Cognitively Healthy to Dementia 
Author, 
Year Setting Recruited From 
Sample 
Size 
Participant 
ages 
(M, SD) 
Anxiety 
Scale or 
Diagnosis 
Dementia: 
Cognitive Scale or 
Diagnosis 
Results for 
Adjusted 
Associations 
(95% CI) 
Method
ological 
Quality 
Meta-
analysis 
weight 
% 
 
Gallacher
, 2009 
 
Community 
 
Caerphilly 
Prospective Study. 
UK 
 
755 
 
48-67 
 
STAI 
(trait) 
 
Diagnosis 
 
OR 5.04 (1.24–
20.45),  
p = 0.024 
 
0.80 
 
8.02 
Burton, 
2013 
Community Consultations in 
Primary Care 
Archive. UK 
400 ≥65 
(81.4, 6.6) 
Diagnosis Diagnosis OR 2.67 (2.01–
3.54),  
p = 0.001 
0.52 27.54 
de 
Bruijn, 
2014 
Community Rotterdam Study. 
Netherlands 
2,708 (68.6, ) HADS MMSE; Informant 
interview; plus 
neuropsychological 
testing. 
RR 0.99 (0.33–
2.97) 
0.75 9.26 
Zilkins, 
2014 
Community Western Australian 
Data Linkage 
System, linked to 
state health-related 
data sets, and 
Hospital Morbidity 
Data Collection. 
Australia 
13,568 65-84 Diagnosis Diagnosis OR 1.37 (1.14–
1.65),  
p = 0.001 
0.76 29.92 
Kassem 
(B), 2017 
Community Recruited from 
community-based 
listings in USA. 
1,425 >65 
(82, 3.1) 
Goldberg Diagnosis OR 1.56 (1.07–
2.26),  
p = 0.02 
 
0.92 25.26 
 87 
 
Figure 2.2. Forest plot for MCI studies at Table 2.5 
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Figure 2.3. Forest Plot for Dementia Studies at Table 2.6 
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Table 2.7 
Results for Adjusted Association between Anxiety and Progression from Cognitively Healthy 
to Dementia 
Author, 
Year 
Recruited From 
Study 
duration 
Years 
Sample Size 
Participant 
ages 
(M, SD) 
Anxiety 
Scale or 
Diagnosis 
Results 
RR 
 
Gallacher, 
2009 
 
Caerphilly Prospective 
Study. UK 
17 755 48-67 
STAI 
(trait) 
 
4.50 (1.23–
13.94) 
Burton, 
2013 
Consultations in Primary 
Care Archive. UK 2.7 
400 (men 
only) 
≥65 
(81.4, 6.6) 
Diagnosis 2.67 (2.01–3.53) 
de Bruijn, 
2014 
Rotterdam Study. 
Netherlands 
(Alzheimer’s disease 
only) 
11.8 2,708 (68.6, ) HADS 
0.99 (0.33–
2.97) 
Zilkins, 
2014 
Western Australian Data 
Linkage System, linked to 
state health-related data 
sets, and Hospital 
Morbidity Data Collection. 
Australia 
20s 13,568 65-84 Diagnosis 
1.37 (1.14–1.65) 
 
Kassem 
(B), 2017 
Recruited from 
community-based listings 
in USA. 
5 
1,425 (women 
only) 
>65 
(82, 3.1) 
Goldberg 1.54 (1.07–2.20) 
Notes: Bold items are distinctively different, compared to other studies in this table; “RR” is 
relative risk ratio; “STAI (trait)” is the trait scale of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (Spielberger & Gorsuch, 1983); “HADS” refers to the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983).  
 
2.3.3 Summary of Results 
From the general systematic literature review: 
i. A summary of studies accepted into the systematic review is provided at Table 1.1, 
with 37 articles, and an aggregate sample size of 56,098. Frequent limitations 
included: insufficient adjustment for confounding variables, and infrequent 
recognition of the importance of trait or chronic anxiety for determining associations 
with cognitive ageing.  
ii. Key results from individual articles, were:  
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a) Working memory mediated the relationship between worry (as proxy for 
anxiety) and cognitive decline (Pietrzak et al., 2015);  
b) Anxiety moderated the association between beta-amyloid status and cognitive 
decline (Pietrzak et al., 2014; Pietrzak et al., 2015); 
c) Lower levels of anxiety symptoms were found to have a stronger relationship 
with cognitive ageing than higher levels, in: Kassem, Ganguli, Yaffe, Hanlon, 
Lopez, Wilson, and Cauley (2017); and, Kassem, Ganguli, Yaffe, Hanlon, 
Lopez, Wilson, Ensrud, et al. (2017).  
d) Different associations between anxiety and MCI were found for various 
permutations of: anxious symptoms and anxiety disorders men and women, and 
amnestic and non-amnestic MCI (Potvin et al., 2011).   
Meta-analysis results were obtained from five studies for longitudinal association 
between anxiety and progression from cognitively healthy to MCI, and five studies of 
progression from cognitively healthy to dementia. Results, were: 
• For the association between anxiety and MCI, results were not significant at:  
RR = 1.07 (95% CI: 0.90–1.26), z = 0.77, p = 0.440, I2 = 70.8%; 
• For association between anxiety and dementia, results were significant at:  
RR = 1.81 (95% CI: 1.22–2.70), z = 2.94, p = 0.003, I2 = 78.6%.  
2.4 Discussion 
From the general systematic literature review, the 37 articles accepted and summarised in 
Table 2.2, suggested an opportunity for a strong review of the evidence. However, the table 
also highlighted frequent, key limitations in these studies. This, and other extracted 
information, demonstrated a strong heterogeneity of methods and outcomes which 
collectively prevented any conclusion about whether anxiety predicts cognitive decline. The 
review by Gulpers et al. (2016) came to a similar conclusion. 
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Some of the individual results extracted for the general literature review remain of 
interest and signal possible analytical approaches in later chapters of this thesis. For example, 
Kassem, Ganguli, Yaffe, Hanlon, Lopez, Wilson, and Cauley (2017) and, Kassem, Ganguli, 
Yaffe, Hanlon, Lopez, Wilson, Ensrud, et al. (2017) reported their results may reflect that 
anxiety is not causal of cognitive ageing but only a marker or symptom of prodromal 
dementia. This was because the results indicated stronger effects size for lower levels of 
anxiety in association with cognitive decline and cognitive impairment. As noted previously, 
these results contradict dose-response expectations for a causal relationship. An alternative 
interpretation (to a non-causal hypothesis) is the prospect that higher levels of anxiety may 
have been more likely to receive treatment or might otherwise have been of shorter duration. 
The study did not measure anxiety levels at follow-up. For the analyses by this PhD study, 
these possibilities can be more fully examined.  
Some of the other studies from the review, that will also inform the analyses, found: the 
association between beta-amyloid status and cognitive decline was moderated by anxiety; and 
different levels of association were found when anxiety was measured by diagnosis or by 
symptom count (Pietrzak et al., 2014; Pietrzak et al., 2015; Potvin et al., 2011). 
The meta-analyses were limited by the number of suitable studies available. Had there 
been a greater number of studies, meta-regression may have been possible with adjustments 
for variables based on: diagnosis versus symptom count for anxiety; mean and standard 
deviation of the age the sample; education levels; gender; benzodiazepine consumption 
(where provided); sample size, and length of study. However, for successful meta-regression, 
Borenstein et al. (2009) recommended a ratio of 10 or more studies for each covariate. Thus, 
a useful meta-regression to determine the influence of these alternative methods, is unlikely 
to emerge in the near future. 
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The need for a greater number of suitable studies for meta-analysis is also reflected in the 
high dispersion score (I2 = 78.6% for the dementia results), indicating there were substantive 
differences between the studies rather than just variation due to error (Borenstein et al., 
2009). If these differences could be identified through meta-regression of a larger sample of 
studies, there may be highly useful information to be obtained about the nature of 
associations between anxiety and cognitive ageing. However, within the small sample, the 
high dispersion accompanied by the important differences between studies featured at Table 
2.7, demonstrate this result may not be reliable. 
Comparing the results for the present meta-analysis with those of Gulpers et al. (2016), 
provides further indication of variability between studies. Gulpers et al. found anxiety was 
associated with MCI (RR = 1.77 [1.38-2.26], p <0.001, with zero dispersion) and with 
dementia (RR = 1.57 [1.02–2.47], p = 0.040, with I2 = 74.5% dispersion). After excluding 
studies without adjustment for depression, these results from Gulpers et al. changed, 
respectively, to RR = 1.92 (1.41–2.63), p =0.001, with zero dispersion, and RR = 1.68 (0.94–
3.02), p = 0.081 with high dispersion (over just three studies) at I2 = 87.5%. Therefore, when 
adjusted for depression, the association found by Gulpers et al. was stronger for MCI (but 
over just two studies) and attenuated for dementia. However, the updated meta-analysis (in 
this chapter) found the opposite i.e. significance for dementia but not MCI. Further, the 
dispersion was high in all results except for MCI from Gulpers et al., where it was zero (over 
two studies).  
Part of the explanation for this contrast in results is that each meta-analysis was based on 
a partially different sample of studies. Differences were: (1) additional studies included here 
that were published since the census date (January, 2015) of Gulpers et al. (2016); (2) earlier 
studies, excluded from the current analysis because of non-adjustment for depression; (3) 
exclusion from the present analysis of studies reporting results in the form of HR (as invalid 
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for meta-analysis), but inclusion of such (HR) studies in the Gulper meta-analysis; and (4) 
inclusion in the current meta-analysis, of papers (published before the census date of Gulpers 
et al.) that were apparently not considered, or were excluded, by Gulpers et al.. These 
additional papers (in category 4) were: Cherbuin et al. (2009) and Gallacher et al. (2009) 
included in the present meta-analysis for associations with MCI, and Gallacher et al. (2009) 
included in the present meta-analysis for associations with dementia. 
These results and qualifiers collectively place a degree of doubt on all of the meta-
analyses presented here. With such contrasting results, it appears there is not a sufficiently 
consistent or reliable result upon which conclusions can be drawn with confidence, about the 
associations between anxiety and cognitive ageing.  
Beyond the limitations specific to the meta-analyses, there have been generalised, 
systematic limitations observed throughout this review. These are most notably, that:  
• as mentioned, anxiety is loosely defined;  
• operationalisation of the measurement of anxiety has embraced widely contrasting 
methods including the fact that some studies (using self-report instruments) collected 
sub-clinical data while others (using diagnosis) did not;  
• anxiety was rarely measured throughout the study period (rather than as a baseline 
observation only); and 
• in 32 of 37 studies, there was no attempt to identify trait anxiety, or deploy 
alternative methods to establish that anxiety may have been chronic. 
One further limitation in the literature is the common practice of observing cognitive 
change over just two observations. I have not featured this, for example in Table 2.2 (along 
with other limitations), because this limitation is of lesser consequence than others 
mentioned, and this two-measurement method applies to the majority of studies. The two-
measurement method was criticised by Singer and Willett (2003), as confounding “true 
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change with measurement error”. Temporal trends in data are not well identified with just 
two measurements.  
Certain strengths of the present review are also evident. Chapter One presented a 
comprehensive overview of the relevant theory, especially regarding the neuropsychological 
mechanisms for anxiety and those linking anxiety to cognitive ageing. The review of the 
literature on evidence for the various associations also was comprehensive and provided an 
important update on the status of the research. Although the meta-analysis results are in 
doubt, this uncertainty justifies a new examination of methods and a fresh motivation for 
replication studies to provide sufficient data for more complete meta-analyses. Finally, 
having identified many of the weaknesses, redesign and future research can both be better 
informed by the oversights and limitations from the past. 
For the balance of this dissertation, some of the observations above will inform methods 
for analysis of data. The data (described at Chapter Four) is secondary, and therefore 
predetermined. Consequently, alternative measurement methods for anxiety, and alternative 
construct definitions, and different measures of cognition, are limited or unavailable. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of secondary data, the next chapter will outline a strategy for 
analysis. Beyond this, future research in this field is recommended to consider the following: 
1. Introduce randomised control trial (RCT), intervention studies to test effects of 
anxiety by treating the anxiety and observing consequential effects of the treatment 
upon both anxiety levels and cognitive change. Such trials will be described in the 
final chapter. 
2. For both observational and RCT studies:  
a. Measure anxiety not just at baseline, but throughout the study, so that the effects 
of anxiety over time can be examined for effect on cognitive performance; and 
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b. Measure anxiety by a variety of methods for each individual in the sample, so 
that associations can be compared, between measurement methods. These 
methods need to include diagnosis, and symptom count for sub-clinical levels of 
anxiety. Ideally, one method should be the Clinical Staging Model of anxiety 
disorders in the elderly, proposed by Oude Voshaar et al. (2015). Another 
method should be the Geriatric Anxiety Inventory, developed by Pachana et al. 
(2007). These two methods would bring anxiety measurement method up-to-
date with instruments which reflect the latest understandings of the nature of 
anxiety, and of old age experience of anxiety. 
3. Ensure the study includes a comprehensive list of potentially confounding variables. 
4. Ensure that the study length exceeds the time-frame of the prodromal effects that are 
likely to confound the associations being tested. 
5. Research neuropsychological feedback mechanisms described at Figure 1.5, to 
determine their influence on the levels of anxiety and cognitive ageing. 
6. Using fMRI or equivalent technology, investigate the neuropsychological 
differences between categories and levels of anxiety, stress, fear, and depression. 
2.5 Conclusions 
This systematic review and meta-analysis have critically evaluated the literature and 
analysed conflicting evidence on anxiety as a risk factor for cognitive ageing. Thirty-seven 
studies were identified which analysed associations between anxiety and cognitive data over 
time, and collectively drew on an aggregate sample of 56,098 individuals.  
Associations between anxiety and cognitive decline are problematic to investigate for a 
variety of reasons explored above, but notably: ambiguities in the construct and 
operationalisation of anxiety and anxiety measurement; and, limited design of many studies 
regarding the temporal confounds deriving from the prodromal effects of dementia. 
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Notwithstanding the intrinsic challenges, study limitations, methodological differences, 
and differences in findings, tentative results have been found from an updated meta-analysis. 
Results for progression to MCI were not significant. However, from the updated meta-
analysis, anxiety predicted progression from cognitively healthy status to dementia with 
approximately an 81% increased risk, compared to individuals without anxiety. There was 
theory (Chapter One) to suggest a plausible case that anxiety is a contributory cause of 
cognitive ageing. This causal hypothesis, together with the meta-analysis result for 
prediction, allow the tentative conclusion that anxiety is a risk factor for dementia.  
These results include a wide variability of individual studies which has two implications. 
Firstly, there is likely to be an array of conditions (such as age profile within the sample, type 
of anxiety measurement, sub-categories of prognostic outcomes, and length of study), for 
which a meta-regression may yield important information about the conditional influences of 
anxiety on cognitive ageing. Secondly, to obtain a reliable and informative result from meta-
analysis and meta-regression, the number of accepted studies will need to be larger, and 
methods more aligned.  
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CHAPTER THREE:  
Methods: Strategic Overview  
 
Abstract 
To identify a strategic approach to methods for the present study, this chapter builds on the 
principles and theory presented in Chapter One, and published evidence for the relevant 
associations, described in Chapter Two. The present chapter structures the research, by: (1) 
Describing scope; (2) Extending the previous description of research questions; (3) Outlining 
analysis steps; and (4) Mapping the above into the thesis structure. These methods will be 
applied to new data to be introduced in Chapter Four. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The primary research questions were described in Chapter One and were qualified by 
delineating cognitive decline and cognitive impairment into relevant categories. These are 
specified again below and then extended to describe specific investigations. There were also 
four major outcomes from Chapters One and Two, relevant to the present chapter. These 
were: (I) Description of the neuropsychological mechanisms posited to link anxiety and 
cognitive ageing; (II) Observation of a variety of analytical methods described in the 
literature; (III) Limitations of the research to date; and, (IV) Results of meta-analysis which 
updated the most recent published review.  
The next step, following this chapter on methods, is to examine new data. The aim is to 
extend the investigation by analyses which are informed both by the theory described in 
Chapter One, and the limitations and findings of the previous research, described in Chapter 
Two. This current chapter maps how these later investigations will be organised. 
 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Scope 
The following observations from Chapters One and Two are foundational to scoping this 
investigation: 
a) Parsimony:     
If anxiety can be demonstrated to predict change in the risk (over time) of 
cognitive ageing, then this is sufficient evidence of effect, without factoring in 
characteristics of the normality or abnormality of rates or incidence of cognitive 
decline or cognitive impairment (Section 1.1.2.1).  
b) Temporal precedence of anxiety:    
If research is not to be confounded by the possibility of substantive memory 
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decline or other cognitive changes causing anxiety (the reverse effect discussed in 
Section 1.1.2.2) then baseline anxiety measurement must occur before cognitive 
impairment.  
c) Chronic or persistent anxiety is expected to be more relevant than state or incident 
anxiety:    
Anxiety can have positive or negative effects on cognitive performance and for 
different neuropsychological reasons. For example, incident or short term anxiety, 
has been associated with temporarily improved cognitive performance (Bierman et 
al., 2008). The Diathesis-Anxiety Heuristic of Cognitive Ageing (Figure 1.5) is 
instructive. From Figure 1.5, it is clear that the intermediate stages, in the effects of 
anxiety on cognitive ageing, include atrophy of the hippocampus (affecting 
memory) and other brain segments. The atrophy is progressive, and takes effect 
over years (Wang et al., 2003). If atrophy is partly a product of anxiety then 
incident anxiety is unlikely to contribute to such atrophy unless the incident 
anxiety is a symptom of chronic anxiety. Either way, it is the chronic anxiety 
which is, apparently, central to the mechanisms leading to cognitive ageing. 
Therefore, chronic anxiety must be identified. Notwithstanding the importance of 
recognizing the presence of long-term or chronic anxiety, most previous research 
has not done so. Even where the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(Spielberger, 2010) was used to measure anxiety, more often it was the state 
anxiety results used for analysis rather than the trait anxiety results (e.g., Petkus et 
al., 2016). Additionally, most analytic methods in past research, were geared only 
to baseline measurement of anxiety, placing further doubt on the valid 
identification of chronic anxiety. Ideally, therefore, the present study would 
examine data for chronic anxiety to determine if there is a result which supports the 
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theory. Examining also associations formed with incident anxiety would then be 
instructive as a direct comparison with the associations formed with chronic 
anxiety. The data available to this study (Chapter Four) are only measures of 
incident anxiety (symptoms during a four-week period), but measurements are 
available over four waves at four-yearly intervals. These can be used to form an 
estimate of the chronicity of the anxiety for each individual. Calculating both forms 
of association will also facilitate comparisons with the previous research.  
d) Adjust models for confounding variables:     
i. Of the many potentially confounding variables, sex, age, education, and 
depression have most often been the central covariates for which adjustment 
has been made in the literature. Adjustment for depression may be 
problematic. Anxiety and depression are comorbid and often, highly 
correlated. Multicollinearity is not a problem in multiple regression analysis 
when the objective is prediction of the response variable (Williams, Grajales, 
& Kurkiewicz, 2013). However, for cross-level interactions formed in multi-
level models, the correlation can lead to type two error, or false finding of 
non-significance for the main effects (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
Interestingly, of the 37 studies identified for the systematic review in Chapter 
One, precisely one article (Zilkens et al., 2014) mentioned a test for 
multicollinearity. Some studies chose not to adjust for depression (e.g., 
Brodaty et al., 2012), and others could not extract a meaningful adjustment 
(e.g., Beaudreau & O'Hara, 2008). For the analyses here, multicollinearity 
(among other assumptions) will be tested and evaluated. (Such tests will be 
reported only where assumptions are found to be violated.) 
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ii. Benzodiazepine consumption is an important additional confound for which 
adjustment should be made:   
Benzodiazepines were discussed in Chapter One as associated with cognitive 
decline and cognitive impairment, and some prior studies have controlled 
their models for this class of anxiolytics. Similar adjustment in the present 
study will permit comparisons between models and with the previous study 
results. 
iii. There are additional variables worth investigating for potential confounding 
effects by virtue of their possible influence on cognitive ageing, and their: 
a) similarity or overlap in meaning with anxiety (e.g., stress); or 
b) likely influence on anxiety levels (e.g. resilience). 
In addition to sex, age, education, GDS (depression), and benzodiazepines, 
candidate variables meeting these criteria, and which are available for 
analysis in this present study (Chapter Four), are: alcohol consumption, 
physical health status, behavioural inhibition, body mass index (BMI), 
neuroticism, life events (as a measure of stressful environment), mastery, 
positive & negative affect, physical activity, resilience, smoking, social 
support, and sleep problems. Analysis of the data will be necessary to 
determine which of these variables are potentially confounding, by 
examining their associations with anxiety, and cognitive decline & cognitive 
impairment. 
e) Alternative anxiety measures or proxies should be compared:    
i. Anxiety is not well defined. Therefore, it would be useful to consider any 
available alternative measures for anxiety or proxies (e.g., neuroticism), in 
order to compare with the main measure of anxiety, for association effects, 
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and also to compare with results from studies using similar proxies. Some 
variables, such as neuroticism, might be considered as both proxies and 
confounds and will, therefore, need to be analysed for effect each way. 
ii. Individual symptoms of anxiety, or symptom clusters, for worry and physical 
responses, should be tested separately as additional proxies for anxiety:    
Some studies have placed most emphasis on worry which is also an 
important symptom of GAD. On the other hand, aged anxiety may be more 
about the physical symptoms (Miloyan & Pachana, 2015). Therefore, 
isolating such items from the primary anxiety scale, and comparing their 
associations with those of the full measure of anxiety, may provide different 
and relevant results. For both worry and physical symptoms, the following 
chapter offers an exploratory factor analysis identifying relevant latent 
factors derived from the Goldberg Anxiety Scale (GAS), and representing 
worry and physical symptoms of anxiety. These latent factors will be 
examined for association and compared with simple items or item clusters. 
f) Association models should be tested with both symptom counts for anxiety, and 
anxiety diagnosis: 
Some studies in the systematic review used anxiety scales, including sub-clinical 
symptom counts (Table 2.3). Other studies used binary diagnosis of anxiety, which 
excludes sub-clinical information. A small number of studies used both methods 
(e.g., Bierman et al., 2008; de Bruijn et al., 2014). Some studies used a scale but 
then converted the symptom counts to the dichotomised equivalent of diagnoses 
(e.g., Brodaty et al., 2012). There are advantages and disadvantages of each 
method. For example, diagnosis may be more accurate than a self-report symptom 
count, but it excludes information, not only about subclinical levels of anxiety but 
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also about the clinical levels (symptom counts above the “clinical” threshold). As 
noted in the next chapter, the PATH data available to this PhD study do not include 
diagnosis of anxiety. However, to the extent available within the data, each 
optional measure of anxiety should be tested for association with cognitive decline 
and cognitive impairment.   
g) Association models should be tested using anxiety symptom counts, trichotomised 
as: none, mild, and moderate to severe:  
Contrary to expectations from dose-response precedent, Kassem, Ganguli, Yaffe, 
Hanlon, Lopez, Wilson, Ensrud, et al. (2017) found low level anxiety had a 
stronger association with subsequent cognitive decline and cognitive impairment 
than either no anxiety or moderate to higher levels of anxiety. There are possible 
explanations for this outcome that do not rely on abandoning the hypothesis that 
anxiety is a risk factor for cognitive ageing (Section 2.3.4.ii.c). This same 
categorisation of anxiety scores should be tested on the new data, for comparison 
with Kassem et al. 
h) Psychological distress also needs to be identified for comparison purposes:   
 Psychological distress has been variously interpreted (e.g., Andrews & Slade, 
2001; Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008; M. H. Banks, 1983; Gallacher et al., 
2009). Psychological Distress will be calculated here by two alternative methods, 
as either the multiplication or addition of the two Goldberg scales, anxiety and 
depression. These are two forms of interaction of the component variables. These 
methods will be discussed in the next chapter (Four) and compared with strategies 
in the literature. Distress may have more influence (on cognitive decline and 
cognitive impairment) than anxiety or depression considered separately. There has 
been some research on these effects (e.g., Gallacher et al., 2009; Simard, Hudon, & 
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van Reekum, 2009). Testing this interaction may, again, add perspective to the 
results for anxiety and depression alone. 
For the purpose of scoping, the items above provide both limitations and additional lines 
of inquiry. The more detailed delineation of research questions to follow, will be understood 
as referring to the scope described above. 
3.2.2 Research Questions  
3.2.2.1 Primary, research questions. 
The two, primary research questions described in Chapter One, were: 
(3) Is anxiety a risk factor for the rate of age-associated, cognitive decline? 
(4) Is anxiety a risk factor for age-associated, incident, cognitive impairment?  
 Chapter One further described cognitive decline (Section 1.3) as referring to decline in 
cognitive performance within cognitive domains such as memory, attention, and cognitive 
processing speed. Similarly, Chapter One categorised cognitive impairment as comprising 
MCI and dementia, where MCI was further categorised as amnestic and non-amnestic, and 
where dementia was further categorised as Alzheimer’s disease (AD), and all other 
dementias. References below to the primary research questions will be intended to infer also 
permutations with appropriate categories of these prognostic outcomes, but limited by the 
availability of data. 
3.2.2.2 Secondary, research questions.  
Subordinate to the primary, research questions above, the following, secondary, research 
questions will be investigated in later chapters and will address the scoping points above 
(Section 3.2.1).  
A. Is anxiety a baseline predictor of cognitive ageing?    
Firstly, and more fundamentally, is baseline anxiety correlated with subsequent 
cognitive decline or cognitive impairment? If there is correlation between baseline 
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anxiety and follow-up cognitive data, then various regression models (linear and 
logistic regression, and multilevel modelling) would be tested to ascertain if the 
association is sustained or attenuated when adjusted for key confounders such as 
depression. If such associations are demonstrated, then mediation analysis would 
be justified to determine effects of the principal confounding variables. 
Additionally, moderation by such confounding covariates can be investigated to 
determine if interactions have greater effect size than their component variables. 
These questions will be applied broadly, where appropriate, to the various 
measures available for anxiety, and proxies, and for derivatives of the GAS scale. 
Such analyses will not be considered for models that do not demonstrate significant 
associations. 
B. As a time-varying variable, does GAS, predict cognitive ageing?  
This simultaneously restricts the scope of question A to the single anxiety measure, 
GAS, and extends the analysis to include repeated measures. As will be 
demonstrated in Chapters Four and Five, there is no alternative measure for 
anxiety, available within the PATH data, likely to be more effective than GAS to 
identify associations with cognitive ageing. The numerous analyses possible 
require limitation of the permutations stemming from the many alternative 
measures for anxiety. Nonetheless, for the GAS predictor, where analyses of 
repeated measures justify further investigation, analyses of mediation and 
moderation will be considered, as suggested by question A above. 
C. Are there subsets of participants for whom associations are different?  
Comparisons will be performed between groups with and without persistently high 
or chronic anxiety, defined by persistence of anxiety at two symptom levels, for 
two or more waves of data. (Symptom levels for persistently high and chronic 
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anxiety will be defined, on the GAS scale, as five and seven symptoms 
respectively.) Secondly, subsets will be identified by confounding variables 
(Section 3.2.1.d.iii). 
3.2.3 Mapping the Above into the Thesis Structure 
Table 3.1 summarises the chapter structure of the remainder of this thesis and delineates 
how the research questions and methods will be incorporated into that structure. 
 
Table 3.1.  
Structure of Remaining Chapters and Summary of Planned Analyses 
Chapter 
Chapter Title / Research 
Question Description 
Four Description of the data Description of the PATH dataset and its derivation; demographic 
characteristics of the sample; distributions of key variables; 
variation of key variables over time; cross-sectional correlations; 
and analysis of missingness; and, correlations between baseline 
anxiety and subsequent cognitive decline & cognitive impairment. 
Possible confounding variables will be investigated by examination 
of correlations [Section 3.2.1.d.iii]. 
Five Is Anxiety a baseline 
predictor of cognitive 
ageing? / Secondary 
Research Question A 
Multivariate, linear, and logistic regression for cognitive decline 
and cognitive impairment categories, applied to baseline 
predictors (GAS, items, derivatives, and proxies), and generalized 
estimating equations applied to further test any associations found 
from the baseline modelling, by examining the effects of repeated 
measures for the relevant anxiety variables, but not repeated 
measures for the outcome variables. 
Six As a time-varying variable, 
does GAS predict cognitive 
ageing? / Secondary 
Research Question B 
Extending the analysis of Chapter Five by applying repeated 
measures for both anxiety and outcome variables, but scoping this 
to the single anxiety variable, GAS. This will include time-lagged, 
cognitive change, and autoregressive models.  
Seven Stratifications of multilevel 
models / Secondary 
Research Question C 
Subsets of participants will be analysed and compared, to identify 
any differences in association between GAS and cognitive change. 
Subsets will include cases with and without chronic anxiety, 
persistently high anxiety, and categories defined by covariates 
previously identified as confounding variables.  
Eight Overview of Statistical 
analyses, and revised 
meta-analysis results 
Summary and interpretation of statistical results from Chapters 
Four to Seven, plus revision of the meta-analysis from Chapter Two 
with results from the PATH analyses. 
Nine Conclusions, Implications, 
and Recommendations 
Conclusions, strengths & limitations, implications, future research, 
and recommendations. 
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3.3 Conclusion 
There is no known, previous research which comprehensively applies all of these 
planned, analytical methods, to the one dataset. Results and interpretations from this present 
study should, therefore, be of value not only in comprehending associations within the PATH 
data, in this dissertation, but also in developing methods for future research. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
The Data 
Abstract 
Background: Previous studies, drawing on a diversity of data sources, have produced 
conflicting results about associations between anxiety and cognitive ageing. 
Methods: New data for this PhD research are drawn from the Personality and Total Health 
Through Life (PATH) study which is hosted by the Australian National University (ANU). 
Ethics for the present study were provided by the ethics approval for PATH. The data are 
described here, and basic analyses are reported, mostly based on correlations and 
distributions. Proxies for anxiety, and derivatives of the Goldberg Anxiety Scale (GAS) were 
examined as alternative measures for the full GAS scale. Baseline values for these variables 
were examined for correlation with cognitive change. Also considered were potential 
confounders, moderators, or mediators of the association between anxiety and cognitive 
change. Participants unavailable for follow-up were also evaluated for any distortion in the 
key associations. 
Results: The main findings were: (1) Anxiety and some of the measures of cognitive ability 
were weakly correlated cross-sectionally (wave by wave); (2) With few exceptions, neither 
the main measure of anxiety (GAS) nor proxies for anxiety, were correlated with changes in 
measures of cognitive ability; (3) Some of the derivatives and items of GAS were weakly 
correlated with a small proportion of the measures of cognitive decline, and cognitive 
impairment; and, (4) Participants who became unavailable for follow-up had higher anxiety 
and depression levels at baseline, and lower cognitive skills, than those who remained for the 
full four waves (12 years).  
Conclusion: Anxiety as measured by GAS was unrelated to cognitive change. Correlations 
between some proxies, derivatives, and items of GAS and cognitive change were small, 
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suggesting these variables may not be demonstrated to be predictors of cognitive ageing, after 
full adjustment.   
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4.1 Introduction 
Previous investigation of longitudinal associations between anxiety and cognitive ageing 
has drawn upon a diversity of data. Examples of data sources were, Longitudinal Aging 
Study, Amsterdam (Bierman et al., 2008), Sydney Memory and Ageing Study (Brodaty et al., 
2012), and Australian Imaging, Biomarkers, and Lifestyle (Pietrzak et al., 2015). Findings 
from such datasets have conflicted (Chapter Two). The present chapter describes new data 
available for this doctoral thesis. It also provides a preliminary analysis with the aim of 
identifying prima facia evidence for longitudinal associations between anxiety and cognitive 
change. 
The data and key measures are described, including: demographic, genetic, and 
psychological characteristics; distributions; trends over time; prevalence; and unavailability 
for follow-up. Also provided is a preliminary examination of unadjusted associations between 
cognitive change over four waves, and baseline GAS (and its items, its derivatives such as 
latent factors, and anxiety proxies such as neuroticism). Potentially confounding variables are 
examined for correlation with anxiety, cognitive decline, and cognitive impairment. And 
finally, additional variables are identified which may act as mediators or moderators, 
potentially influencing any associations between anxiety and cognitive change. 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Data Source & Ethics Approval 
Data for this study were drawn from the Personality And Total Health Through Life 
(PATH) study, established in 1999 to collect information on depression, anxiety, cognitive 
ability, substance use, and genetic and environmental risk factors and moderators. PATH is a 
prospective, cohort study. Data collection is planned to extend over 20 years at four-
yearly intervals (Anstey et al., 2012) and has, so far, been obtained for four waves over 12 
years. The data collected are specified, and related publications are indexed, at: 
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http://crahw.anu.edu.au/research/projects/personality-total-health-path-through-life. The 
dataset and collection are managed by the Centre for Research in Ageing, Health and 
Wellbeing at the ANU. The original ethics approval for the PATH project was obtained from 
ANU Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) in 1998 with protocol M9801. This 
original approval was followed by a long sequence of approvals referring to individual waves 
of data and specific, additional data collections, and continuing until approval for HREC 
2010/542 (PATH main study for 20s, 40s and 60s Wave 4 and 60s wave 5). This sequence of 
HREC approvals for PATH all serve to provide ethics approval for this PhD research. 
4.2.2 Participants 
Participants were randomly recruited from the electoral roles for the Australian Capital 
Territory and the adjoining town of Queanbeyan, New South Wales (Anstey et al., 2012). 
Voting in Australia is compulsory, so electoral roles represent close to 100% of the targeted 
age demographic. There are three age cohorts. At baseline, participants were aged 20-24, 40-
44, and 60-64. This thesis focuses on the oldest cohort (60+) which has an overall age range, 
for the four waves, from 60 to 76 years. PATH participants in the 60+ cohort numbered 2,551 
at baseline, representing about 53% of individuals approached for participation. 
Cognitively impaired participants at baseline were removed from the dataset (for use in 
this thesis) to ensure the initial starting sample was free from clinical and pre-clinical 
cognitive impairment. Cognitively healthy participants at baseline were identified as those 
with Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) scores > 26 and as not classified as likely to be 
diagnosable with mild cognitive impairment (MCI) or dementia (by virtue of clinical 
assessment). This MMSE cut-point was more conservative than the more typical cutpoint of 
MMSE scores >24 (for example, Anderson, Sachdev, Brodaty, Trollor, & Andrews, 2007). 
The higher cutpoint reflects the purpose here of identifying cognitively non-impaired 
individuals in this relatively young cohort. The lower cutpoint is typically chosen to identify 
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cognitively impaired individuals conservatively, who might be diagnosable with MCI or 
dementia. The cut-point score >26, accords with suggestions of Anstey et al. (2008) in their 
examination of the PATH data, which reported mean MMSE for participants with cognitive 
impairment at a little over the MMSE score of 26. By these criteria, 161 participants were 
excluded from Wave 1 data, leaving a residual of 2,390 cognitively healthy participants. 
These exclusions, based on MMSE scores, included 36 participants identified at Wave 1 with 
dementia or MCI. 
4.2.3 Measures 
The primary research questions (Chapter Three) collectively query whether anxiety 
predicts cognitive ageing in cognitively non-impaired, older adults. Key variables are, 
therefore, repeated measures of anxiety (and derivatives and proxies for anxiety), cognitive 
performance, possible moderators (interacting with predictor variables), mediators 
(intervening between predictor and outcome variables), and confounds (influencing both 
predictor and outcome variables). Some variables conceivably fit more than one of these 
descriptions. These key variables can also be classified in the following categories: 
demographic, genetic, personality, physical health, mental health (including anxiety), 
cognitive measures, medications, and lifestyle measures. Relevant variables in each of these 
categories are described at Table 4.1.  
Because of the large number of variable names introduced in this chapter, I have 
italicised PATH variable names (in the text but not in tables) to distinguish them from other 
uses of the same words. For example, “neuroticism” might be referred to both as a condition 
(not italicised) and as a PATH variable name (italicised). Additionally, acronyms are 
described at Table 0.1, p., xvi. 
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Table 4.1 
Main Measures 
Category 
Name of 
Test or Scale 
Variable Name (Abbreviation); Description; (Source of Scale) 
Anxiolytics  Any medication 
for anxiety 
All current prescription medications identified by 
participant as for the purpose of treating anxiety. 
Benzodiazepines  Benzodiazepines 
taken for any 
reason 
Valium, Xanax, Mogadon, whether for anxiety, 
depression, or insomnia. 
Cognition California 
Verbal 
Learning Test 
Trial 1  
Immediate 
Recall 
(IR) 16 words to recall, same words provided in 
immediate & delayed recall test; Californian Verbal 
Learning Test (CVLT; immediate & delayed recall). 
Measures episodic memory; (Delis et al., 1987). 
Cognition California 
Verbal 
Learning Test 
Trial 2 
Delayed Recall  (DR); Sixteen words to recall, same words provided in 
immediate & delayed recall test. Measures episodic 
memory; (Delis et al., 1987). Measurement method in 
Wave 4 was not equivalent to that of other waves. 
Consequently Wave 4 data for DR have not been used. 
Cognition Purdue 
Pegboard 
Purdue 
Pegboard 
(PPd), (PPn), (PPb): Purdue Pegboard test of dominant 
hand, non-dominant hand, and both hands together; 
using left, right, or both hands, respectively.  Participant 
places as many pegs as possible in holes in left or right 
columns. Score for each of the three tests is the number 
of pegs placed in 30 seconds. This is a cognitive motor 
task, measuring psychomotor speed; (Tiffin, 1968). 
Cognition Spot-the-
Word Test – 
Version A 
Spot the Word (StW) 60 items, pairs of words with one real and one 
made up. The task is to select the real word. Estimates 
premorbid, verbal intelligence; (Baddeley et al., 1993). 
Cognition Standardised 
Mini Mental 
State 
Examination 
Mini Mental 
State 
Examination 
(MMSE) 23 items with a maximum score of 30. Typically 
a screen for dementia; deployed in PATH as a measure 
of global cognitive impairment; (Molloy, Alemayehu, & 
Roberts, 1991). 
Cognition Symbol Digit 
Modalities 
Test 
Symbol Digit 
Modalities Test 
(SDMT) Participant has 90 seconds to pair specific 
numbers with given geometric figures; measures 
processing speed and cognitive dysfunction; (Smith, 
1982). Normative data are available at Kiely, 
Butterworth, Watson, and Wooden (2014). 
Cognition Wechsler 
Memory Scale 
Digit Span 
Backwards 
(DSB) Five items, each with two questions; repeating 
backwards a string of digits, ranging from 3 to 7 digits. 
Scores range from 0 to 10. Measures working memory; 
(Wechsler, 1945). 
Cognition Multiple Tests 
plus Clinical 
Assessment 
Dementia Details of tests and assessments are at Section 4.2.3.1. 
Dementia was described by the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual  of Mental Disorders, fourth edition 
(DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) as a 
“Syndrome that may be caused or characterised by 
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Category 
Name of 
Test or Scale 
Variable Name (Abbreviation); Description; (Source of Scale) 
multiple cognitive deficits, which include memory 
impairment and at least one of the following: aphasia, 
agnosia or disturbance in executive functioning. Social 
or occupational function is also impaired.” See also 
Section 1.3 for an overview of dementia and MCI – their 
relationship and their respective sub-categories. 
Cognition Multiple Tests 
plus Clinical 
Assessment 
Mild Cognitive 
Impairment 
(MCI) Details of tests and assessments are at Section 
4.2.3.1. MCI is briefly described as a prodrome of 
dementia. MCI is the pre-dementia stage of cognitive 
impairment. See Petersen et al. (2001) for a description. 
It may include memory loss (amnestic MCI) or not (non-
amnestic MCI). See also Section 1.3 for an overview of 
dementia and MCI – their relationship and their 
respective sub-categories. 
Demographic  Age Age of participant in years, at Wave 1. 
Demographic  Education Years of education at Wave 1. 
Demographic  Racial Group Caucasian, Aboriginal, Asian, Other. 
Demographic  Sex Sex (male or female). 
General Health PATH 
Medications 
questionnaire 
Sleep 
Medications 
PATH questionnaire on medications: Yes/no response to 
whether taken medications for sleep within the last 
month.  
Genetic Buccal Swabs APOE e4 carrier 
status 
(APOE e4); Apolipoprotein E, assessed by Buccal swabs; 
(Cherbuin et al., 2008). 
Lifestyle Factors  Tobacco Use Smoker: never, past, current; (Jorm et al., 1999). 
Lifestyle Factors Alcohol Use 
Disorders 
Identification 
Test (AUDIT) 
Alcohol 
Consumption 
Alcohol frequency — number of drinks per day; 
(Saunders, Aasland, Babor, De la Fuente, & Grant, 1993). 
Lifestyle Factors Brief life 
events 
questionnaire 
Life Events 16 Life events (in past 6 months) – yes/no questions:  
The List of Threatening Experiences; (Brugha & Cragg, 
1990).  
Lifestyle Factors Supportive 
Interactions 
Social Support Social support 20 questions: 10 general and 10 
regarding partner relationship. Of the 10 general, 4 are 
positive, 6 are negative. Of the partner questions, 5 are 
positive and 5 are negative. Each score on Likert scale, 
reversed for analysis, to: 0=never; 1=rarely; 
2=sometimes; 3=often. 
(Schuster, Kessler, & Aseltine, 1990). 
Mental Health Brief Patient 
Health 
Questionnaire 
Trouble Sleeping Primary care evaluation of mental disorders. One item 
referring to previous two weeks, asking, “Trouble falling 
or staying asleep, or sleeping too much?”, with answers: 
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Category 
Name of 
Test or Scale 
Variable Name (Abbreviation); Description; (Source of Scale) 
1. Not at all; 2. Several days; 3. More than half the days; 
4. Nearly every day.   (Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams, & 
Group, 1999) 
Mental Health Goldberg 
Depression 
and Anxiety 
Inventory 
Goldberg 
Anxiety Scale 
(GAS) Self-report; nine yes/no items; describe symptoms 
of anxiety during the preceding fortnight; (Goldberg et 
al., 1988).  
Mental Health Goldberg 
Depression 
and Anxiety 
Inventory 
Goldberg 
Depression 
Scale 
(GDS) Self-report; nine yes/no items; describe 
symptoms of depression during the preceding fortnight; 
(Goldberg et al., 1988). 
Mental Health Goldberg 
Depression 
and Anxiety 
Inventory 
Psychological 
Distress 
(PsD) Derived alternatively as the multiplication (PsDM) 
or the addition (PsDA) of the two Goldberg sub-scales: 
anxiety and depression.  
Personality Connor-
Davidson 
Resilience 
Scale 
Resilience Resilience; (Connor & Davidson, 2003). Not available in 
W1 or W2. 
Personality PANAS Positive Affect (PAS); Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) 10 
questions; (Watson & Clark, 1994) 
Personality Pearlin’s 
Mastery Scale 
Mastery Mastery — 7 individual questions with 4 options: 1-
Strongly agree; 2- Agree, 3-Disagree, 4-strongly 
disagree; (Pearlin, Menaghan, Lieberman, & Mullan, 
1981). 
Physical Health  Body Mass 
Index 
(BMI); Ratio of weight to height-squared. 
Physical Health Short Form 
Health Survey 
Physical Health General health: Item 1 of 12 item survey; (Ware Jr, 
Kosinski, & Keller, 1996). 
Physical Health Stress and 
Health Study.  
Health survey 
questionnaire 
Physical activity Physical activity-frequency & times — maximum scores 
for mild=90, moderate=50, vigorous=30; (Marmot et al., 
1991). 
 
4.2.3.1 MCI and dementia. 
Most of the variables mentioned in Table 4.1 are measured by a single test or scale. Two 
important variables, indicating degrees of cognitive impairment, are based on multiple tests 
or scales, plus clinical assessment. These two variables are MCI and dementia. Screening (by 
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cognitive testing) and clinical assessment for MCI and dementia in PATH, were described by 
Anstey et al. (2008) and Anstey et al. (2013) for Waves 1 to 3. Wave 4 was similarly 
conducted except that there were two levels of screening instead of one, before the final 
clinical assessment which, in Wave 4, included a clinical interview. The results of screening 
and clinical assessment, across all waves, was that participants were either diagnosed with 
MCI or dementia or were recorded as free of both conditions. Data collected for Wave 4 
included assessments by the criteria of both Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, fourth edition (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and DSM-5. 
For example, the equivalent of “dementia” by DSM-IV criteria, was the DSM-5 disorder, 
Major Neurocognitive Disorder (major-NCD). MCI is close in definition to Mild 
Neurocognitive Disorder (mild-NCD). However, these disorders defined by DSM-5 are not 
strictly equivalent to the disorders of MCI and dementia. Because major- and mild-NCD were 
not recorded for Waves 1 to 3, only the data for DSM-IV disorders of dementia and MCI are 
used here across all waves for longitudinal analysis.  
4.2.3.2 Proxies for anxiety. 
Table 2.2 listed five of the 37 accepted studies in the literature review, as analysing 
proxies for general anxiety, rather than a direct measure. Proxies mentioned at Table 2.2 
were: neuroticism; worry about subjective memory; mild worry; phobic anxiety; and anxiety 
inferred from items in other scales. From PATH data, available proxies for anxiety, as 
suggested by those previously adopted, are listed at Table 4.2. Each prospective proxy is 
tested in this chapter for cross-sectional correlation with GAS. Table 4.2 describes also 
variables that are derived from GAS items, such as a latent factor representing somatic 
aspects of anxiety. The nature of, and arguments for using these derivatives of GAS, are 
delineated at Section 4.2.4.9.  
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Table 4.2 
Description of PATH Variables Available as Derivatives# of, or Proxies for, GAS. 
Name of Test or Scale 
(Abbreviation) 
Variable 
Name 
Description; (Source of Scale) 
Behavioural Inhibition and 
Behavioural Activation 
Scales (BISBAS), Inhibition 
component (BIS) 
Behavioural 
Inhibition 
(Abbreviation) 
Seven BIS questions, on behavioural inhibition, from the BISBAS of 24 
questions. “Indicate how much you agree or disagree with each 
statement”: examples: “I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or 
know somebody is angry at me”; “Criticism or scolding hurts me quite 
a bit”; “I worry about making mistakes”. Likert scale responses from: 
1=Very false for me to 4=Very true for me. There are three items that 
are reverse scored before aggregating the total score; e.g., “I have 
very few fears compared to my friends”; (Carver & White, 1994) 
BPHQ Anxiety component, 
Wave 2^ 
BPHQ-anxiety-
W2 
Questions 12, & 12a to12f of the Brief Patient Health Questionnaire 
(BPHQ), refer to Generalised Anxiety Disorder. These refer to the last 
four weeks with responses on a three point Likert scale: 1. Not at all; 2 
Several days; 3. More than half the days.  (Spitzer et al., 1999). 
Eysenck Personality 
Questionnaire (EPQ) 
Neuroticism Neuroticism scale within EPQ is also referred to as the “introversion” 
scale. Twelve, yes/no questions, such as: “Are you often troubled by 
feelings of guilt?”; and “Would you call yourself tense or ‘highly-
strung’?”  EPQ is available for Waves 1 & 2 only. (S. B. Eysenck, 
Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985) 
Cortisol  Cortisol Serum cortisol from blood sample 
Goldberg Anxiety Scale 
(GAS) 
Chronic GAS# Individuals are identified as having a chronic GAS score, if their score ≥ 
7, for either two or more, or three or more, of the available four 
waves. Chronic, by this definition, is the equivalent of persistently 
clinical GAS. 
Goldberg Anxiety Scale 
(GAS) 
Clinical GAS# A binary indicator, derived from the GAS scale; defined by the 
cutpoint: score ≥ 7. 
Goldberg Anxiety Scale 
(GAS) 
GAS-Sleep# By exploratory factor analysis (Appendix 4.A), this represents items 5 
(sleeping poorly), and 9 (difficulty falling asleep) of the GAS scale, 
weighted at: .764, and .745, respectively (Goldberg et al., 1988). 
Goldberg Anxiety Scale 
(GAS) 
GAS-Somatic# By exploratory factor analysis (Appendix 4.A), this represents items: 6 
(head & neck aches), 7 (trembling, tingling, dizzy spells, sweating, 
diarrhoea, frequent urination), and 8 (worried about health) of the 
GAS scale, weighted at: .312, .671, & .421, respectively. (Goldberg et 
al., 1988). 
Goldberg Anxiety Scale 
(GAS) 
GAS-Worry# By exploratory factor analysis (Appendix 4.A), this represents items: 1 
(Keyed up), 2 (Worrying a lot), 3 (Irritable), and 4 (Difficulty relaxing), 
of the GAS scale with weightings: .774, .695, .568, and .483 
respectively. (Goldberg et al., 1988). 
Goldberg Anxiety Scale 
(GAS) 
Persistently-
high-GAS# 
Individuals are identified as having a persistently-high-GAS score, if 
their score ≥ 5, for either two or more, or three or more, of the 
available four waves. 
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Name of Test or Scale 
(Abbreviation) 
Variable 
Name 
Description; (Source of Scale) 
Goldberg Anxiety Scale 
(GAS) 
Trichotomised 
GAS# 
Separating GAS scores into three categories: zero, 1 — 4 (mild), and 5 
— 9 (moderate to severe). This follows the method of (Kassem, 
Ganguli, Yaffe, Hanlon, Lopez, Wilson, & Cauley, 2017), who found 
strongest, predictive associations for low range GAS scores. 
Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS) 
Negative 
Affect 
Ten questions from the PANAS scale of 24 questions. “Indicate to 
what extent you have been feeling this way the last 4 weeks. Likert 
scale from1=very slightly or not at all; to 5=extremely. Examples are: 
Irritable, afraid, upset, guilty. These data are available for Waves 1 to 
3 only; (Kercher, 1992). 
Ruminative Style Rumination  Negative ruminative style. “How often do you? . . .: Ten questions 
with Likert scale responses 1 (never) to 4 (always): e.g., “”I think about 
how alone I feel” These data are available for Waves 1 to 3 only;  
(Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) 
 
Notes. ^BPHQ, anxiety component is available only from Wave 2. BPHQ = Brief Patient 
Health Questionnaire. # Derivatives of GAS are further described and commented upon at 
Section 4.2.4.9. 
 
4.2.4 Statistical Analysis 
4.2.4.1 General analytical methods. 
Tables and graphs were produced to demonstrate distributions, correlations, and trends 
across the four waves of data. The alpha level was entered as p = .05 for all tests of 
significance. Analyses were performed using IBM SPSS statistics package, version 25 (IBM 
Corp., Released 2017), unless otherwise specified below.  
4.2.4.2 Key variables by wave. 
To demonstrate trends across time of key variables, graphs are presented as boxplots for 
non-Gaussian data and error-bars for Gaussian data. Boxplots demonstrate the median, 
interquartile range, minimum & maximum values excluding outliers, plus the outliers. Error-
bars demonstrate means and standard deviation at each wave, and, therefore, represent the 
95% confidence intervals for the means. 
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4.2.4.3 Participants unavailable for follow-up. 
Group comparisons were produced to demonstrate differences in key variables for 
participants who became unavailable for follow-up, compared to those who remained 
available. Group differences were assessed, using T-tests for continuous, parametric 
variables. For GAS and the Goldberg Depression Scale (GDS) which have non-normal 
distributions (illustrated below), nonparametric analyses were deployed, and compared with 
parametric calculations, to assist in the interpretation of results. The Mann-Whitney U-test 
was used for the nonparametric variables. However, the Mann-Whitney U-test does not report 
the direction or size of the difference between groups, or the confidence intervals. These tests 
of limited usefulness were not required for comparing results for most cognitive variables 
(parametric variables). 
4.2.4.4 Prevalence. 
Prevalence of clinical anxiety and clinical depression were calculated using cutpoints of 
scores ≥7 for GAS and scores ≥5 for GDS (Kiely & Butterworth, 2015). Psychological 
Distress (PsD) is defined here as the interaction of anxiety and depression either by 
multiplication of the GAS and GDS scores, or by their addition. Consequently, notional, 
“clinical” cutpoints for psychological distress were formulated by two methods: (1) 
multiplication, equivalent to the product of the clinical cutpoints for each of GAS and GDS (5 
x 7=35); and, (2) Additive, as the sum of the individual cutpoints (5+7=12). Either method 
attributes a “clinical” status to PsD even if GAS or GDS is scored individually at a lower than 
clinical provided the other component is scored sufficiently highly to compensate and to still 
achieve the required minimum cutpoint. These are only notionally at “clinical levels” because 
there is no formally defined clinical level of psychological distress. 
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For each variable, the prevalence of clinical levels was calculated as a percentage of 
clinical cases from total sample tested. Confidence intervals (95%) for the percentage 
prevalence, were also derived. 
4.2.4.5 Scales. 
The GAS and GDS scales were examined for internal consistency (more typically 
referred to in the literature as reliability), at Wave 1. The Maximum Guttman’s Lambda 
statistic (MGLS) was used in place of the more traditional Cronbach’s alpha. MGLS is a 
more accurate reflection of internal consistency (Callender & Osburn, 1979). MGLS 
provided six calculations of internal consistency, λ1 to λ6.  The maximum of these six 
calculations is regarded as the best option for calibrating internal consistency (Callender & 
Osburn, 1979). Of these, λ3 is equivalent to Cronbach’s alpha.  
Factor analysis, particularly of the GAS scale, is relevant to the prospect that proxies for 
GAS and their associations with cognitive ageing, may reveal new information about how 
and whether anxiety predicts cognitive decline or cognitive impairment. Exploratory factor 
analysis using Mplus (Version 7.4; R. Burns, personal communication, 2015) options for 
binary data (at Wave 1) were used to ascertain whether there were latent factors underlying 
the scale. A principal axis factor analysis was applied with oblique rotation (direct oblimin). 
Oblique rotation was chosen because any latent factors were not expected to be independent 
within this well-defined, single construct. The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) measure was 
used as an indicator of sampling adequacy. Further details are at the Appendices 4.A & 4.B.  
Scales other than GAS and GDS were not examined for internal consistency; nor were 
they factor-analysed. There was no use for such information for the proxies and confounders, 
etc. And, the cognitive scales were not designed or constructed in a way conducive to such 
analyses. For example, the SDMT score is achieved by completing as many (similar) items as 
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possible within a time limit, and, therefore, these questions are not individual items for this 
purpose. 
4.2.4.6 Cross-Sectional correlations with GAS. 
Correlations tested were in two categories: firstly, cross-sectional relationships, by wave, 
between GAS, and the main demographics; and secondly, cross-sectional relationships, by 
wave, between GAS, and GDS and the cognitive measures.  
4.2.4.7 Cognitive change. 
Change in cognitive performance is presented in several different forms. Firstly, 
graphical representation of performance at each wave (Section 4.3.3), demonstrates change in 
average scores, over time, for each cognitive measure. Secondly, (at Section 4.3.8) graphical 
representations are provided for the Wave 4 distributions of cognitive change (baseline to 
Wave 4 differential). Finally, graphical representation of incident MCI and dementia, by 
wave, demonstrate the trend in conversion to these impairments.  
4.2.4.8 Confounding variables. 
With regard to potential influence on associations between anxiety and cognitive change, 
potentially confounding variables considered were: anxiolytics; education; sex; general 
health; physical health; mastery; physical activity; positive affect; life events (stressors), 
smoker status; sleeping problems; and resilience. This list was derived by observation of the 
covariates considered in the literature, for adjustment of models, then matching such 
variables to the available variables in the PATH data. 
4.2.4.9 Derivatives of GAS. 
Table 4.2 (above), describes seven variables identified as derivatives of GAS and 
indicated with a hash mark (#). These constructed variables are derivatives by virtue of 
having been calculated from some or all of the nine items of the GAS scale. These derivatives 
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are presented as possible proxies for GAS, subject to verification of suitable correlations. 
They are:  
1.  GAS-Somatic [derived by exploratory factor analysis at chapter Appendix 4.A, 
Sections 1.2.2, 3.2.1.g, and 4.3.5.2.1; Miloyan and Pachana (2015)]. 
2.  GAS-Worry [derived by exploratory factor analysis at chapter Appendix 4.A; 
Sections 1.2.1, 3.2.1.e., and 4.3.5.2.1; Pachana et al. (2007)].  
3. GAS-Sleep [derived by exploratory factor analysis at chapter Appendix 4.A, 
Sections 3.2.1.d.iii, and 4.3.5.2.1] 
4.  Clinical GAS [Binary transformation: GAS scores ≥ 7 (Kiely & Butterworth, 
2015).  
5. Chronic GAS (equivalent to persistently clinical GAS [see 7. Below] — which is 
clinical GAS derived by two methods: either ≥ 2, or ≥ 3 waves of the available 4 
waves). 
6.  Trichotomised GAS [Categorical transformation: zero, low (GAS score = 1 to 4), 
moderate to high (GAS≥5); Section 3.2.1.h; (Kassem, Ganguli, Yaffe, Hanlon, 
Lopez, Wilson, & Cauley, 2017)].  
7.  Persistently-high-GAS [Binary transformation: High if score ≥ 5, applied 
alternatively for ≥ 2 or ≥ 3 of the available 4 waves].  
Each of these derivatives offers an alternative prospect for identifying useful associations 
between anxiety and cognitive change and is justified either by precedent from the literature 
or by the exploratory factor analysis (Sections 4.2.4.4, 4.3.5.2, and Appendix 4.A). Or, in the 
case of the fifth and seventh derivatives above, chronic GAS and persistently-high-GAS, the 
arguments and justification are summarised at Section 3.2.1.c which refers to Figure 1.5. 
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4.2.4.11 Associations with cognitive change, for GAS, GAS items, derivatives, 
and proxies. 
Baseline GAS proxies were examined for correlation with each other and the main GAS 
scale. Baseline values of GAS, its items, derivatives, and proxies, were each tested for 
unadjusted association with cognitive change between baseline and Wave 4, as well as 
association with Wave 4 incident MCI and dementia. 
4.2.4.12 Additional variables as potential moderators or mediators 
a. In addition to the variables introduced above, there are potentially important 
moderators or mediators of associations between anxiety and cognitive decline 
or cognitive impairment. These additional variables are APOE carrier status, 
and BMI. For example: Pankratz et al. (2015) found the addition of APOE e4 
carrier status improved their regression models for longitudinal association 
between anxiety and cognitive change, and Cherbuin et al. (2009) found (using 
PATH data) BMI was among the related predictors of conversion to mild 
cognitive disorders. APOE is divided into single and double e4 carrier status 
(heterozygous and homozygous). The potential of these variables to influence 
longitudinal associations between anxiety and cognitive change will be 
examined in later chapters. Here, they are examined for direct correlation with 
anxiety, anxiety proxies, and cognitive change. 
 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 The Sample 
Table 4.3 describes the PATH, 60+ cohort, sample sizes and participation rate, by wave. 
Table 4.4 provides frequencies by wave, of individuals classified as cognitively healthy 
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(MMSE > 26) at baseline. Table 4.5 provides Wave 1 data on demographics, cognitive 
ability, and mental health, for accepted cases.  
 
Table 4.3.  
PATH Sample Size and Participation Rate by Wave: 60+ cohort 
 
Wave 1 
N (%) 
Wave 2 
N (% of wave 1 
interviewed) 
Wave 3 
N (% of wave 1 
interviewed) 
Wave 4 
N (% of wave 1 
interviewed) 
Sample 
approached 
4,831 2,551 (100%) 2,234 (87.6%) 1,932 (75.7%) 
Interviews 2,551 (52.8% of 
approached) 
2,222 (87.1%) 1,973 (77.3%) 1,645 (64.5%) 
Not interviewed* 2,280 (47.2% of 
approached) 
329 (12.9%) 578 (22.7%) 906 (35.5%) 
Wave to wave, 
net attrition 
 329 (12.9%) 
249 (11.2% of 
Wave 2 interviews) 
328 (16.6% of 
Wave 3 interviews) 
Note: * Not interviewed figures are net totals of additional people approached from a  
previous wave, refusals, deaths, and cannot be found”. 
 
 
Table 4.4.  
Frequencies by Wave: Participants found Cognitively Healthy at Baseline 
Sample 
n 
Wave 1 
n 
Wave 2 
n 
Wave 3 
n 
Wave 4 
Valid 2,390 * 2117 1891 1582 
Total 
Unavailable to 
follow-up  
(% of W1) 
0 273 (11.4%) 499 (20.9%) 808 (33.8%) 
Note: * 161 participants were excluded with cognitive impairment. 
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Table 4.5.  
Wave 1 Characteristics for Cognitively Healthy Participants 
Wave 1 Variables Statistics 
Age years: mean (SD) 62.51 (1.51) 
Alcohol: hazardous or harmful consumption n (%): 143 (6.0%) 
Anxiolytics: n (%) 125 (5.2%) 
APOE e4 carrier: Sub-study sample size;  
e4/e4 number (%) [Homozygous];  
single e4 carrier (%) [Heterozygous]. 
526; 9 (1.7%); 132 (25.1%) 
Benzodiazepines: n (%) 62 (2.6%) 
BMI: mean (SD) 26.80 (5.30) 
Caucasian: n (%) 2303 (96.4%) 
Cognitively healthy  
[MMSE > 26]: n, mean (SD) 
2390, 
29.37 (0.83) 
Delayed Recall: mean (SD) 6.33 (2.41) 
Digit Span Backwards 5.03 (2.20) 
Education years: mean (SD) 13.97 (2.70) 
EPQ Neuroticism 3.28 (3.00) 
Female: n (%) 1,176 (49.2%) 
General Health: mean (SD)  2.34 (0.97) 
Physical Health: mean (SD) 48.96 (9.82) 
Goldberg Anxiety Scale: mean (SD), median, mode 2.20 (2.30), 1.00, 0.00 
Goldberg Depression Scale: mean (SD), median, mode 1.63 (1.84), 1.00, 0.00 
Immediate Recall: mean (SD) 7.28 (2.19) 
Life events: mean (SD) 0.81 (1.07) 
Mastery: mean (SD) 21.98 (3.55) 
Negative Affect: mean (SD) 13.88 (4.86) 
Psychological Distress (PsDM) by multiplication of GAS & 
GDS mean (SD), median, mode. 
6.36 (11.862), 1.00, 0.00 
Psychological Distress (PsDA) by addition of GAS & GDS  
mean (SD), median, mode. 
3.82 (3.78), 3.00, 0.00  
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Wave 1 Variables Statistics 
Physical Activity: mild; moderate; vigorous: mean (SD) for 
each. 
Mild: 1.48 (0.84) 
Moderate: 2.15 (1.00) 
Vigorous: 3.33 (0.98) 
Positive Affect: mean (SD) 31.49 (7.16) 
Present Smoker: n (%) 249 (10.4%) 
Purdue Pegboard (both hands): mean (SD) 10.47 (1.72) 
Social Support general (negative): mean (SD) 18.18 (3.02) 
Social Support general (positive): mean (SD) 5.36 (1.86) 
Social Support partner relationship (negative): n (%); mean 
(SD) 
15.14 (3.16) 
Social Support partner relationship (positive): n (%); mean 
(SD) 
6.64 (2.59) 
Spot the Word: mean (SD) 52.26 (5.4) 
Symbol Digit Modalities Test: Mean (SD) 50.40 (9.13) 
Note. MMSE = Mini Mental State Examination; BMI = Body mass index; 
EPQ = Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. 
 
 
4.3.2 Distributions  
Figures 4.1 to 4.9 illustrate the baseline distributions of each of the following key 
variables: GAS; GDS; MMSE; Immediate Recall (IR); Delayed Recall (DR); Symbol Digit 
Modality Test (SDMT); Purdue Pegboard both hands (PPb); Digit Span Backwards (DSB); 
and Spot the Word (StW). Each figure illustrates a normal curve overlay and quantile-quantile 
(QQ; sample versus theoretical distributions) plot, illustrating variation from the normal 
curve. These Wave 1 distributions are typical also of distributions in the remaining waves.  
Acceptable normality is demonstrated in these figures, for: IR, DR, SDMT, PPB, and 
DSB. StW was normally distributed but truncated at its maximum scale score of 60 points 
(1.43 SD above the mean). GAS, GDS and MMSE were not normally distributed. GAS and 
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GDS both had their modal scores at zero and were approximately distributed exponentially 
(with negative exponent). Both had modal scores at zero and were truncated at zero. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Wave 1 Goldberg Anxiety Scale (GAS) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Wave 1 Goldberg Depression Scale (GDS) 
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Figure 4.3. Wave 1 Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) 
 
  
Figure 4.4. Wave 1 Immediate Recall (IR) 
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Figure 4.5. Wave 1 Delayed Recall (DR) 
 
  
Figure 4.6. Wave 1 Symbol Digit Modality Test (SDMT) 
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Figure 4.7. Wave 1 Purdue Pegboard both hands (PDPP-bh) 
 
 
  
Figure 4.8. Wave 1 Digit Span Backwards (DSB) 
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Figure 4.9. Wave 1 Spot the Word (StW) 
 
4.3.3 Key Variables by Wave 
For an overview of trends in the nonparametric variables, Figure 4.10 compares box 
plots for all four waves, for GAS, GDS, MMSE, and StW. Figure 4.11 demonstrates trends, 
using error bars, for remaining cognitive variables. These parametric variables are SDMT, 
MMSE, IR, DR, DSB, and PPb. StW is presented both as box plots and error bars, because it 
is marginally parametric in distribution. 
The box plots at Figure 4.10, indicate outliers, some of which may appear extreme. 
However, the outliers here, and in other variables not graphically displayed, are within testing 
parameters and should not be excluded.  
At Figures 4.10 and 4.11, the only upward trend is for StW, but this information is of 
marginal value because of its mentioned, truncated distribution. Trends were roughly 
constant for: GAS, GDS, MMSE, StW, & DSB. Trending downward, were: SDMT, IR, DR 
and PPb. Lower scores for the cognitive measures represent poorer performance. 
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GDS 
 
MMSE 
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Figure 4.10.  
Box plots of Anxiety, Depression, Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE), and Spot the 
Word (StW) across four Waves of data for the cognitively healthy cases.  
Note: Vertical axes are raw scores.  
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IR 
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Figure 4.11.  
Error bars of cognitive variables by wave across four Waves of data for the cognitively 
healthy full sample, for Symbol Digit Modality Test (SDMT), Immediate Recall (IR), 
Delayed Recall (DR; DR data were unavailable for Wave 4), and Digit Span Backwards 
(DSB), Purdue Pegboard Both hands (PPb; representative of the trend also for dominant hand 
and non-dominant hand). 
Note: Error bars are for 95% confidence intervals of the means. 
 
 
4.3.4 Participants Unavailable for Follow-Up 
Table 4.3 above, provided frequencies by wave of cases accepted at baseline, as well as 
numbers (and percentages), unavailable to follow-up. Unavailability was due to: death, 
moved out of area, illness, dementia, and a small number of refusals. 
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Comparisons were made between participants available and unavailable for follow-up at 
either wave 3 or 4, as two separate analyses. Analyses were performed to determine whether 
such cases reflected different anxiety, depression, or cognitive scores at baseline and at either 
Wave 2 (for participants unavailable at Wave 3), or Wave 3 (for participants unavailable at 
Wave 4). The Mann-Whitney U-test and T-test for differences between groups, were 
compared for MMSE, GAS, and GDS. The Mann Whitney U-test for significance takes 
precedence over the T-test, for nonparametric variables. Therefore, significance reported by 
T-tests for GAS, GDS, and MMSE, at Tables 4.8 and 4.9, are irrelevant, unless corroborating 
significance reported by the Mann Whitney U-tests.  
Results are at Table 4.6 (for Mann-Whitney U-tests), and Table 4.8 (for T-tests) for cases 
becoming unavailable at wave 3, and Table 4.7 (for Mann-Whitney U-tests) and Table 4.9 
(for T-tests), for cases becoming unavailable at wave 4. Tables 4.25 and 4.26 also provide 
results of T-tests for differences between groups, for the parametrically distributed cognitive 
variables.  
By comparing these results within and between tables, the following points emerge: 
• For participants unavailable at Wave 3: From the U-tests, there are no differences 
between groups for their scores in GAS, GDS, or MMSE at Wave 2, and only a 
difference in GDS at Wave 1, indicating a higher GDS score for the unavailable 
group.  
• For participants unavailable at Wave 4: There are no differences at Waves 1 or 3 
in MMSE. For GDS, there are differences at Waves 1 and 3, confirmed by both 
types of test. For GAS, there are confirmed (by T-test) differences at Wave 3 but 
unconfirmed (by T-test) differences at Wave 1. The confirmed differences (at 
either Waves 1 or 3) indicate that GAS and GDS were higher, and MMSE were 
scores were lower, for the unavailable group. 
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• Remaining cognitive differences between groups are simpler to ascertain because 
they rely on T-tests alone. See Tables 4.8 and 4.9.  
o For participants unavailable at Wave 3 (Table 4.8), there were 
significantly lower scores at Wave 1 in all these cognitive variables. At 
Wave 2, there were significantly lower scores in SDMT, PPb, and DB.  
o For participants unavailable at Wave 4, the baseline cognitive scores were 
lower for SDMT and StW. And, at Wave 3, all cognitive scores were 
significantly lower for the unavailable group. 
• In Sum:  
o GAS was higher at Wave 3 for participants unavailable at Wave 4, but 
otherwise there was no difference in GAS among these tests;  
o GDS was higher at baseline for participants unavailable either at Wave 3 
or 4, and higher at Wave 3 (but not Wave 1) for participants unavailable 
at Wave 4;  
o With some exceptions, there was a predominance of lower cognitive 
scores at Wave 1, and Waves 2 or 3 for participants becoming unavailable 
respectively at Waves 3 or 4. 
Sections 4.3.10 and 4.3.11 below offer further insights into predictors of unavailability to 
follow-up, by examining associations respectively, with persistently-high-GAS and Chronic 
GAS. 
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Table 4.6. 
Mann-Whitney U-test: Differences between two groups, in medians for GAS, GDS, and 
MMSE at waves 1 & 2. Group1: cases present at wave 3; Group 2: cases missing at wave 3 
but previously present. 
Measure 
 Asymptotic Significance (at .05 level) of difference 
between medians of two groups: 
 present or missing at wave 3 
 Medians at  
Wave 1 
 
 
Medians at  
Wave 2 
GAS  .023  not significant 
GDS  .001^  .047 
MMSE  not significant  not significant 
^Remains significant after Bonferroni correction  
(at p < .05; two-tailed) for 3 comparisons. 
 
 
Table 4.7. 
Mann-Whitney U-test: Differences between two groups, in medians for GAS, GDS, and 
MMSE at waves 1 & 3. Group1: cases present at wave 4; Group 2: cases absent at wave 4 
but previously present. 
Measure 
 Asymptotic Significance of difference (at .05) level 
between medians of two groups: 
 present or missing at wave 4 
Median at  
Wave 1 
 
 
Median at  
Wave 3 
GAS .014^  .010^ 
GDS  .000^  .001^ 
MMSE  not significant  not significant 
^Remains significant after Bonferroni correction  
(at p < .05; two tailed) for 3 comparisons. 
 
 
  
 137 
Table 4.8 
T-test: Standardised differences between means (at waves 1 & 2 for GAS, GDS and cognitive 
measures) for two groups: available, or unavailable at wave 3 (and previously present). 
Measure 
 Standardised difference between means of two groups: 
 available and unavailable at wave 3 (and previously present). 
Standardised difference between 
means  
at wave 1 
 
 
Standardised difference between 
means  
at wave 2 
Difference 
between 
means (S.E.) 
 
95% CI  
(p) 
 
 
Difference 
between 
means (S.E.) 
 
95% CI  
(p) 
GAS 
 
.195 (.051)  .095 – .295 (.000) ^  .064 (.071)  
-.075 – .203  
(.373) 
GDS 
 
.253 (.051)  .153 – .352 (.000) ^  .179 (.072)  
.038 – .320  
(.013) 
MMSE  -.160 (.028)  -.216 – -.104 (.000) ^  -.358 (.079)  -.512 – -.203 (.000) ^ 
SDMT  -.404 (.051)  -.503 – -.305 (.000) ^  -.421 (.072)  -.562 – -.279 (.000) ^ 
PPB  -.167 (.051)  -.268 – -.066 (.001) ^  -.236 (.071)  -.375 – -.096 (.001) ^ 
IR 
 
-.246 (.051)  -.345 – -.146 (.000) ^  -.141 (.073)  
-.284 – .002  
(.050) 
DR 
 
-.186 (.052)  -.289 – -.084 (.000) ^  -.108 (0.080)  
-.265 – .050  
(.180) 
DB 
 
-. 255 (.051)  -.355 – -.155 (.000) ^  -.238 (.072)  
-.379 – -.097  
(.001) ^ 
StW 
 
-.381 (.051)  -.481 – -.282 (.000) ^  -.198 (.077)  
-.350 – -.046 
(.011) 
Notes: (1) A positive difference between groups implies cases not continuing at wave 3 had a 
higher mean (than continuing cases); (2) Refer to table 4.1 for meanings of abbreviates of 
measures; (3) ^ Remains significant (at p < .05; two-tailed) after Bonferroni correction for 11 
comparisons. 
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Table 4.9 
T-test: Standardised differences between means (at waves 1 & 3 for GAS, GDS and cognitive 
measures) for two groups: available, or unavailable at wave 4. 
Measure 
 Standardised difference between means of two groups: 
 available and unavailable at wave 4 (and previously present) 
 Standardised difference between 
means  
at wave 1 
 
 
Standardised difference 
between means  
at wave 3 
 
Difference 
between 
means (S.E.) 
 
95% CI 
(p) 
 
 
Difference 
between 
means (S.E.) 
 
95% CI 
(p) 
GAS 
 
.111 (.058)   
-.003 – .225 
(.056) 
 .187 (.060)  
.068 – .304 
(.002) ^ 
GDS 
 
.166 (.057)  
.055 – .278 
(.004) ^ 
 .287 (.060)   
.170 – .405 
(.000) ^  
MMSE 
 
-.164 (.339)  
-.227 – 1.102  
(.641) 
 -.359 (.061)  
-.479 – -.240 
(.000) ^ 
SDMT 
 
-.281 (.058)  
-.396 – -.166 
(.000) ^ 
 -.429 (.061)  
-.548 – -.311 
(.000) ^ 
PPb 
 
-.161 (.060)  
-.280 – -.043 
(.007) 
 -.271 (.062)  
-.393 – -.149 
(.000) ^  
IR 
 
-.154 (.059)  
-.270 – -.038 
(.009) 
 -.235 (.061)  
-.354 – -.117 
(.000) ^ 
StW 
 
-.298 (.057)  
-.410 – -.187 
(.000) ^ 
 -.333 (.062)  
-.455 – -.211 
(.000) ^ 
Notes:  
(1) A positive difference between means refers to cases unavailable at wave 4 as having a 
higher mean (than available cases);  
(2) Refer to table 4.1 for meanings of abbreviates of measures; and 
(3) DR data were unavailable for wave 4. 
(4) ^ Remains significant (at p < .05; two-tailed) after Bonferroni correction for 9 
comparisons. 
 
4.3.5 Prevalence 
Prevalence estimates are at Table 4.10 for: clinical levels of anxiety (estimated by GAS); 
depression (estimated by GDS); and comorbid anxiety and depression (estimated by clinical 
levels of both measures). Also included in Table 4.10, is an equivalent set of results for 
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psychological distress, notionally also at clinical levels, and calculated by two alternative 
methods, multiplication and addition of scores for each, as described in the Methods Section. 
The trends in prevalence of all five variables over the four waves, are slightly downward.  
Table 4.10. 
Prevalence Estimates of Clinical Anxiety (GAS≥7), Depression (GDS≥5), Comorbid anxiety 
and Depression, plus Psychological Distress, for the 60+ Cohort from PATH, Cognitively 
Healthy Participants at Baseline. 
Clinical Disorders Wave 1 
N, n, % prevalence, 
(95% CI % 
prevalence)  
Wave 2 
N, n, % prevalence, 
(95% CI % 
prevalence) 
Wave 3 
N, n, % prevalence, 
(95% CI % 
prevalence) 
Wave 4 
N, n, % prevalence, 
(95% CI % 
prevalence) 
GAS 2385, 152, 6.4%,  
(2.5%-10.3%) 
2098, 114, 5.4%,  
(1.3%-9.6%) 
1876, 88, 4.7%,  
(0.3%-9.1%) 
1575, 69, 4.4%,  
(-.04%-9.2%) 
GDS 2382, 211, 8.9%,  
(5.0%-12.7%) 
2097, 195, 9.3%,  
(5.2%-13.4%) 
1875, 158, 3.1%,  
(-1.4%-7.5%) 
1573, 133, 8.5%,  
(3.7%-13.2%) 
Comorbid GAS & 
GDS 
2385, 84, 3.5%, 
(-0. 4%-7.5%) 
2100, 65, 3.1%, 
(-1.1%-7.3%) 
1876, 41, 2.2%, 
(-2.3%-6.7%) 
1574, 34, 2.2%, 
(-2.7%-7.0%) 
Psychological 
Distress (PsDM) 
by multiplication 
of GAS & GDS 
2382, 114, 4.8%,  
(0.9%-8.7%) 
2095, 94, 4.5%,  
(0.3%-8.7%) 
1875, 55, 2.9%,  
(-1.5%-7.4%) 
1573, 49, 3.1%,  
(-1.7%-8.0%) 
Psychological 
Distress (PsDA) by 
addition of GAS & 
GDS 
2382, 125, 5.2%, 
(1.3%-9.2%) 
2095, 100, 4.8% 
(0.6%-9.0%) 
1875, 65, 3.5% 
(-1.0%-7.9%) 
1573, 55, 3.5% 
(-1.4%-8.4%) 
Notes:  
N is sample size after discounting cases either unavailable for follow-up or with missing data;  
n is the number of cases with clinical level score.  
% prevalence is the percentage of n/N.  
The 95% CI is for the % prevalence. 
PsD cutpoints: by multiplication ≥ 35; by addition ≥12. 
PsDM = PsD derived by multiplication. 
PsDA = PsD derived by addition. 
 
 
From Table 4.10, it is notable that comorbid GAS and GDS have prevalence, wave-by-
wave, more like psychological distress calculated by the product of the GAS and GDS scores 
than by their sum. Such comparisons are more meaningful when accounting for the 95% 
confidence intervals. However, these confidence intervals indicate all the comorbidity 
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prevalence percentages, and most of the Waves 3 & 4 percentages for all measures, are not 
statistically significant estimates of the general population. 
 
4.3.6 Scales 
4.3.5.1 Internal consistency. 
For GAS and GDS, internal consistency and basic descriptions at Wave 1 are listed in 
Table 4.11. GAS and GDS both have acceptable Lambda values for internal consistency. 
 
Table 4.11. 
Consistency for GAS and GDS at Wave 1(cognitively normal cases). 
Measure/Scale 
Number of 
Items 
Maximum 
Guttman’s 
Lambda 
 
Score 
Mean (SD) 
Notes 
GAS 9 λ2 = .783 2.2 (2.308)  
GDS 9 
λ2 = .761 1.64 (1.805) If item 7 (dealing with waking early) were 
removed, λ2 = .802 
 
4.3.5.2 Exploratory factor analyses. 
4.3.5.2.1 Goldberg Anxiety Scale. 
The nine items of the GAS were analysed using data for Wave 1. Other Waves were also 
analysed (results not shown) and were found to be approximately consistent with Wave 1. 
Details of the analysis, including factor loadings, are described at chapter Appendix 4.A. 
Three factors were identified: Factor 1 – Worry:  Drawing on items for: keyed-up, worrying, 
irritable, difficulty relaxing, and worried about health; Factor 2 – Sleep:  Drawing on items 
for: difficulty relaxing, sleeping poorly, difficulty falling asleep; and Factor 3 – Somatic: 
Drawing on items for: headaches, trembling, and worried about health. ‘Difficulty relaxing’ 
was represented in Factors 1 and 2, and ‘worried about health’ was represented in factors 1 
and 3. No symptoms of anxiety were unrepresented in the factor loadings. 
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4.3.5.2.2 Goldberg Depression Scale. 
The nine items of the GDS were analysed using data from Wave 1. Exploratory factor 
analysis using Mplus options for binary data were used to ascertain whether there were latent 
factors underlying the scale. Details of the analysis, including factor loadings, are described 
at chapter Appendix 4.B. A two-factor solution was found suggesting: Factor 1 – Low 
energy: Drawing on items for: Felt slowed up, and Lacking energy; and, Factor 2 – Hopeless: 
Drawing on items for: Lost confidence, Felt hopeless, and Lost interest. Waking early and 
Lost weight were unrepresented in these factors. 
4.3.7 Cross-Sectional Correlations with GAS 
4.3.7.1 Associations between GAS, age, sex, and education. 
Demographic covariates that may influence associations between anxiety and cognitive 
performance include age, sex, and education. Table 4.12 reports nonparametric correlations 
between GAS scores and the demographic covariates. At each wave, GAS was positively 
associated with female sex, and negatively associated with years of education. There was no 
association between GAS and age. 
 
Table 4.12.  
Nonparametric, Cross-Sectional Correlations between GAS (by Wave) and Age, Sex, & 
Baseline Education 
 GAS score correlated with: 
Wave Age 
 
 
Female 
 
 
Education 
1 .019  .131**   -.072** 
2 .023  .135**   -.068**  
3 .031  .117**  -.049* 
4 .040  .092**   -.051*  
Note:  * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level; and, ** at the .01 level, (2-tailed) 
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4.3.7.2 Cross-Sectional associations between GAS, GDS, and cognitive measures. 
For cognitively healthy individuals, nonparametric correlations between anxiety, 
depression and cognitive measures, by wave, are presented in Tables 4.13 to 4.16. These 
tables present a pattern of significant correlations between the cognitive measures at each 
wave. At Wave 1, GAS was positively correlated only with GDS and negatively with SDMT. 
These two correlations were sustained at all waves, and as time progressed, cross-sectional 
correlations with GAS included more of the cognitive measures so that by Wave 4, GAS was 
correlated with all cognitive measures except DB and StW. Most associations between 
cognition and GAS were weak. Between cognition and GDS, correlations were either 
medium or weak. Notably, associations between GAS and GDS were at a moderate level 
throughout all waves. 
 
Table 4.13. 
Nonparametric Correlations for Wave 1: Anxiety, depression, and cognitive performance. 
Variable GAS GDS SDMT PPd PPn PPb IR DR DSB StW 
GAS 1          
GDS .612** 1         
SDMT -.073* -.112** 1        
PPd -.030 -.065** .231** 1       
PPn -.023 -.065** .220** .478** 1      
PPb -.029 -.063** .261** .542** .564** 1     
IR -.011 -.060** .265** .167** .114** .146** 1    
DR  .000 -.041* .287** .159** .116** .136** .819** 1   
DSB -.037 -.071** .338** .091** .078** .105** .239** .223** 1  
StW -.006 -.002 .329** .048* .072** .077** .270** .245** .313** 1 
Notes: 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*    Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 4.14 
Nonparametric Correlations for Wave 2: Anxiety, depression, and cognitive performance. 
Variable GAS GDS SDMT PPd PPn PPb IR DR DSB StW 
GAS 1          
GDS .654** 1         
SDMT -.063** -.104** 1        
PPd -.021 -.061** .240** 1       
PPn -.059** -.091** .250** .553** 1      
PPb -.014 -.064** .233** .599** .609** 1     
IR -.043* -.086** .233** .153** .109** .141** 1    
DR  -.030 -.085** .231** .162** .115** .151** .812** 1   
DSB -.038 -.027 .345** .073** .081** .089** .229** .188** 1  
StW .001 .006 .278** .051* .084** .070** .239** .239** .335** 1 
Notes: 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*    Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
  
 144 
 
Table 4.15 
Nonparametric Correlations for Wave 3: Anxiety, depression, and cognitive performance. 
Variable GAS GDS SDMT PPd PPn PPb IR DR DSB StW 
GAS 1          
GDS .595** 1         
SDMT -.115** -.166** 1        
PPd -.087** -.137** .271** 1       
PPn -.078** -.109** .263** .537** 1      
PPb -.095** -.120** .300** .583** .631** 1     
IR -.037 -.068** .282** .191** .162** .187** 1    
DR  -.045* -.063** .290** .189** .150** .189** .819** 1   
DSB -.030 -.056* .311** .090** .098** .112** .224** .198** 1  
StW -.012 -.043 .269** .056* .055* .081** .228** .222** .338** 1 
Notes: 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*    Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 4.16 
Nonparametric Correlations for Wave 4: Anxiety, depression, and cognitive performance. 
Variable GAS GDS SDMT PPd PPn PPb IR DSB StW 
GAS 1         
GDS .605** 1        
SDMT -.096** -.142** 1       
PPd -.073** -.162** .282** 1      
PPn -.086** -.155** .307** .591** 1     
PPb -.083** -.140** .288** .623** .648** 1    
IR -.056* -.082** .277** .141** .131** .107** 1   
DSB -.041 -.064* .311* .123* .142* .167* .217* 1  
StW .008 .024 .268** .024 .050 .061* .253** .313** 1 
Notes: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
DR data were unavailable for wave 4. 
 
4.3.8 Cognitive Change 
For the key variables, the wave-by-wave change in average cognitive performance was 
illustrated at Section 4.3.3, and at Figures 4.10 and 4.11, above.  
A different perspective on change between Waves 1 and 4 is provided by Figure 4.12 
below, which shows frequency distributions of cognitive change, calculated as the difference 
in score (between Waves 1 and 4) for each cognitive variable and for each individual, then 
graphed as a frequency distribution of these changes over time. In each case, the spread of 
cognitive change is roughly, normally distributed. There is a clear shift to lower scores for IR, 
PPb, and SDMT; and to higher scores for StW; and, remaining cognitive measures were not 
clearly different after the four waves.  
At Figure 4.13 and Table 4.17, trends for incident cognitive impairment indicate a sharp 
increase in both MCI and, dementia, toward the end of the study time frame. 
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Figure 4.12.  
Frequencies of score-changes from Wave 1 to Wave 4, for immediate recall (IR), delayed 
recall (DR), Purdue Pegboard – both hands (PPb), spot the word (StW), mini mental state 
examination (MMSE0, symbol digit modalities test (SDMT), and digit span backwards 
(DSB). Score-changes for DR were from Wave 1 to Wave 3 (Wave 4 data unavailable). For 
each graph, the normal curve is overlayed for comparison. 
 
 
In addition to the above measures of cognitive ability, there are also to be considered the 
incidence of MCI and dementia. Figure 4.13 illustrates the frequencies by wave, of MCI and 
dementia, for which frequencies are presented at Table 4.17.  
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Figure 4.13. Frequencies of MCI and Dementia by Wave 
 
Table 4.17 
Frequencies by Wave, Illustrated at Figure 4.13, for MCI and Dementia 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 
MCI 0 23 33 143 
Dementia 0 0 7 46 
 
4.3.9 Confounding Variables 
From Table 4.18, there were 14 variables which were associated with both the predictor 
and the prognostic outcomes (cognitive change), as indicated in the final column, thus 
indicating potential for confounding effects on associations between anxiety and cognitive 
change. These are in addition to depression, which has already been established in the 
literature as a confounder. These additional 15 variables were: anxiolytics; education; sex; 
general health; physical health; mastery; physical activity (at three levels); positive affect; 
smoker status; sleeping problems; consulted doctor Re memory; and resilience.  
0
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Table 4.18  
Nonparametric Correlations of Possible Confounding Variables at Baseline, with GAS and 
Change (Wave 1 to Wave 4) in Cognitive Functions. 
 
Variable 
Baseline 
Anxiety 
(GAS) 
IR DR PPb StW MMSE SDMT DSB 
Correlated 
with both 
GAS and 
any 
Cognitive 
Decline? 
(Y)es or 
(N)o 
Age .020 -.087** -.077** -.053* -.001 -.030 -.037 -.026 N 
Alcohol: 
hazardous or 
harmful 
consumption: 
-.050* .012 -.014 .034 -.037 .024 .002 .004 N 
Anxiolytics -.219** .033 -.023 .022 .036 .081** .060* .005 Y 
Benzodiazepines .126** .026 -.006 -.023 .001 -.003 -.010 -.032 N 
Education years -.073** .019 -.032 .004 -.046 .067* .011 -.012 Y 
EPQ 
Neuroticism 
.498** .009 .026 -.013 .002 .011 .008 -.030 N 
Female .130** -.052* .015 -.058* .035 .125** .009 .015 Y 
General Health -.370** .029 .026 -.099** .002 .052* .051 .022 Y 
Physical Health -.435** .035 .021 .109** -.005 .043 .053 .025 Y 
Life events .200** -.028 -.043 -.026 -.009 .025 -.041 .028 N 
Mastery (Wave 
4) 
-.380** .027 .022 .004 .041 .058* .021 .031 Y 
Negative Affect .579** -.035 -.033 .002 -.030 -.001 -.007 -.026 N 
Physical Activity: 
mild; moderate; 
vigorous. 
.129** 
.177** 
.133** 
.049 
.003 
.005 
-.003 
-.005 
.038 
-.034 
-.060* 
-.072** 
-.014 
-.002 
.032 
-.071** 
-.001 
-.007 
.014 
-.042 
-.035 
.000 
-.015 
.016 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Positive Affect -.280** .031 .013 .006 .035 .073** .051 -.017 Y 
Smoker: current 
- n (%); Mean all 
(SD) 
never=0; past=1; 
current=2 
.043* .007 -.014 .023 -.029 -.054* -.066* -.030 Y 
Social Support 
general 
(negative) 
.311** .0004 -.029 -.030 .009 .-.008 -.038 .063 N 
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Variable 
Baseline 
Anxiety 
(GAS) 
IR DR PPb StW MMSE SDMT DSB 
Correlated 
with both 
GAS and 
any 
Cognitive 
Decline? 
(Y)es or 
(N)o 
Social Support 
general 
(positive) 
-.113** -.016 -.007 -.044 .026 .031 .023 -.002 N 
Social Support 
partner 
relationship 
(negative) 
.247** -.022 -.020 .044 -.030 .006 -.018 -.010 N 
Social Support 
partner 
relationship 
(positive) 
-.194** .000 -.015 -.017 .009 -.058 -.012 -.007 N 
Sleep 
medications 
Wave 1 
-.277** .029 .040 .043 .009 -.024 .039 .037 N 
Goldberg Wave 
1, sleeping 
poorly 
.611** -.033 -.028 -.033 .020 .034 -.018 -.020 N 
BPH Wave 1, 
Trouble sleeping  
.543** -.041 -.054* -.056* -.001 .014 -.034 -.024 Y 
Subjective 
memory 
complaint 
-.196** .016 -.001 -.028 .856 -.022 -.007 -.004 N 
Consulted 
Doctor Re 
Memory W1 
.221** .011 -.011 -.026 -.023 -.020 -.065* -.005 Y 
Resilience Wave 
3^ 
-.130** -.018 -.006 -.079** .025 .030 .026 -.001 Y 
GDS 
Depression W1 
.613** -.001 -.028 -.047 -.005 -.049 -.051 -.014 N 
Notes. ^Resilience data were unavailable for Wave1; Wave 3 data were used here as a proxy.  
* = significant at the p < .05 level; ** = significant at the p < .01 level (2-tail). 
 
4.3.10 Persistently-high-GAS 
Table 4.19 reports frequencies by wave, of persistently-high-GAS sub-groups from 
PATH. For the group with high GAS for at least three waves, the numbers of participants at 
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each wave were constant (at 140) until a reduction in wave 4. For the group with high GAS 
for at least two waves, the numbers of participants at each wave were constant (at 332) only 
in Waves 1 and 2, before a reduction in Wave 3. Notable is that by either definition of 
persistently-high-GAS (high for two or more, or for three or more, waves of the four), the 
group of participants represents only a small subset of the PATH sample. For example, 140 
represented just 5.9% of the cognitively healthy, baseline sample. 
The associations between persistently-high-anxiety and unavailability at Wave 4 follow-
up, is reported at Table 4.20. The positive correlations infer that persistently-high-GAS (for 
either 2 or 3 waves) is weakly associated with loss to follow-up in Wave 4.   
 
Table 4.19 
Frequencies by wave, of cognitively healthy cases at baseline, for which there was a 
persistently-high-GAS score. 
 
Present at 
Wave 1 
Present at 
Wave 2 
Present at 
Wave 3 
Present at 
Wave 4 
High GAS for 3 
or more Waves 
140 140 140 122 
High GAS for 2 
or more waves 
332 332 311 263 
Notes: (1) GAS score is defined here as persistently high if ≥5 symptoms, present for ≥3 or 
≥2 waves; (2) GAS is Goldberg Anxiety Score.   
 
 
Table 4.20 
Nonparametric Correlations between Persistently-high-GAS and Unavailability for Follow-
up at Wave 4. 
 
Persistently-high-GAS  
for ≥ 2 waves 
Persistently-high-GAS  
for 3 waves 
Available until Wave 3 only 
(Unavailable at Wave 4) 
.117** .090** 
Notes.  The was no significant correlation for the group Unavailable at Wave 3. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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4.3.11 Chronic GAS 
Chronic anxiety, as measured by GAS, is similar to the above explanation of 
persistently-high-GAS but using the clinical cutpoint (symptom count ≥ 7) in place of the 
high cutpoint (≥ 5). Clinical levels of GAS, and its cutpoint, have been previously explained 
(Section 4.2.4.4).   
Table 4.21 reports frequencies by wave, of chronic GAS. For the group with chronic 
GAS for at least three waves, and for the group with chronic GAS for at least two waves. The 
cell sizes are small, particularly for the group that exhibited chronic GAS for at least three of 
the four waves.  
The associations between chronic GAS and unavailability at Wave 4 follow-up, is 
reported at Table 4.22.  Chronic GAS was not correlated with unavailability for follow-up.  
Table 4.21 
Frequencies by Wave, of Cognitively Healthy Cases at Baseline, for which there was a 
Chronic GAS Score Observed for ≥3 or ≥2 Waves. 
 
Present at 
Wave 1 
Present at 
Wave 2 
Present at 
Wave 3 
Present at 
Wave 4 
Chronic GAS for 3 or 
more Waves 
31 31 31 27 
Chronic GAS for 2 or 
more waves 
86 85 83 70 
Notes:  
(1) GAS score is defined here as persistently high if ≥5 symptoms, present for ≥3 or ≥2 
waves;  
(2) GAS is Goldberg Anxiety Score.   
 
 
Table 4.22 
Nonparametric Correlations between Chronic GAS and Availability for Follow-up at Wave 4. 
 
Chronic GAS  
for ≥ 2 waves 
Chronic GAS  
for 3 waves 
Available until Wave 3 only 
(Unavailable at Wave 4) 
-.002 -.002 
Notes.  There was no significant correlation for the group Unavailable at Wave 3 (data not 
shown); and, no correlation with Available until Wave 3 (but unavailable at Wave 4) – data 
shown in table. 
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4.3.12 Associations with Cognitive Change, for GAS, GAS Items, Derivatives, and 
Proxies 
Table 4.2 described the GAS derivatives and other proxies which are referred to here, in 
analyses of correlations. Table 4.23 provides Spearman (nonparametric) correlation between 
GAS and each of the derivatives and proxies at baseline.  
From Table 4.23, most correlations were positive and significant at the p < .01 level. 
Exceptions were: the correlation between BPHQ-anxiety-W2 and BIS (not significant), and GAS 
Trichotomised Mild with most other variables for which correlations were small, or negative, or not 
significant. 
Apart from associations with GAS Trichotomised Mild, correlations ranged from .138 
(between BIS and GAS-Sleep) to .801 (between GAS and GAS-Worry). The highest 
correlation between GAS and proxies other than GAS derivatives, was between GAS and 
negative affect (at .579). The proxy, BPHQ-anxiety-W2 is described at Table 4.2, and is 
included in these analyses because it represents potentially valuable data even though the 
measurement was not taken at baseline. The correlation, not shown in the table, between 
BPHQ-anxiety-W2 and GAS at Wave 2, was .607 (p < .001).  
Table 4.24 presents nonparametric correlations between GAS (plus derivatives and 
proxies), and cognitive change between Waves 1 and 4, for each of the cognitive measures. 
The table demonstrates only a small number of correlations. The significant correlations 
appear only for GAS derivatives: (1) Clinical GAS, with decline in PPb; (2) Persistently-
high-GAS subgroup (≥2waves) with decline in PPb; (3) Persistently-high-GAS subgroup 
(≥3waves), with decline in both IR and SDMT; (4) Chronic GAS (≥3 waves) with decline in 
DR; (5) Trichotomised GAS, in the low range, with improved PPb, and in the moderate to 
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severe range, with decline in both PPb and SDMT; and (6) GAS-Somatic, with decline in 
PPb.  
Considering this same table (4.24) from the perspective of which cognitive measures 
were influenced by the GAS derivatives: StW, MMSE, and DSB were not associated with 
any of the GAS derivatives; IR was associated (negatively) only with Persistently-High-GAS 
Subgroup (≥3waves); DR was associated (negatively) only with Chronic GAS (≥3 waves); 
PPb was correlated with five GAS derivatives [Clinical GAS, Persistently-High GAS-
subgroup (≥2waves), Trichotomised GAS moderate to severe, Trichotomised GAS Low, and 
GAS-somatic] — these were all negative associations except for Trichotomised GAS-low 
range; and, decline in SDMT was associated with Persistently-high-GAS subgroup 
(≥3waves) and Trichotomised GAS Moderate to Severe. Effect sizes reflected by the 
correlations in Table 4.24 were all small.  
Table 4.25 reports correlations of baseline GAS, derivatives, and proxies, with Wave 4 
incident MCI and dementia plus their sub-categories. Positive correlations were: Persistently-
high-GAS subgroup (≥3waves) and Trichotomised GAS moderate to severe, with amnestic 
and total MCI. Various negative correlations are reported in the table. All correlations were 
with small effect size. 
Tables 4.24 and 4.25 are also convenient places to demonstrate correlations between 
baseline PsD and cognitive change. PsD derived by multiplication was negatively correlated 
with PPb. Otherwise, there was no association found. 
Table 4.26 reports only significant correlations between individual, baseline, GAS items 
and cognitive change. Decline in PPb over the four waves, was associated with the highest 
number of GAS items (item numbers: 5, 6, & 9). Difficulty falling asleep (GAS item 9) was 
associated with three measures of cognitive decline, (PPb, SDMT, & DSB). Only GAS item 
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number 1 (Keyed up), was (positively) correlated with MCI at Wave 4. Only GAS item 2, 
Worrying, was correlated with dementia at Wave 4. 
There were no substantive correlations (results not displayed) between GAS (or proxies) 
and cognitive change, for the subgroups of participants who became unavailable for follow-
up. 
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Table 4.23  
Nonparametric Correlations between Baseline GAS, Derivatives, and Proxies.. 
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GAS full sample 1                
Clinical GAS W1 .433** 1               
Persistently-high-
GAS (≥2 waves) 
.467** .361** 1              
Persistently-high-
GAS (≥3 waves) 
.346** .381** .620** 1             
Chronic GAS (≥2 
waves) 
.282** .495** .482** .585** 1            
Chronic GAS (≥3 
waves) 
.191** .404** .286** .461** .593** 1           
GAS-Sleep .655** .373** .345** .253** .210** .144** 1          
GAS-Somatic .730** .380** .360** .283** .250** .184** .309** 1         
GAS-Worry .801** .433** .437** .437** .275** .194** .370** .377** 1        
GAS-Trichotomised 
Mild 
.227** -.269** -.220** -.189** -.141** -.119** .020 .180** .013 1       
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GAS Trichotomised 
Moderate to 
Severe 
.680** .557** .557** .443** .337** .245** .513** .503** .652** -.483** 1      
BIS .276** .150** 197** .144** .119** .098** .138** .188** .273** .009 .224** 1     
Neuroticism .498** .303** .346** .283** .236** .178** .259** .336** .495** .010 .408** .588** 1    
Negative Affect .579** .332** .340** .254* .220** .159** .264** .353** .639** .020 .467** .293** .510** 1   
Rumination .492** .283** .336** .252** .215** .172** .273** .359** .449** .049* .384** .400** .582** .509** 1  
BPHQ-anxiety-W2^ .386** .306** .439** .327** .344** .245** .302** .298** .281** -.168** .302** .071 .271** .269** .286** 1 
Cortisol W1 .022 .059 .075 .080 .020 -.002 .032 .003 -.025 -.014 .023 .075 .015 -.022 -.026 -.009 
Note: ** = significant at the p < .01 level; GAS= Goldberg Anxiety Scale; BIS= Behavioural Inhibition Scale; GAS-Physical= physical 
symptoms from the GAS; GAS-Worry= worry item from the GAS. ^BPHQ-anxiety data were available only from Wave 2.  
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Table 4.24 
Nonparametric Correlations of Baseline GAS, Derivatives, & Proxies, with cognitive change 
from Baseline to Wave 4 
 
Variable 
IR DR PPb StW MMSE SDMT DSB 
GAS full sample -.030 .028 -.048 .031 .037 -.039 -.022 
Clinical GAS W1 .000 .028 -.060* .020 -.022 -.020 -.035 
W1 GAS for 
Persistently-high-
GAS Subgroup (≥2 
waves) 
-.051 -.007 -.095 .034 -.013 -.076 -.032 
W1 GAS for 
Persistently-high-
GAS subgroup (≥3 
waves) 
.017 -.039 -.043 .076 -.087 -.031 -.080 
W1 GAS for Chronic 
GAS (≥2 waves) .115 .006 .049 .056 -.022 .019 .040 
W1 GAS for Chronic 
GAS (≥3 waves) .177 -.375* .059 .130 -.389 -.171 .126 
GAS-Sleep -.032 -.018 -.045 .025 .033 -.040 -.040 
GAS-Somatic -.018 -.010 -.054* .009 .007 -.023 -.010 
GAS-Worry -.018 -.024 -.026 .025 .031 .237 -.010 
W1 GAS for 
Trichotomised GAS 
Low 
-..019 -.055 -.096* -.022 .041 .026 .018 
W1 GAS for 
Trichotomised GAS 
Moderate to Severe 
-.007 -.062 -.036 .009 -.096 -.055 -.018 
PsDM -.027 -.037 -.053* -.016 -.010 -.043 -.023 
PsDA -.017 -.027 -.048 -.008 -.004 -.049 -.019 
BIS -.015 -.003 -.016 .016 .019 .010 .004 
Neuroticism .009 .026 -.013 .002 .001 .008 -.030 
Negative Affect -.035 -.033 .002 -.030 -.001 -.007 -.026 
Rumination -.022 .001 .008 -.032 -.005 -.024 -.007 
BPHQ-anxiety-W2^ -.064 -.047 -.079 .089 -.052 -.098* .557 
Cortisol -.018 -.039 -.037 .087 -.046 .005 .025 
Note. ^ This row of data was based on Wave 2 established as baseline with no cognitive 
impairment. BPHQ is approximately normally distributed so correlations are Pearson, 
parametric correlations. 
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Table 4.25 
Nonparametric correlations of Baseline GAS, Derivatives, and Proxies,  
with Wave 4 MCI and Dementia 
  MCI W4  Dementia (new at) W4 
Anxiety or Proxy 
W1 
 
Amnestic 
Non-
amnestic 
Total 
MCI 
 
Alzheimer’s 
disease 
Other than 
Alzheimer’s 
disease 
Total 
Dementia 
GAS full sample  -.022 ..083 .030  -.096 .000 -.068 
Clinical GAS  .086 .023 .090  -.072 -.024 -.071 
W1 GAS for 
Persistently-
high-GAS 
(≥2waves) 
 
.179 -.067 .110  No cases .018 .018 
W1 GAS for 
Persistently-
high-GAS 
(≥3waves) 
 
.027 -.455* -.364*  No cases No cases No cases 
W1 GAS for 
Chronic GAS (≥2 
waves) 
 
-.206 -.086 -.406  No cases No cases No cases 
W1 GAS for 
Chronic GAS (≥3 
waves) 
 
-.073 -.133 -.387  No cases No cases No cases 
Trichotomised 
GAS Low 
 
.473 -.033 -.016  .032 .031 .091 
Trichotomised 
GAS Moderate to 
severe 
 
.402 .108 -.006  -.082 -.016 -.099 
GAS-Sleep  .022 .079 .070  -.122* .018 -.072 
GAS-Somatic  -.033 .018 -.023  -.029 -.019 .000 
GAS-Worry  .004 .101 .068  -.056 -.019 -.061 
PsDM  .024 .069 .066  -.097 .024 -.062 
PsDA  .011 .091 .066  -.094 .016 -.057 
BIS  -.049 .068 -.005  -.083 .024 -.056 
Neuroticism  .022 .102 .082  -.042 -.012 -.061 
Negative Affect  -.010 .095 .049  -.035 0.030 -.027 
Rumination  .005 .077 .048  .020 .047 .029 
BPHQ-anxiety-
W2^ 
 
.028 .032 .049  -.152 -.119 -.229 
Cortisol  -.038 -.018 -.047  -.147 .041 -.132 
GDS Depression  -.029 .082 .023  -.037 .039 .004 
Note: Correlations of binary variables are not necessarily meaningful. The next chapter 
examines these relationships with logistic regression. 
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Table 4.26 
Correlations between Baseline GAS Items and Cognitive Change (Waves 1 to 4) AND 
Cognitive Impairment Wave4: Showing only Significant Results. 
GAS items PPb StW SDMT DSB MCI Dementia 
1-Keyed up     .113*  
2-Worrying  .079**    -.118* 
5-Sleeping 
Poorly 
-.057*      
6-Head & 
Neck 
Aches 
-.059*      
9-Difficulty 
Falling 
Asleep 
-.072**  -.072** -.055**   
* = significant at the p < .05 level; ** = significant at the p < .01 level (2-tail). 
 
 
 
4.3.13 Additional Variables as Potential Moderators or Mediators 
Table 4.27 provides the nonparametric correlations between GAS, derivatives, and 
proxies, on the one hand, and APOE e4 carrier status & BMI, on the other. Only BMI was 
correlated with anxiety proxies (BIS, GAS-Somatic, and rumination) as well as cognitive 
change (PPb, SDMT). BMI therefore, qualifies as a possible confounder of associations 
between anxiety and cognitive change. APOE carrier status e4/e4 (homozygous) was 
unrelated to anxiety measures but was associated with cognitive changes (decline in DR, and 
DSB, and incident dementia at wave 4).  
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Table 4.27 
Nonparametric Correlations of Additional Variables with Anxiety (and Proxies),  
and Cognitive Change 
Variable 
APOE e4 
BMI e4 single 
Heterozygous 
e4/e4 
Homozygous 
GAS full sample -.035 -.005 .035 
Clinical GAS .047 -.028 .011 
Persistently-high-GAS 
Subgroup (≥2waves) 
.014 -.004 .031 
Persistently-high-GAS 
subgroup (≥3waves) 
.036 -.033 .017 
Chronic GAS (≥2waves) .014 -.027 .012 
Chronic GAS (≥3waves) .064 -.017 .005 
Trichotomised GAS Low -.030 .043 .016 
Trichotomised GAS 
Moderate to Severe 
.013 -.051 .013 
GAS-Sleep -.040 -.003 .052* 
GAS-Somatic .012 -.022 .053* 
GAS-Worry .005 -.023 -.009 
BIS -.017 .016 -.058** 
Neuroticism -.004 -.039 -.025 
Negative Affect -.038 -.045 -.004 
Rumination -.064 .007 .050* 
BPHQ-anxiety-W2 .034 -.030 .044 
Change in IR -.030 -.055 -.019 
Change in DR -.025 -.117* -.022 
Change in PPb -.035 .048 -.071* 
Change in StW -.053 -.010 .014 
Change in MMSE .002 -.030 -.024 
Change in SDMT -.043 .018 -.054* 
Change in DSB .050 -.106* -.011 
MCI W4 .212 -.095 .001 
Dementia W4 .035 .396** -.052 
Correlated with both anxiety 
(or proxies) and Cognitive 
Change. 
No No Yes 
Notes: “Change in” IR etc, refers to change from Wave 1 to Wave 4  
in cognitive score. Positive change represents an increased score.  
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4.3.14 Summary of Results 
4.3.14.1 The Sample. 
Baseline PATH data for cognitively healthy participants from the 60+ cohort, were 
analysed over four waves, at four-yearly intervals (12 years).  
4.3.14.2 Distributions. 
Baseline distributions of key variables were examined for normality. Most were 
approximately normally distributed. Three variables were distributed nonparametrically. 
They were GAS, GDS and MMSE. StW was distributed approximately with normal 
distribution but truncated at the maximum scale score, 1.43 standard deviations above the 
mean. 
4.3.14.3 Prevalence. 
Prevalence of clinical anxiety (GAS score ≥ 7) at baseline was 6.4% at baseline. 
Prevalence of clinical levels of depression (GDS score ≥ 5) was 8.9% at baseline. Prevalence 
of comorbid anxiety and depression, by the same measures, was 3.5%. A level of 
psychological distress, described notionally as a “clinical” level, was calculated by two 
alternative methods for the interaction of GAS and GDS. Clinical psychological distress 
represented either 4.8% or 5.2% of the sample at baseline.  
4.3.14.4 Key variables by wave. 
By observation of error bars (for parametric data) or box plots (for non-parametric data) 
across all four waves, there was a downward trend in scores for SDMT, IR, DR, PPb, and no 
clear trend for GAS, GDS, MMSE, or DSB. StW appears to trend upwards but the baseline 
distribution of this variable was only marginally normal, so error bar indication of trend over 
time was not necessarily a valid result, and box plots indicate no trend. There were no other 
upward trends. 
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4.3.14.5 Participants unavailable for follow-up. 
Comparative group analysis of participants, available and unavailable for follow-up at 
Waves 3 and 4, revealed unavailable individuals scored lower on most cognitive measures. 
There were mixed results for differences (between groups) in GAS and GDS scores, earlier in 
the sequence of four waves. 
4.3.14.6 Scales. 
GAS and GDS scales were internally consistent. Other variables were not suitable for 
examination of internal consistency.  
Exploratory factor analyses of GAS and GDS revealed latent factors, able to represent 
both constructs. The latent factors for GAS were: Worry, Sleep, and Somatic. For GDS, 
latent factors were: Low energy, and Hopeless. 
4.3.14.7 Cross-sectional correlations with GAS. 
Cross-sectional correlations reported at Tables 4.12 to 4.16, indicated: 
1. Wave-by-wave, GAS was positively correlated with female sex, and negatively 
correlated with years of education; 
2. At Wave 1, the set of cognitive measures are mutually correlated, and correlated 
with GDS.  GAS was not correlated with the cognitive measures except for 
SDMT. This pattern was repeated at subsequent waves except that GAS became 
cross-sectionally correlated with more of the cognitive measures, ultimately with 
all except DSB and StW. 
3. GAS and GDS were moderately correlated at each wave. 
4.3.14.8 Cognitive change. 
For the cognitive measures, the distributions of changes in scores between Waves 1 and 
4 indicated a shift, to lower scores for IR, PPb, and SDMT; and to higher scores for StW, and 
DR. Both incident MCI and dementia escalated sharply over the four waves. 
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4.3.14.9 Confounding variables. 
Fourteen variables were identified as possible confounders to associations between 
baseline anxiety and cognitive change between Waves 1 and 4. These 14 variables were in 
addition to GDS (depression). GDS was not established as a confounder for PATH data, in 
the preliminary analyses at Tables 4.18 or 4.25, but has been identified in the literature as a 
common confounding variable for associations between anxiety and cognitive change 
(multiple references to confounding and comorbidity at Chapters One & Two). As a 
precaution GDS will be included as a potential confounder in PATH analyses. The other 14 
confounders are: anxiolytics; education; female sex; general health; physical health; mastery; 
physical activity at three levels; positive affect; smoker status; sleeping problems; consulted 
doctor Re memory; and resilience. BMI was added to this list in a subsequent examination of 
possible, additional moderators and mediators (Section 4.3.13).  
4.3.14.10 Persistently-High-GAS.  
Participants with persistently high anxiety represented only a small subset of the PATH 
sample: at baseline there were 140 with high anxiety (using GAS) for at least three of the four 
waves. Persistently-high-GAS was associated with loss to follow-up at Wave 4. 
4.3.14.11 Chronic GAS. 
Chronic GAS was defined as a clinical level of GAS sustained alternatively for ≥ 2 or ≥ 
3 waves of the available 4 waves. The number of cases with chronic GAS, by either 
definition, was small. Chronic GAS was not associated with unavailability for follow-up. 
4.3.14.12 Associations with cognitive change, for GAS, GAS items, derivatives, and 
proxies. 
GAS and all the selected proxies were moderately to highly correlated, cross-sectionally, 
with each other. GAS (full scale) was not correlated with cognitive change. However, three 
measures of cognitive decline were associated with six of the GAS derivatives. Notable 
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among these was that decline in PPb was correlated with four derivatives. The only 
correlations with Wave 4 dementia were negative, suggesting anxiety may be protective 
against dementia. Two derivatives [persistently-high-GAS subgroup (≥3waves), and 
Trichotomised GAS Moderate to severe] were positively correlated with Wave 4 MCI. 
Five of the nine, individual GAS items (at baseline) were correlated with cognitive 
change. Of these, the most influential appear to be Difficulty falling asleep which was 
negatively correlated with PPb, SDMT, and DSB. Of the cognitive measures, PPb was 
(negatively) correlated with the most GAS items (sleeping poorly, head & neck aches, and 
difficulty falling asleep). 
4.3.14.13 Additional variables as potential moderators or mediators. 
BMI may be an additional confounder of associations between anxiety and cognitive 
change, and may also be a moderator or mediator.  
4.4 Discussion 
4.4.1 Main Results 
This chapter describes the PATH data for the 60+ cohort and provides a basic analysis. 
The analyses were mainly by examining distributions and correlations which were cross-
sectional (wave-by-wave), and longitudinal, comparing baseline anxiety with cognitive 
change over the duration of the study. The full GAS scale was not correlated with Wave 1 to 
4 change in any of the cognitive scales, and was not correlated with Wave 4, incident MCI or 
dementia.  
The derivatives and proxies for GAS were important to consider because GAS itself 
offers little prospect of association between anxiety and cognitive change. However, most 
permutations of these variables, also demonstrated no correlation. The only correlations were 
with small effect size (r2 < .1). These correlations were mostly with derivatives of GAS 
(Tables 4.22 and 4.23) rather than with the proxies.  
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4.4.2 Prevalence 
Referring to Table 4.10, prevalence of clinical anxiety and clinical depression were not 
directly available from the 60+ cohort of the PATH data because diagnoses were not obtained 
by the study. The table is based on dichotomised data, using cutpoints of GAS≥7, and 
GDS≥5. Diagnoses for anxiety and depression were, however, obtained for the middle cohort 
(aged 52 to 58), during the fourth wave of the PATH study. Kiely and Butterworth (2015) 
analysed this data for sensitivity and specificity, using Receiver Operating Characteristics 
curve (ROC) and Area Under Curve (AUC), to identify cut points at which depression and 
anxiety scores (on the Goldberg scales) would most likely indicate clinical diagnosis. 
Because their analysis (Kiely & Butterworth, 2015) was not applied to the older age cohort, 
the results do not necessarily apply to the current project. On the other hand, these authors 
found that within their sample the results for cut points were not related to the age of the 
participant. Additionally, the age range of their sample was close to that of the 60+ cohort at 
baseline).  
The Goldberg Anxiety or Depression Scales are broadly based on symptoms for GAD 
and Major Depressive Disorder. Comparison of PATH based results with prevalence statistics 
from other Australian sources, needs to consider not only age and reference period (one 
month for PATH), but also whether the measures were based on any specific disorder and 
whether that was comparable with the Goldberg scales. Comparison may also vary, 
depending on the environment from which the sample was taken. For example, in their 
literature review on prevalence of anxiety in older adults, Bryant et al. (2008) reported quite 
different prevalence for all anxiety disorders for adults >60, in community samples (1.2% to 
15%), and clinical settings (1% to 28%). They attributed these divergent statistics to 
methodological inconsistencies. They noted the prevalence of any level of anxiety symptoms 
ranged from 15% to 52.3% in community samples. For comparison, PATH cases recording 
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any GAS score above zero at wave 1, numbered 1,678 (69.42%). Hunt, Issakidis, and 
Andrews (2002) reported 12-month prevalence of Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) in 
≥65-year-old Australians at 3.6% which was based on the Australian National Survey of 
Mental Health and Well-being (ANSMHW). By comparison, the clinical GAS prevalence 
results reported in Table 4.10 are 6.4% (CI: 2.5%-10.3%) at Wave 1, reducing to 4.7% (CI: 
0.3%-9.1%) at Wave 3. The prevalence of 3.6% from Hunt et al. is not directly comparable to 
the PATH study results in Table 4.10 because their reporting period was 12 months rather 
than the one month in PATH. Also, in Hunt et al., the age range started at 65 years and was 
open ended above that. For PATH, the age range was 60 to 72 years. Anxiety tends to be less 
prevalent with advancing age over 60 in community settings (Bryant et al., 2008; Hunt et al., 
2002). This downward trend is reflected in Table 4.10. For further comparison, McEvoy et al. 
(2011) also analysed the ANSMHW dataset and concluded, for any anxiety disorder, the 12-
month prevalence was 5.2% (S.E. 0.7) for 65-74-year-olds, and 2.3% (S.E. 0.7) for 75-85-
year-olds. Considering these various results and qualifications, the anxiety prevalence results 
from PATH data appear plausible, although a precise comparison remains unavailable. 
An additional distinction between datasets considered above is that baseline cognitively 
impaired cases were eliminated from the PATH data. Prevalence estimates from PATH, prior 
to elimination of cognitively impaired cases at wave 1, would have been 6.9% for anxiety 
(compared to 6.4% at Table 4.10). Although this is a small adjustment, it contributes to the 
differences between datasets for comparison purposes. 
Australian prevalence of depression was reported by Anstey, von Sanden, Sargent-Cox, 
and Luszcz (2007), based on the Australian Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ALSA). They 
reported 14.4% of community-dwelling participants were depressed. Age groups reported 
included: for 65-69-year-olds, 13.0-13.6% depressed; and for 70-74-year-olds, 11.7-14.2% 
depressed. Depression was measured in ALSA using the Centre for Epidemiological Studies 
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Depression Scale (CES-D) which did not have an evaluated and accepted clinical cutpoint. 
The CES-D instrument was designed to capture symptoms defined for major depressive 
disorder. The ALSA data included individuals in residential care. Also, the reporting period 
was one week. Thus, comparison of PATH (8.9% CI: 5.0%-12.7% at baseline) with ALSA 
(13.0% to 14.2% prevalence) is approximate. By using original PATH data at baseline, not 
reduced to a cognitively healthy sample, these prevalence statistics are marginally greater at 
mean = 9.5% (CI: 5.8%-13.2%). 
An example of a lower estimate of the prevalence of depression comes from the 
ANSMHW. Wilhelm, Mitchell, Slade, Brownhill, and Andrews (2003) found the 30-day 
prevalence was 3.7% (S.E. 0.9) by DSM-IV criteria, and 3.9% (S.E. 0.8) by the World Health 
Organisation, International Classification of Diseases, 10th edition (ICD-10) criteria, in 55-
64-year-old Australians. For 65+ year-olds they reported 1.2% (S.E. 0.3) by DSM-IV, and 
1.2% (S.E. 0.2) by ICD-10. These figures do not include affective disorders other than major 
depression, and so are directly comparable with both the ALSA and PATH results (PATH 
used the Goldberg scale which was constructed on the criteria for major depressive disorder). 
From the available, Australian data, the PATH results appear plausible. 
Comorbid anxiety and depression was present at 3.5%, reducing to 2.2% to in the PATH 
data. Bryant et al. (2008) noted the comorbid condition was at lower prevalence in the aged 
community and in the Berlin study of 70- to 85-year-olds by Schaub and Linden (2000) 
ranged from 4.5% down to 2.3% for individuals over 85. In an Australian study, McEvoy et 
al. (2011) reported comorbidity between major depressive disorder and any 12-month anxiety 
disorder ranged from about 22% to 34% in age groups which, however, did not demonstrate a 
trend over age. These figures were drawn from a graphical representation and are 
approximate. These Australian figures were drawn from the 2007 National Survey of Mental 
Health and Wellbeing. They are not directly comparable with the PATH data for which 
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anxiety, measured by GAS, is intended to reflect GAD only (not the full spectrum of anxiety 
disorders). However, there is a strong contrast between the two sets of figures and, 
apparently, no unambiguous method to conclusively compare the PATH data, specifically on 
the comorbidity of GDS and GAS. 
The prevalence estimates from PATH, at Table 4.10, include results for PsD, calculated 
in two ways, as the product and sum of GAS and GDS. Psychological distress has been 
presented here as the interaction of anxiety and depression. Interaction is ordinarily 
calculated as a product. So, this form of interaction is reported. However, the literature more 
typically interprets PsD as the sum of anxiety and depression symptoms (e.g., the Kessler 
Psychological Distress Scale [K10]; Andrews & Slade, 2001). Cutpoints for determining a 
clinical level of PsD are not published, most probably because clinical PsD is not formally a 
psychological disorder, as defined by the DSM-5. For the Kessler psychological distress 
scale, there are ten items which present a mixture of anxiety and depression related questions 
based on experiences in the previous 30 days. Each question was ranked by the participant on 
a 1 to 5 scale. The score range was 10–50, with mean=14.2, median=12.0. The distribution 
was heavily skewed (skew=2.2). Although there were no clinical cutpoints presented by 
Andrews and Slade (2001), they noted 68% or participants scored < 15. These figures are 
consistent with the additive version of PsD (from PATH) as described at Table 4.5, with 
similar (negative) exponential distributions. 
The calculated prevalence results at Table 4.10, for PsD, are based upon reasonable 
constructs and are consistent with the literature, even though, as said, there are no published 
definitions of clinical levels of PsD, nor corresponding cutpoints on published scales. 
4.4.3 Derivatives of GAS 
Derivatives of GAS were explored here both because each derivative has a specific 
interest value in discovering relationships with cognitive data, and because the main measure 
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of GAS was found to be uncorrelated with cognitive change. It, therefore, became necessary 
to investigate more deeply to determine if these derivatives offered insights into associations 
with cognitive ageing. Comments on each derivative follow. 
4.4.3.1 Persistently-high-GAS.  
Table 2.2 listed 37 studies accepted into the literature review, and demonstrated that 33 
of these 37 did not specify trait anxiety as the key variable for testing associations with 
cognitive decline or CI. Instead, these 33 studies used a measure of state or temporary 
anxiety, or did not specify the duration of anxiety. Cases with persistently high anxiety are 
theoretically more likely to be associated with cognitive decline (Chapter One). 
In this context, persistent means continuing over a long period of time. Persistence is not 
necessarily about continuity, but if there were a short-term reduction in the severity of the 
condition then persistence would imply the return of the higher-level condition. The word 
“persistent” is used here in place of “trait” anxiety. The concepts are similar. However, trait 
anxiety has been operationalised in a specific way by the State-Trait Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). By referring to ongoing anxiety as “persistent”, I 
draw on a wider and more generalised interpretation, not limited by the rich history of 
literature on the single concept of trait anxiety.  
Persistently high anxiety is also distinguished from chronic anxiety, which implies a 
persistent, clinical level of anxiety (See below, Section 4.4.3.2). The statistical analyses in 
this thesis benefit from drawing on both concepts of: high anxiety (cutpoint of five symptoms 
which is equivalent to ≥1 SD above the mean); and, clinical anxiety (seven symptoms). 
Clinical anxiety has the benefit of identifying a level of anxiety recognised as a category 
which can be compared with other research. However, as noted, the cell sizes in the PATH 
data for chronic anxiety (persistently, clinical level), were small. The slightly lower cutpoint 
for high anxiety allowed a more useful sub-sample for analysis. 
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The two alternative calculations of persistently-high-GAS identified individuals who had 
experienced five or more symptoms, for ≥ 2 waves, or for ≥3 waves of the data. These 
alternatives allowed larger cell sizes for the 2-wave version, and greater persistence for the 3-
wave version which might (theoretically at least) have related more strongly to cognitive 
change. 
Each measurement of GAS referred only to the previous four weeks and so it was 
possible that the participant would have lower levels or no anxiety at other times, but as a 
population average the likelihood that these individuals had more of a persistent condition, 
appeared plausible, provided the condition was repeatedly observed.  
The persistence of the condition and the change in cognitive ability were measured over 
the same 12 years of the study. This might suggest the anxiety cannot be assumed to predict 
the cognitive change. However, baseline data have been established as clear of CI. If 
subsequent waves included causal effects in both directions (anxiety causes cognitive decline 
and CI, and decline or impairment triggers anxiety), then this is precisely what would be 
expected from the model at Figure 1.5. Identifying the class of individuals who have 
persistently high anxiety, by drawing on the data for all four waves, does not invalidate the 
possibility of predictive association between baseline GAS and cognitive change.  
4.4.3.2 Clinical & Chronic GAS. 
As described in Methods (Section 4.2.4.9.4), the clinical level of GAS was defined as a 
symptom score ≥7. Chronic GAS levels, means persistently, clinical levels of GAS. Baseline 
clinical GAS was examined and found to have no significant associations except with decline 
in DR between baseline and Wave 4 (Table 4.24). For Chronic GAS, the cell sizes for the 
correlations were small, as indicated by the frequencies for chronic GAS at Table 4.21. The 
only correlation with cognitive change was with DR (Table 4.24). These two correlations (for 
clinical and chronic GAS) with DR will be considered in later chapters. However, like 
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persistently-high-GAS (Section 4.4.2.1 above), any correlation between chronic GAS and 
cognitive decline would be calculated over the same period of time and therefore would not 
qualify as indicative of whether anxiety predicts cognitive change.  
Prevalence of the clinical level of GAS is discussed below at Section 4.4.5.  
4.4.3.3 Latent factors of GAS. 
Exploratory factor analysis of the GAS scale was carried out to identify latent factors 
which may usefully represent GAS as derivatives, or help to explain effects of important 
components of GAS. Similar factor analyses for comparison in the literature appear to be 
unavailable. Published analyses have been for the full Goldberg Anxiety and Depression 
scale of 18 items, and which have been confirmatory factor analyses to investigate the 
validity of the anxiety and depression components as the dominant latent factors (e.g., 
Christensen et al., 1999; Goldberg et al., 1987). Details of the factor analysis (for this thesis) 
of the GAS scale are provided at the Appendix 4.A, and a summary follows here for each 
factor. 
4.4.3.3.1 GAS-Sleep. 
The sleep, latent factor was identified at Appendix 4.A as factor 2, comprising two items: 
5 (sleeping poorly; loading: 0.764), and 9 (difficulty falling asleep; loading: 0.745). This 
factor was unrelated to cognitive change (Tables 4.24 & 4.25), although sleeping poorly, as 
an individual item, was related (weakly) to decline in PPb (Table 4.26). This last point is 
explored further below at Section 4.4.9. 
4.4.3.3.2 GAS-Somatic and GAS-Worry. 
These two factors are considered here together because of the earlier observation 
(Section 1.2.2) that the (relatively) recently developed, Geriatric Anxiety Inventory (Pachana 
et al., 2007) put more emphasis on physical symptoms than on worry, which was supported 
by Gonçalves, Pachana, and Byrne (2011) and Miloyan and Pachana (2015). Correlations at 
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Table 4.24 show GAS-somatic was indeed associated (weakly) with cognitive decline (PPb 
only), whereas GAS-Worry was not. But this is small evidence of association, and therefore, 
no conclusion is drawn here from the PATH data on these alternatives of somatic and worry 
symptoms. 
GAS-Somatic was comprised of items: 6 (head & neck aches, loading: .312), 7 
(trembling, tingling, dizzy spells, sweating, diarrhoea, frequent urination, loading: .671), and 
8 (worried about health, loading: .421). As such it has a scattered content and although 
named here as “Somatic” it is not purely a physical construct. GAS-Worry was comprised of 
items: 1 (Keyed up, loading: .774), 2 (Worrying a lot, loading: .695), 3 (Irritable, loading: 
.568), and 4 (Difficulty relaxing, loading: .483). Again, this is not purely about “worry”, 
although it is close. Among these individual items, 1. Keyed-up, 2. Worrying, 6. Head & 
Neck Aches, had individual associations (mostly weakly) with cognitive change (Table 4.24).   
4.4.3.4 Trichotomised GAS. 
Another derivative of GAS was Trichotomised GAS [zero, low (GAS=1 to4), and 
moderate to high (GAS≥5), (as referred to previously at Section 2.3.2.1, and citing Kassem, 
Ganguli, Yaffe, Hanlon, Lopez, Wilson, & Cauley, 2017; Kassem, Ganguli, Yaffe, Hanlon, 
Lopez, Wilson, Ensrud, et al., 2017)]. Kassem found low symptom levels of GAS had a 
stronger association with cognitive change than moderate to severe levels. The PATH data 
demonstrated the reverse result, with low range GAS positively correlated with PPb, and 
higher range GAS negatively associated with both PPb and SDMT (Table 4.22). These 
results inferred that low symptom levels were associated with improved PPb results after four 
waves, and higher symptom levels were associated with decline in both PPb and SDMT 
scores. Thus, the PATH data, contrary to Kassem’s results, accord with dose-response 
expectations. 
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4.4.3.5 GAS items. 
Other components of the GAS worthy of consideration are the individual items. Like the 
derivatives and proxies, the items were individually tested for correlation with cognitive 
change (Table 4.26). Five of the available nine items were correlated (all negatively) with at 
least one measure of cognitive change, implying that each of these items may be a predictor 
of cognitive decline. Worry and difficulty falling asleep predicted two and three measures of 
decline, respectively. The other items predicted only one measure of decline. Again, 
however, each correlation was with small effect. 
4.4.4 Proxies for Anxiety 
The derivatives of GAS reported above could serve as proxies. Other proxies (listed at 
Table 4.2) were found to correlate with GAS, its derivatives, and with each other. They 
appear prima facie, therefore, to represent similar constructs to GAS and serve as alternative 
measures for anxiety. Unlike the derivatives, however, the proxies were mostly uncorrelated 
with changes in cognitive ability or with incident cognitive impairment. This suggests that it 
may not be anxiety which is a predictor of cognitive change but instead some selective 
elements of the anxiety measures (as described by the derivatives).  
4.4.5 Participants Unavailable for Follow-up 
Individuals who did not remain available for the study to Wave 4, scored lower on most 
cognitive measures. In the two-group comparisons to derive these results, there were mixed 
findings regarding relative levels of anxiety and depression for these same individuals. 
However, there was indication that unavailability at Wave 4 was related to persistently-high-
GAS (Table 4.20). Contrary to this last finding, in their investigation of comorbid anxiety and 
depression in late life, DeLuca et al. (2005) noted that anxious participants were less likely to 
discontinue from their longitudinal study than non-anxious participants. On the other hand, 
Bierman et al. (2008) reported individuals with higher symptom count for anxiety and lower 
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cognitive performance were more likely to discontinue, which was consistent with the PATH 
data, on both counts. Whether individuals are more or less likely to become unavailable for 
follow-up may be peculiar to the nature of the sample and the study. 
4.4.6 Cognitive Change 
Graphs at Figures 4.11 and 4.12 present in different ways, the changes over time in 
cognitive scores. Figure 4.11 presented error bars for the means at each wave; Figure 4.12 
presented distribution of the changes from Waves 1 to 4. There is agreement between these 
methods that there was decline in IR, PPb, and SDMT; and average improvement to higher 
scores for StW. Change in DR is not apparent at Figure 4.12 but is clear at Figure 4.11. There 
is agreement that there was no change in DSB.   
For the 60+ cohort, an average decline in cognitive abilities over the 12 years of the 
PATH study was to be expected. For StW, average improvement in scores may be because 
recognition of real words in contrast to made up words would be largely a reflection of 
knowledge, and not only a measure of cognitive processing (reasoning, processing speed 
etc.). Older individuals tend to preserve such knowledge based abilities, or even improve on 
them (Horn & Cattell, 1967).  
4.4.7 Confounders 
From Table 4.18, there were 14 confounders identified. Additional to these 14 variables, 
are depression and BMI which were identified elsewhere. 
Significant correlations were small and in some instances not in the expected direction. 
For example, subjective memory complaint was negatively correlated with baseline GAS, 
implying that a lower level of subjective memory complaint was associated with greater level 
of anxiety. Contrary to this result was that consulting a doctor regarding memory (at Wave 1) 
was positively correlated with baseline GAS. From these results, subjective memory 
complaint could be in error. 
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4.4.8 Cross-sectional correlations with GAS 
The main implications from cross-sectional correlations are:  
• GAS was only weakly correlated with cognitive measures, with possible 
implications for GAS in association with change in cognition; and  
• GAS and GDS were moderately correlated at each wave, implying potential for 
multicollinearity issues in regression analyses in the following chapter. 
4.4.9 Associations with Cognitive Change, for GAS, GAS Items, Derivatives, and 
Proxies 
Unadjusted associations identified between baseline anxiety measures and cognitive 
change were summarised at Section 4.3.14.12. These were all with small effect size. 
Notwithstanding these small effects, further investigation (in Chapter Five) is warranted to 
consider whether deeper analysis might eliminate or explain these associations.  
There was a cluster of associations with decline in PPb, reported at Tables 4.24 and 4.26. 
Although all were with small effect and were unadjusted, they are worth noting. These 
associations were with baseline values for: Clinical GAS, GAS-Somatic; lowest level of 
trichotomised GAS; PsDM (Psychological distress); and, GAS items 5-sleeping poorly, 6-
head and Neck Aches, and 9-Difficulty Falling Asleep. However, as noted in the following 
chapter, all of these, except GAS items 2 and 9, were eliminated at the next step of analysis 
by inclusion of adjustment for the basic confounding variables, sex, age, education, and 
depression. GAS items 2 and 9 were also eliminated by subsequent adjustments presented in 
Chapter Five. So, although there appears to be a pattern of associations with PPb, none of 
these apparently related variables was worth pursuing beyond the next steps in analysis. 
4.4.9.1 Covariates warranting further investigation. 
Sex, age, education, and GDS were the key covariates in previous related studies. If 
sufficient unexplained variance remains after regression models including these covariates, 
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then additional covariates of interest have been identified above which can be selectively 
evaluated. Relevant covariates, identified above, are: anxiolytics; general health; tobacco 
use; alcohol consumption; life events; social support; resilience; positive affect; mastery; 
physical health; physical activity; consulted a doctor Re. memory; APOE e4 carrier status; 
and, BMI. Of these, APOE e4 was unrelated to anxiety (in all its measures at Table 4.27), 
eliminating APOE as a confounder. Also, BMI was not related to the full GAS measure. BMI 
was, however, related to both GAS derivatives or proxies and cognitive change (Table 4.27). 
Therefore, BMI remains of interest as a possible confounder, but only temporarily so. At 
Chapter Five, all associations between GAS derivatives and proxies and cognitive change, 
will be eliminated from further examination as contributing to associations between anxiety 
and cognitive ageing. Thus BMI, as a potential confounder, becomes redundant. Resilience 
was measured only in Waves 3 and 4. Therefore, this variable was not considered relevant 
when adjusting regressions for baseline covariates. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The few correlations reported between baseline anxiety and cognitive change were with 
small effect size. The following chapter will examine these identified correlations more 
closely to determine if they are attenuated when adjusted for likely confounding variables and 
when repeated measures of the dependent variables are considered. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:   
Is Anxiety a Baseline Predictor of Cognitive Ageing? 
Abstract 
Background: This chapter considers correlations identified at Chapter Four, between 
baseline anxiety, (including Goldberg Anxiety Scale (GAS) items, GAS derivatives, and 
anxiety proxies) and cognitive change.  
Methods: For each such correlation found significant, adjusted regression analyses were 
applied. Then, adjusted Generalized Estimation Equations (GEE) were deployed for further 
analysis if significant results were reported from the regression models. For these GEE 
models, repeated measures were included for the outcome variables but not for predictors 
which were always included only at baseline values.   
Results & Conclusion: No anxiety-related, fully adjusted, baseline predictor was associated 
with cognition or cognitive impairment. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is to complete an analysis commenced in the previous chapter, to 
discover if baseline anxiety predicts age related cognitive change. This focus on baseline 
predictors was a common method of previous studies (e.g., Brodaty et al., 2012; DeLuca et 
al., 2005; Jessen et al., 2010; Palmer et al., 2007; Somme, Fernández-Martínez, Molano, & 
Jose Zarranz, 2013). Analytical methods using baseline predictors only, were principally 
multivariate, linear, and logistic regression. These studies typically examined cognitive 
change as either the difference in score between baseline and follow-up, or incidence of 
cognitive impairment. For explanation of variance, most studies also considered the effects of 
covariates: age, sex, education, and depression.  
In this chapter, I will analyse the PATH data by similar methods. For significant 
associations found from these methods, I will also examine: (1) The effects of adjustment for 
additional covariates as identified in the previous chapter; and, (2) Whether modelling by 
General Estimating Equations (GEE) reveals a different association when repeated measures 
for cognitive change are considered, but the predictor variable is held constant at baseline 
value. 
The focus on baseline anxiety is adopted here despite the strong theoretical argument in 
Chapter One that incident or state anxiety was not expected to be causative of cognitive 
ageing. The proposition, partly explained by the heuristic at Figure 1.5, was that state (or 
enduring) anxiety would be required to provide the necessary long term, neuropsychological 
effects. However, the baseline associations in the PATH data must still be known and 
understood. Also, because many past studies have been done this way, it will be necessary to 
determine these baseline associations from PATH, in order to make comparisons with the 
earlier studies. 
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At Chapter Four (Tables 4.24 to 4.26), baseline GAS and proxies for anxiety were found 
not to be correlated either with change in cognition or with incidence of cognitive 
impairment. The single exception (an alternative measure of anxiety) was BPHQ-Generalised 
Anxiety Disorder, which was measured only from Wave 2. Derivatives of GAS found to 
correlate with cognitive change were: Clinical GAS; Chronic GAS (≥3 waves); GAS-
Somatic; GAS-Sleep; Persistently high GAS (≥3 waves); Trichotomised GAS (Low); and 
Psychological Distress (by multiplication of anxiety and depression scores). There were also 
GAS items (1, 2, 5, 6, & 9) which were individually correlated with cognitive change (Table 
4.26). Only these associations are explored in this Chapter.  
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Research Questions 
In context of the thesis overall, Chapter Three, delineated the research questions for this 
present chapter. Both primary research questions (Section 3.2.2.1), and Secondary Research 
Question A (Section 3.2.2.2.A), apply here. Collectively, these research questions required 
investigation of whether baseline anxiety predicts either the rate of cognitive decline or the 
incidence of cognitive impairment.  
5.2.2 Statistical Analysis 
More specifically, Table 3.1 required testing by multivariate linear and logistic 
regression, hierarchical multilevel modelling, structural equation modelling, and moderation 
and mediation analysis, where appropriate. However, as the results will demonstrate below, 
significant associations were limited to regression outcomes. Thus, the more advanced 
analyses were not attempted after associations were found to be attenuated.  
Where results remained significant after adjustment for the basic list of covariates (age, 
sex, education, and depression), the model was tested with additional variables as covariates 
identified at Section 4.4.9.1, and their possible effect sizes were mooted by correlations at 
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Tables 4.18 and 4.27. Among these variables, and considering the effect sizes, the most likely 
covariates to influence the relevant associations appear to be Physical health, Anxiolytics, 
Mastery, physical activity, consulted a doctor Re. memory, and smoking status. Although this 
is not a complete list (from Section 4.4.9.1), it will be established below as sufficient to 
demonstrate attenuation of all the possible associations examined. 
For analysis of the predictor variable BPHQ-Generalised Anxiety Disorder, Wave 2 data 
were reset as baseline and all cases with cognitive impairment were removed. “Baseline” 
covariates were selected from the Wave 2 data. Cognitive change was identified as the 
difference between baseline and Wave 4 scores for each variable representing cognitive 
performance by domain.  
SPSS software version 25 was used throughout. Significance was determined by 
reference to 95% confidence intervals.  
5.2.2.1 Multivariate linear regression. 
For each of the significant correlations identified earlier (Chapter Four), multivariate 
linear regression was applied to baseline GAS and its proxies and derivatives, as predictors, 
and cognitive change within cognitive domains as outcome variables.  
5.2.2.2 Logistic regression. 
For regression analysis involving binary dependent variables, analysis was performed 
using SPSS binary logistic regression.  
5.2.2.3 Generalized Estimating Equations. 
For associations found significant upon adjusted multivariate linear regression, further 
testing was applied. SPSS Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) were deployed, with 
repeated measures for the dependent variable only. Mixed models were not required for 
obtaining random effects because the models were attenuated at basic levels. 
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5.3 Results 
Most regression models produced results indicating that sex, age, education, and baseline 
GDS (depression), attenuated any initial association. These non-significant results are not 
presented here. The remaining (significant) associations were only for individual GAS items 
and for BPHQ- Generalised Anxiety Disorder (Wave 2), and are listed at Table 5.1. After 
configuring Wave 2 as baseline (for this single special model (5) involving BPHQ-
Generalised Anxiety Disorder) by removal of cases with cognitive impairment, the remaining 
sample size was 2005. 
 
Table 5.1 
Significant Results from Multivariate Linear Regression Models for possible Associations 
Implied by Correlations Reported at Tables 4.24 to 4.26. Adjusted for Sex, Age, Education, 
and Baseline Depression. 
Model 
# 
Source 
Table 
IV 
(Baseline 
Predictor) 
DV 
Re-
gression 
Type 
Coeffic-
ient  
(95% CI) 
Signifi-
cance 
p = 
Beta 
Exp(B) 
(95% CI) 
1 4.26 
GAS item 2: 
Worrying 
StW 
change 
W1–W4 
MVLR 
0.899 
(0.808 – 
1.238) 
.000 .130  
2 4.26 
GAS item 2: 
Worrying 
Dementia 
by Wave 4 
LR 1.290 .017  
3.632 
(1.254 – 
10.524) 
3 4.26 
GAS item 9: 
Difficulty 
falling 
asleep 
SDMT 
change 
W1–W4 
MVLR 
-1.026 
(-2.027 –  
-0.025) 
.045 -0.057  
4 4.26 
GAS item 9: 
Difficulty 
falling 
asleep 
DSB 
change 
W1–W4 
MVLR 
-0.334  
(-0.109 –  
-0.041) 
.026 -0.062  
5 4.24 
BPHQ_GAD 
W2^ 
SDMT 
change 
W2–W4 
MVLR 
0.634 
(0.243 – 
1.025) 
.002 0.207  
Notes: MVLR = Multivariate, linear regression; LR = Logistic regression; IV = Independent 
Variable; DV = Dependent Variable; GAD = Generalised Anxiety Disorder. For Model 5, 
Wave 2 was redefined and reconfigured as baseline. Covariates were drawn from this new 
baseline. 
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SDMT is the only DV represented more than once in Table 5.1. Predictors for SDMT 
were GAS item 9 (difficulty falling asleep) and BPHQ-Generalised Anxiety Disorder, but 
these variables predicted change in opposite directions – decline for GAS item 9, and 
improvement for BPHQ-Generalised Anxiety Disorder. GAS item 9 (difficulty falling asleep) 
also predicted a decline in DSB. GAS item 2 (worrying) predicted an improved score for 
StW, and an increased incidence of dementia by Wave 4.   
Adjustments for additional, relevant covariates, were applied to these models (1 to 5; at 
Table 5.1), providing the results at Table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.2 
Regression Applied to Models in Table 5.1; Adjusted for additional covariates 
Model # 
(from 
Table 5.1) 
IV 
(Predictor) 
Wave 1 
DV Adjusted for: 
Coeffic-
ient  
(95% CI) 
Signifi-
cance 
p = 
Beta 
Exp(B) 
(95% CI) 
1 GAS item 2: 
Worrying 
StW 
change 
W1–W4 
Sex, Age, Education, 
Depression, Consulted 
doctor Re. memory, 
Physical health, 
Anxiolytics, Mastery, 
Physical Activity, and 
Smoking Status. 
2.447 
(0.734 – 
4.161) 
.005 .277  
2 GAS item 2: 
Worrying 
Dementia 
by Wave 4 
Sex, Age, Education, 
Depression. 
 
.987 .060  2.683 
(.959 – 
7.504) 
3 GAS item 9: 
Difficulty 
falling 
asleep 
SDMT 
change 
W1–W4 
Sex, Age, Education, 
Depression, Consulted 
doctor Re. memory,  
.246  
(-2.333–  
2.825) 
.851 .016  
4 GAS item 9: 
Difficulty 
falling 
asleep 
DSB 
change 
W1–W4 
Age, Sex, Education, 
Depression, Consulted 
doctor Re. memory.  
.021  
(-0.791 –  
0.832) 
.960 .004  
5 BPHQ_GAD 
W2 
SDMT 
change 
W2–W4 
Age, Sex, Education, 
Depression, Consulted 
doctor Re. memory. 
.543  
(-0.223 – 
1.309) 
.162 .220  
Notes: IV = Independent Variable; CV’s = Covariates; DV = Dependent Variable; GAD = 
Generalised Anxiety Disorder; Significant variance was explained by the bolded covariates. 
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From Table 5.2, Model 1, GAS item 2 (Worry) remained associated with StW (score 
change between waves 1 and 4) after full adjustment. Worry was no longer associated with 
incident dementia (by Wave 4; Model 2). GAS item 9 (difficulty falling asleep) was no 
longer associated with decline in SDMT (Model 3) or DSB (model 4). BPHQ-Generalised 
Anxiety Disorder no longer predicted change in SDMT. 
Model 1 was explored further to determine if repeated measures for dementia, rather than 
the simplified dementia by wave 4, would clarify whether the association between GAS item 
2 and dementia was sustained. For this purpose, GEE was deployed, with outcome variable of 
incidence by-wave for dementia, but relaying only on baseline measures of GAS item 2.  
Table 5.3 
GEE Applied to Model 1 only, from Tables 5.1 & 5.2. 
Model # 
(from 
Tables 5.1 
& 5.2) 
IV 
(Predictor) 
(Baseline 
value as a 
constant) 
 
DV  
By 
repeated 
measures 
(Waves 1 
to 4) 
Adjusted 
for 
Additional 
CVs 
B SE 95% CI 
P 
For  
Predictor 
1 
GAS item 2: 
Worrying 
StW 
Sex, Age, 
Education, 
Depression, 
Consulted 
doctor Re. 
memory. 
.457 .636 
-.790 – 
1.705 
.472 
Notes: IV = Independent Variable; CV’s = Covariates; DV = Dependent. Bolded variables in 
the adjustment column indicate significant effect on the DV. 
 
 
From Table 5.3, Worrying (GAS item 2) was no longer a significant predictor.  
5.4 Discussion 
After correlation analysis (previous chapter) then fully adjusted, linear, and logistic 
regression, only one variable, an item of the GAS scale, remained associated with cognitive 
change. This was: GAS item 2 (worrying), associated with change in StW between Waves 1 
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and 4. However, this association was not sustained in GEE analysis, accounting for repeated 
measures of the dependent variable (Table 5.3).  
Analysis reported at Table 5.3 adopted an unusual approach for analysis of repeated 
measures of the outcome variable while holding the predictors at baseline values. This was 
specifically to highlight the results obtained when referring to the baseline measures. Such 
method is not without precedent within the literature reviewed at Chapter Two. For example, 
Pietrzak et al. (2014) applied multilevel modelling using only a baseline measure of anxiety 
as the main predictor.  
The analysis of associations with GAS items (for example, by accounting for repeated 
measures of the predictor variables) will be taken no further here for two reasons. Firstly, 
these individual items are of limited interest. They do not fully represent the construct of 
anxiety. And secondly, they are binary indicators, which, therefore, carry little information.  
5.5 Conclusion 
Possible associations of cognitive change with baseline anxiety, derivatives, and proxies, 
have been eliminated progressively by the series of analyses commencing with correlations in 
Chapter Four, then regression and GEE. Referring only to baseline measurements as 
predictors of cognitive change, there is no association (in the PATH data) with cognitive 
ageing. In the next chapter, I will investigate the time-varying influence of anxiety, referring 
to the repeated measures of the full GAS scale. 
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CHAPTER SIX:   
As a Time-Varying Variable, Does the Goldberg Anxiety Scale 
Predict Cognitive Ageing? 
Abstract 
Background: Investigation of possible associations between baseline representations of 
anxiety, and age-associated cognitive change, were presented in earlier chapters. The current 
chapter reports investigation of repeated measures of the Goldberg Anxiety Scale (GAS), 
which is the primary representation of anxiety within the PATH data. 
Methods: The primary analysis method was Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE), by 
SPSS. Four, temporal treatments of GEE were deployed, to test present and delayed influence 
of anxiety upon cognition, which was also treated as a time-varying variable. The alternative 
temporal treatments were time-lagged, auto-regressive, and cognitive change. These temporal 
treatments are described at Section 6.2.4.4. For significant effects, additional investigations 
were applied to test the results and to identify implications. These additional methods 
included graphical interpretation, and linear mixed models (LMM) to examine random 
effects.  
Results: The only significant association was the interaction, anxiolytics*GAS as predictor of 
digit span backwards (DSB), over four waves. Anxiolytics is a binary variable representing 
baseline consumption (yes or no) of these medications. The fully adjusted effect for the 
standard temporal treatment was OR = 1.382 (95% CI: 1.132 to 1.688), p = .002. For time-
lagged, OR = 1.273 (CI: 1.082 to 1.498), p = .004; for auto-regressive OR = 1.122 (CI: 1.001 
to 1.257), p = .047; and, for cognitive change OR = 0.953 (CI: 0.838 to 1.083), p = 0.457. 
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Discussion & Conclusion: Other than the significant interaction, associations 
investigated by GEE found no, fully adjusted association between GAS and cognition. For 
the interactions, analyses were limited by a strong content of missing data. Also, there 
appears to be no significant effect over time, only a difference in intercept between subgroups 
which were implied by the interaction including a binary variable. These are tentative 
findings, to be analysed further in the next chapter. 
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6.1 Introduction 
A diverse range of regression models was examined in Chapters Four and Five, to 
investigate possible associations between baseline anxiety and cognitive change. Only 
unadjusted associations were found between anxiety and rates of cognitive decline or incident 
cognitive impairment. These findings embraced a variety of representations of anxiety, 
including the main variable GAS, its derivatives, and proxies. As foreshadowed in the 
methods strategy (Chapter Three), the following investigation is limited to the main anxiety 
measure, GAS. This chapter extends the analysis to repeated measures for both the main 
predictor (GAS) and outcome variables, thus extending the analyses in this thesis, for the first 
time, beyond the influence of baseline anxiety.  
Repeated measures of both anxiety and cognition have been included in previous 
investigations reported in the literature, using multilevel models (e.g., Bierman et al., 2008; 
Petkus et al., 2016; Wadsworth et al., 2012). As another option for comprehensive 
longitudinal investigation, some researchers have adopted survival analysis for cognitive 
impairment outcomes (e.g., DeLuca et al., 2005; Petkus et al., 2016; Ramakers et al., 2010; 
Wadsworth et al., 2012). However, for the PATH data, survival analysis would not be a valid 
approach because incident cognitive impairment was recorded only at four-yearly intervals, 
and, therefore, not on a continuous timeline. Multilevel models (MLM) remain as the 
important option to consider here, for both continuous and binary outcomes. Against this 
background, generalised estimating equations (GEE) are deployed in this chapter as a close 
approximation of MLM (Twisk, 2013). The choice of GEE as the primary analytical tool is 
further discussed at Methods. 
A central consideration in the following analyses is that Chapter One established on the 
theory, that if anxiety causes long-term decline in age-associated, cognitive performance then 
the psychological and neurological mechanisms are most likely to occur over long periods. It 
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is because of this that a standard approach to MLM may be insufficient as an analysis 
method. For Standard, longitudinal MLM, the influence of the predictors does not account 
for, or identify, the specific association between the DV measure at each time point, and the 
measure of the predictor at a previous time point, the time-lagged effect of the predictor. To 
identify and account specifically for delayed effects of predictors, Twisk (2013) 
recommended inclusion in MLM models of time-lagged effects of the time-variant predictor 
variable (as explained further at Section 6.2.4.4). Although not adopting Twisk’s 
comprehensive approach requiring four, alternative, temporal treatments, Bierman et al. 
(2008) included time-lagged effects of the main predictor, and found no influence of prior 
anxiety upon current cognition. This was so even though a fully adjusted model, but 
excluding lagged effects, demonstrated present “temporary” association between anxiety and 
cognition, and which varied between positive and negative association, depending on the 
level of the anxiety. By contrast, Petkus et al. (2017) used structural equation modelling to 
account simultaneously for lagged and double-lagged effects of the predictor (over one and 
two waves of the data). They found different associations for each, with cognitive change. 
Thus, the literature offers alternative methods and contrasting results. The alternative 
temporal treatments are explored here with new data in order to extend the previously 
published research, which has so far been limited to just the two mentioned studies. 
6.2 Methods 
Here, I detail reasons for making certain choices in methods, to clarify and justify 
choices in analytical techniques based on the research questions, theory, and limitations of 
the standard methodology.   
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6.2.1 Research Questions 
This chapter addresses both the primary research questions (Section 3.2.2.1) and 
secondary research question B (Section 3.2.2.2). Question B refers to the time-varying nature 
of the central predictor variable, anxiety, as measured by GAS.  
6.2.2 Outcome Variables 
The continuous outcome variables were repeated measures for cognitive ability, which 
were specifically: Purdue Pegboard both hands (PPb), Symbol Digit Modality Test (SDMT), 
Digit Symbol Backwards (DSB), Immediate Recall (IR), Mini Mental State Examination 
(MMSE), and Spot the Word (StW). The binary outcome variables were incident MCI and 
dementia. Subcategories such as Alzheimer’s disease and amnestic MCI were unavailable 
before Wave 4. Therefore, this chapter does not attempt to analyse longitudinal data in these 
subcategories. 
6.2.3 Regression Analysis for Time-Varying Variables 
The software package for SPSS Version 25 (IBM Corp., Released 2017) was used 
throughout. From the SPSS online-manual, and from Twisk (2013), the following 
summarises the features of, and differences between, the options within SPSS, for regression 
analysis with time-varying variables. Reasons for the choices of methods in this chapter are 
drawn from these descriptions. 
GEE models provide for continuous, binary, or ordinal outcome variables. Mixed Models 
are available as Linear Mixed Models (LMM) for continuous outcome variables only or 
Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMM) for binary, ordinal, categorical, or continuous 
outcome variables. These are progressively more complex and more flexible methods. GEE 
and mixed models calculate longitudinal associations appropriately with adjustment for 
dependence between repeated measures. GEE calculates fixed effects only. The two, mixed 
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models methods both calculate fixed and random effects. For a more comprehensive 
comparison between the methods, see Twisk (2013), chapters 4 to 8. 
In the literature described at Chapter Two of this thesis, multilevel modelling has been 
typically based on mixed models. Here I have taken a different approach. For a parsimonious 
analysis, I have used the simplest and most direct methods available. Almost exclusively, I 
have explored fixed effects only, using GEE. This is because, as reported below, for the fully 
adjusted , fixed-effects models, there was attenuation of the association between the primary 
predictor (GAS) and the outcome variable. Random effects statistics from mixed models, 
presuppose a fixed effects association. Therefore, the more comprehensive analyses available 
from mixed models generally were not required. However, there were exceptions where 
significant fixed effects justified analysis by LMM to obtain information about random 
effects. 
6.2.3.1 Settings in General Estimating Equations (GEE) and for linear mixed 
models (LMM). 
Settings for GEE are described fully at Appendix 6.A. Settings for LMM are described 
fully at Appendix 7.A.  
6.2.3.2 Goodness of fit. 
Comparison of the goodness of fit of models (in GEE output) with similar DV (and on 
the same sample) can be approximated by the quasi likelihood estimator of minus two log-
likelihood (-2LL). This statistic does not permit valid Chi-squared calculation of probability 
(and thus, significant difference between models), but does allow approximate estimates 
based on the criteria that “less-is-better”.  All models evaluated by GEE only, were 
attenuated. Therefore, this “quasi likelihood” parameter was sufficient for purpose. 
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6.2.3.3 Variance explained by the model. 
GEE by SPSS does not compute the proportion of variance in the DV, explained by the 
model. However, this can be calculated from other components of the output, using the 
equation: 
R2 = 1 – Smodel / S2DV  (Equation 6.1) 
Where R2 is the proportion of variance explained by the model; Smodel is the total variance of 
the model, indicated in the SPSS output as the parameter, “Scale”; and, S2DV is the variance of 
the DV (Twisk, 2013; Equation 4.5). It follows, 1 – R2 is the unexplained component of the 
variance.  
6.2.4 Time 
6.2.4.1 Temporal confounding. 
Established in previous chapters, was the need to eliminate cases where cognitive 
impairment was recorded at Wave 1. For observational data, this is an important precaution to 
reduce the prospect of temporal confounding in the associations between anxiety and 
cognitive change as outcome. However, the possibility of temporal confounding remains 
because unmeasured cognitive decline may be the cause of anxiety. Although this 
confounding may be impossible to eliminate, adjustment for baseline subjective memory 
complaint is included here in order to identify and reduce this influence and, thus, to reduce 
the degree of confounding. This adjustment will take the form of controlling for baseline data 
on the variable: consulted a doctor regarding memory. This variable was introduced in 
Chapter Four and was used to refine regressions in Chapter Five. Although adjustment for 
subjective memory complaint has precedent in the literature, most studies have not 
considered it. Therefore, the adjustments included here will appear in the tables after the 
more standard adjustments (for sex, age, education, and GDS [depression]), to accommodate 
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direct comparisons with results for these standard adjustments in the main body of the 
literature. 
6.2.4.2 Adjustment for time. 
To compare effects, models were estimated with and without adjustment for time. As 
recommended by Twisk (2013), time was entered as a CV due to the potential misleading 
results caused by missing data when entering ordinal or categorical predictors as factors. 
Further, detailed description of adjustment for time is provided at Appendix 6.B. 
6.2.4.3 Interactions with time. 
Associations between GAS and the cognitive DV may be modified by time. For example, 
if the sign of the coefficient of the time interaction term were positive, the relationship 
between the two terms would become stronger over time (Twisk, 2006). Models were 
explored for these interactions by including the predictors: time, time*GAS or time*Lagged-
GAS (“lagged-GAS” is explained at Section, 6.2.4.4). Quadratic time was similarly 
considered. See also Section 6.2.7 for a qualification on interpreting models which include 
interaction terms. 
6.2.4.4 Alternative temporal treatments. 
Recommended by Twisk (2013), was that longitudinal, multilevel models be considered 
with alternative temporal treatments of the data. As well as the standard model, illustrated 
here as Temporal Treatment 1 by Figure 6.1, Twisk recommended a time-lagged model 
(Temporal Treatment 2; Figure 6.2), an autoregressive model (Temporal Treatment 3; Figure 
6.3), and a changes (in outcome, between measurements) model (Temporal Treatment 4; 
Figure 6.4). In each of these mentioned figures, I have included both the relevant matrix 
equation and a simplified diagram, notionally representing parts of the calculations that are 
unique to this temporal treatment. Therefore, these notional diagrams do not attempt fully to 
represent the model equation. More specifically, the diagrams do not represent the effects of 
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average slope (coefficient) of the predictor upon the DV, or the matrix algebra (summarised 
for multilevel modelling, for example, by Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), or the adjustment to 
the covariance between repeated measures (accounting for the dependence between 
measures).  
 
 
 DV1   GAS1 
 DV2 =  β0 + β1  GAS2 +   . . . 
 DV3   GAS3 
 DV4   GAS4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Temporal Treatment 1: Standard Multilevel Model. 
DVt = Dependent Variable (at time t) such as incident dementia or processing speed measured by 
SDMT; CVt = covariate or predictor (at time t) such as anxiety (GAS); βk represents the coefficient of 
the kth term of the model, and, specifically, βo represents the intercept. 
 
 
 
 DV2   GAS1 
 DV3 =  β0 + β1 GAS2 +   . . . 
 DV4   GAS3 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Temporal Treatment 2: Time-Lagged Model. 
      GAS1        GAS2       GAS3        GAS4 
      GAS1        GAS2       GAS3 
        DV2         DV3         DV4 
       DV1         DV2         DV3         DV4 
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DVt = Dependent Variable (at time t) such as incident dementia or processing speed measured by 
SDMT; CVt = covariate or predictor (at time t) such as anxiety (GAS); βk represents the coefficient of 
the kth term of the model, and, specifically, βo represents the intercept. 
 
 
 
 DV2   GAS1 DV1 
 DV3 =  β0 + β1 GAS2 + β2 DV2                     +   . . . 
 DV4   GAS3 DV3 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3. Temporal Treatment 4: Autoregressive Model: DV is a function of time-lagged 
GAS plus time-lagged DV. 
DVt = Dependent Variable (at time t) such as incident dementia or change in processing speed 
measured by SDMT; CVt = covariate or predictor (at time t) such as anxiety (GAS); βk represents the 
coefficient of the kth term of the model, and, specifically, βo represents the intercept. 
 
 
 
 
 DV2 – DV1   GAS1 
 DV3 – DV1 =  β0 + β1  GAS2       +   . . . 
 DV4 – DV3   GAS3 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Temporal Treatment 3: Cognitive-Change Model. 
DVt = Dependent Variable (at time t) such as incident dementia or processing speed measured by 
SDMT; CVt = covariate or predictor (at time t) such as anxiety (GAS); βk represents the coefficient of 
the kth term of the model, and, specifically, βo represents the intercept. 
  
      GAS1        GAS2       GAS3 
      GAS1        GAS2       GAS3 
       DV1 
DV2 – DV1 DV3 – DV2 DV4 – DV3 
        DV2         DV3         DV4 
 198 
 
Essentially, the differences between these temporal treatments are: 
A. Treatment 2 (time-lagged) includes the predictor (GAS) from the previous wave 
of data (thus: lagged-GAS), in place of the current value of GAS (which was 
Treatment 1). 
B. Treatment 3 (auto-regressive) similarly (to Treatment 2) draws on the lagged 
effect of the predictor. And, the DV is again the simple current measurement 
(current wave). However, this model introduces an additional CV, which is the 
previous wave’s measurement for the DV.  
C. Treatment 3 uses the same lagged effect of the predictor (GAS) as in Treatments 
2 & 3, but the DV is changed from the raw measurements for the DV to the 
difference between the current and previous measurements of the DV. 
Temporal treatments 2 to 4 have in common that they each include the time-lagged effect 
of GAS, in place of the immediate effect, or cross-sectional association, at each wave. The 
differences between treatments 2 to 4 are in the alternative arrangements of the DV.  
Twisk (2013) advised against attempting to combine two or more of these temporal 
treatments into one model, on the basis that the result would be too complex to interpret. The 
better approach is to run the models separately but then to interpret each within the context of 
all results.  
For the cognitive-change model (Figure 6.4), the change between waves for incident 
cognitive impairment was represented by the binary change: 0 = no change (between 
consecutive measures), and 1 = change (between consecutive measures from “not impaired” 
to “impaired”). For MCI this becomes a meaningless model because the data include a high 
frequency of reversion from MCI to normal cognition. So, this temporal treatment was 
excluded from the analyses for MCI.  
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6.2.5 Covariates 
As in Chapter Five, the plan for controlling for covariates (CVs) was to include these 
sequentially, in four groups. Adjustments were made for: (1) the central covariates of sex, 
age, education; and, depression; (2) consulted a doctor regarding memory (Section 6.2.4.1); 
and (3) anxiolytics, physical health, social support, mastery, physical activity, alcohol 
consumption, life events, and smoking status, (Section 4.4.9.1). These groupings also 
accommodated a further requirement to adjust in correct sequence for temporally prior 
effects, where this criterion was relevant and determinable. Thus, adjustment for sex was 
prior to age. However, this criterion was mostly not a required consideration. Covariates were 
entered into models, using baseline values. 
6.2.6 Models  
Base models demonstrate the unadjusted association between the primary predictor 
(GAS or lagged-GAS) and the DV.  
When sufficiently adjusted, all models demonstrated there was no association between 
GAS and the relevant DV. Therefore, final models are defined here as the simplest models for 
which the associations between the predictor (GAS or lagged-GAS) and the outcome 
variable, were attenuated. Thus, these final models excluded redundant CVs, those CVs that, 
by their removal from the model, did not alter the attenuated status of the association (for 
GAS or lagged-GAS).  
Fully adjusted models included all CVs identified above (Section 6.2.5). These were 
designed to report which CVs remained significantly associated with the DV, when fully 
adjusted. These models also demonstrate the maximum variance explained when considering 
all known, relevant data. Fully adjusted models are presented here, with and without time and 
time interactions, in order to demonstrate the effects of such time adjustments. Time 
interactions were: time*GAS, time*time; and, time*time*GAS. Fully adjusted models are 
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also presented with interactions between GAS and the CVs that remained significant (in the 
fully adjusted models). Except where a significant association was found, investigation of 
fully adjusted models was limited to the standard temporal treatment. This was because all 
final (attenuated) models were identified at much simpler levels of adjustment and, therefore, 
alternative temporal treatments were unlikely to yield results.  
6.2.7 Interactions 
Interactions with time are described at Section 6.2.4.3. Interactions between GAS and 
CVs other than time, were considered only within the context of fully adjusted models. Fully 
adjusted models are presented here with and without interactions, because models containing 
interactions do not demonstrate main effects of the lower order terms, but rather effects 
conditional upon the value of the other term in the interaction, being set to zero (Field, 2013; 
Grace-Martin, 2018). Consider the equation: 
Y = B0 + B1X1 + B2X2 + B3X1*X2 + … (Equation 6.2) 
B1 is conditional on X2 = 0, and B2 is conditional on X1 = 0. For X2 not equal to zero, the 
alternative effect of X1, for which I will use the symbol β1, is given by β1 = B1 + B3X2.  
The reported significance of each term (X1, X2) is also conditional on the values of the 
terms in the interaction. Thus, models with and without interaction terms but which are 
otherwise equivalent, are not directly comparable in terms for either the effect size or 
significance of the lower level predictors (Grace-Martin, 2018).  
6.2.8 Assumptions 
As previously in this thesis, results for assumption testing would be reported here only 
upon violations. There were no such violations. Among the considered possibilities for 
assumption violations, were multicollinearity (especially between anxiety and depression 
measures), and normality of the distribution of residuals.  
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Regarding multicollinearity, the precaution was taken in the analyses, to centre the GAS 
(and lagged-GAS) data (all waves centred to the baseline mean). This has the effect of 
reducing multicollinearity, with any IV or DV but particularly of interest, with depression, 
which has been previously mentioned as prone to multicollinearity with anxiety measures.  
Regarding the normal distribution of residuals, this can only be verified with continuous 
outcome variables. The binary outcomes, by definition, cannot produce residuals with a 
normal distribution. These residuals were, therefore, not required.  
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Base, Final, and Intermediate Models 
Appendix 6.C provides an analysis of detailed models for PPb. Tabulated results provide 
non-standardised results for multilevel models using GEE, for associations between GAS (by 
repeated measures) and cognitive scores (by repeated measures). Models include the four 
temporal treatments. Model interpretations at the appendix, describe the derivation of these 
models, and the effects of inclusion and exclusion of adjustments for time.  
Appendix 6.D summarises final models and interpretations, for all DVs and all temporal 
treatments. In summary, no combination of DV and temporal treatment remained significant 
when sufficiently adjusted. The outcome variables, and temporal treatments requiring the 
most adjustment (before attenuation was reported), were: PPb – standard, auto-regressive, 
and cognitive change; SDMT – all temporal treatments; DSB – standard, auto-regress, and 
cognitive change; and StW, lagged-GAS. One covariate of interest in previous chapters, was 
depression. Adjustment for this variable resulted in attenuation of the association between 
GAS and the relevant DV, for: PPb, auto-regressive and cognitive change treatments; SDMT, 
all temporal treatments; and, DSB, cognitive change only.  
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6.3.2 Fully adjusted Models  
Fully adjusted models are reported at Appendix 6.E. These include models for all DVs 
but only for the standard temporal treatment. There are three versions of each fully adjusted 
model. The first version reports the effects of all CVs but without adjustment for time, and 
excluding interactions. The second version is time-modified, meaning it includes effects of 
time adjustment and time interactions with GAS. The third version of the fully adjusted 
models investigates interactions between GAS and CVs (other than time), for CVs that were 
significantly associated with the DV in the first version of the model. Because a significant 
association was reported for the DSB models, the alternative temporal treatments also were 
examined for DSB. These are reported at Appendix 6.F. Here, models are reported only for 
the relevant (significant) interaction. 
Also shown at these appendices 6.E and 6.F, are the “Quasi Likelihood under 
Independence Model Criterion (QIC) using the full log quasi-likelihood function”, and the 
total variance explained by each model.  
6.3.2.1 Two specific results. 
From Appendix 6.E, two specific, fully adjusted results, are featured here for later 
reference. Chapter Eight will call on this information for the purpose of updating and 
evaluating previous meta-analyses. These results are: 
• From Model S: Association between GAS and MCI:  
OR = 1.044 (0.871–1.251), p = 0.216. 
• From Model N: Association between GAS and dementia was not determined in a 
fully adjusted  model, which did not converge. 
6.3.2.2 Effects of time. 
For fully adjusted models, the time associations reported at Appendix new 6.E were: 
a) Time was associated with: SDMT; and, StW. 
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b) Time*time was associated with: SDMT; StW; PPb; and, IR. 
c) Time*GAS, and Time*time*GAS were not associated with any DVs. 
Association with time, at a) implies that predicted values for these DVs changed 
significantly over the four waves of the study. Association with time*time at b) implies that 
changes in predicted values of the DVs changed quadratically over the four waves. For 
SDMT and StW, change over time was both linear and quadratic, implying both trends were 
present in data. 
6.3.2.3 Interactions, other than with time. 
The CVs tested for interactions with GAS were only those which were individually 
significant, in the fully adjusted models (Appendix 6.E). These selected CVs are summarised 
at Table 6.1. Models for dementia failed to converge when all CVs were introduced. The 
maximum list of CVs for which the dementia model ran successfully, was: sex, age, 
education, and GDS. Adjustment for time or any interaction term resulted in non-
convergence of the model. 
Table 6.1 
Individually, Significant CVs in Fully adjusted Models. Each was tested for significant 
interaction with GAS. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Baseline Covariate 
Sex Age Edu-
cation 
Depres
sion 
Physical 
Health 
Anxio-
lytics 
Alcohol Smoker Dr Re. 
Memory 
PPb X    X     
SDMT  X X       
DSB   X   Xa   X 
IR X  X   X    
MMSE    X   X   
StW   X  X  X   
MCI        X  
Dementia  Xb        
Notes: 
a The interaction anxiolytics*GAS was the only significant interaction. 
b For Dementia, models failed to converge with more CVs than sex, age, education, & 
depression. Age was a significant CV but was not tested in interactions. 
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The interaction anxiolytics*GAS was associated with DSB for the standard temporal 
model, with OR = 1.382 (CI: 1.132 to 1.688), p = .002; for lagged-GAS, OR = 1.270 (CI: 
1.083 to 1.489), p = .003, for auto-regressive, OR = 1.122 (CI: 1.001 to 1.257), p = .047; and, 
for cognitive change OR = 0.953 (CI: 0.838 to 1.083), p = 0.457. See detailed GEE output at 
Appendix 6.E model I, and Appendix 6.F models A and B. No other significant interaction 
was observed.  
6.3.2.3.1 Further investigation of significant interactions, in fully adjusted models.  
Anxiolytics is a binary indicator with values 0 or 1, representing consumption of 
anxiolytics at baseline. GAS scores were centred at the baseline mean. The product of 
anxiolytics and GAS, therefore, produced values for the interaction component of the model, 
that were either zero (0*GAS), or the unaltered GAS score. For the centred GAS variable 
scores at or above the baseline mean were positive; scores below the mean were negative. 
The interaction effectively identified subgroups, with and without baseline consumption of 
anxiolytics. A further subgrouping is possible according to levels (low or high) of GAS 
scores. Subgroups will be examined more comprehensively at the next chapter. Here, I will 
provide only a preliminary analysis. 
Firstly, LMM was used to reproduce the model. This was to determine random effects for 
the intercept and the slope of the interaction. This LMM model produced slightly different 
results for fixed effects, as was expected because LMM and GEE compute differently with 
respect to both missing values and the adjustment for dependence between measures (Twisk, 
2013). However, when random effects were added, the LLM failed to converge, thus 
rendering random effects computations, invalid. Models for alternative temporal treatments 
produced similarly invalid analyses for random effects.  
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The remaining analyses here are mainly graphical in nature, with the aim of confirming 
and interpreting the significant effects. Figure 6.5 provides a graph of predicted DSB scores 
(from the fully adjusted model by LMM, without interactions). This is for the standard 
temporal model. The graph includes confidence intervals at each wave, calculated as 95% 
confidence for the sample means.   
 
 
Figure 6.5. LMM predicted DSB over time, from Standard temporal, fully adjusted model; 
full sample. 
 
From Figure 6.5, it may be concluded the fully adjusted model applied to the full sample, 
does not predict a trend over time, in the mean level of GEE predicted DSB.  
Figure 6.6 divides the sample into two subgroups, for participants with and without 
baseline consumption of anxiolytics. Here the slopes are equivalent and imply no change over 
time, but the intercepts are different. 
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Figure 6.6. LMM predicted DSB over time, from Standard temporal, fully adjusted DSB 
model, for two subgroups, participants with and without consumption of anxiolytics at 
baseline. 
 
Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show results for the sample divided into four subgroups: 1) no 
anxiolytics & negative GAS (blue line); 2) no anxiolytics & positive GAS (red line); 3) 
anxiolytics & negative GAS (green line); and, 4) anxiolytics & positive GAS (orange line). 
The graphic for confidence intervals at Figure 6.8 may be a little confusing, but they indicate 
the only subgroup different to the others is represented by the green line for participants who 
consumed anxiolytics and who had below mean GAS scores. 
 207 
 
Figure 6.7. Predicted DSB over time, from Standard temporal, fully adjusted DSB model; full 
sample divided into four subgroups as indicated at the legend. 
 
 
Figure 6.8. Predicted DSB over time, from Standard temporal, fully adjusted DSB model; full 
sample divided into four subgroups as indicated at the legend. This is the same as figure 6.7 
except that confidence intervals (95% for the mean), are included. See Table 6.2 for means 
and CIs upon which this graph is base. 
 208 
 
 
Table 6.2 provides the mean predicted DSB results of LMM analysis, with CIs, 
equivalent to the graph at Figure 6.8. The table is colour coded to match the graph. Cell sizes 
are small because of missing data. The small cell sizes (particularly for the green and orange 
subgroups) have also reduced accuracy for CI calculations. It is likely to be the missing data 
which has caused the LMM models for random effects, not to converge. 
Table 6.2 
Subgroup Means for predicted DSB (by LMM), with CI and Cell Sizes, corresponding to 
Figure 6.8. 
 
Subgroup 
Mean (CI) for Predicted DSB,  
n (cases missing) 
No Anxiolytics & 
Negative GAS 
No Anxiolytics & 
Positive GAS 
Anxiolytics & 
Negative GAS 
Anxiolytics & 
Positive GAS 
Wave 1 
5.46 (5.37–5.54),  
175 (1355) 
5.21 (5.11–5.31), 
148 (605) 
2.65 (2.14–3.15), 
4 (27) 
5.23 (4.68–5.79), 
16 (78) 
Wave 2 
5.48 (5.39–5.57), 
162 (1163) 
5.16 (5.06–5.27), 
124 (567) 
2.96 (2.14–3.79), 
5 (23) 
4.90 (4.09–5.71), 
11 (63) 
Wave 3 
5.42 (5.33–5.51), 
157 (1035) 
5.22 (5.09–5.35), 
105 (507) 
2.86 (2.32–3.40), 
4 (25) 
4.98 (4.23–5.72), 
12 (49) 
Wave 4 
5.45 (5.35–5.56), 
114 (843) 
5.25 (5.14–5.37), 
102 (456) 
3.03 (1.93–4.13), 
4 (26) 
5.04 (3.90–6.19), 
7 (36) 
 
 
Although the analyses represented by Table 6.2 and Figures 6.5 to 6.8 are limited and not 
entirely equivalent to multilevel analysis, they are based on the LMM output for mean, 
predicted DSB. Therefore, they do provide some insight into the parameters which 
distinguish these four subgroups from each other. 
Based on these graphs and Table 6.2, there was no change reported in predicted DSB 
over time, for any subgroup. All slopes were equivalent. The only difference between 
subgroups was the intercept for participants who consumed anxiolytics and had lower than 
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average GAS scores. The difference in DSB scores between this one subgroup and the 
remainder of the sample was roughly 2 points on the DSB scale ranging from 0 to 10. At 
Figure 6.8, Wave 4, the green and orange CI markers overlap, therefore, statistically, there 
was ambiguity at this one time point between the subgroups.  
When the multilevel modelling of the interaction was extended to include time as a CV 
and time was included in the interaction: time*anxiolytics*GAS, the results from GEE and 
LMM analyses were contradictory. For GEE analysis, this three-way interaction was not 
significant (p = .892). For LMM analysis, the interaction, fixed effects were: coefficient = 
.151 (.038–.263), p = .009. The opposing results between GEE and LMM methods, are most 
likely due to the different treatments by each for the considerable component of missing data. 
The goodness of fit for the LMM results was worse for the model including time (-2LL = 
5030.520 compared to 5013.728 without time). Therefore, without the need to compute Chi-
square probabilities, the model including time does not provide additional, significant 
information.  
The meaning and the direction of change implied by the significant association of the 
anxiolytics*GAS interaction, reported above, remains unclear. If there is no change over 
time, the moderately sized odds ratio (1.382) and its positive sign may mean only that there 
was a difference between subgroups, based on different intercepts.  
Similar analyses to the above were applied to the significant interaction effects for the 
two alternative temporal treatments (lagged-GAS and autoregressive), with similar results.  
These significant interactions will be further examined in Chapter Seven. 
6.3.3 Variance Explained 
Variances explained by all models were small. For example, consider the final model for 
the standard temporal treatment for SDMT, at Appendix 6.D, Table 1. By the method at 
Section 6.2.3.3, the variance explained by this model was 6.7%. The explained variance for 
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the fully adjusted model for SDMT, standard temporal treatment, was 12.2%. See this at 
Appendix 6.E, Model D. This small improvement in the variance explained was typical of 
most fully adjusted models compared to final models.  
6.4 Discussion 
6.4.1 Summary of Findings 
The interaction of anxiolytics and GAS was associated with DSB in fully adjusted 
models for standard, lagged-GAS, and autoregressive models, with full adjustment. For these 
interactions, there was only a difference in intercept between subgroups of participants. 
Although considerable missing data limited the possible analyses, there appeared to be no 
effect over time and no difference in slope between these subgroups. Subgroups will be 
examined more comprehensively in the next chapter. Other than these results, extensive 
analysis by multilevel modelling has not demonstrated any fully adjusted association between 
GAS and any of the nominated dependent variables (Section 6.2.2). 
6.4.2 Comparisons with the Literature 
There is no known report in the literature, of significant association between the 
interaction of anxiolytics consumption and anxiety, with a cognitive outcome variable. The 
finding here of no association (other than for the anxiolytics interaction) is consistent with 
about a quarter of past research (Chapter Two).  
The main difference between the present and previous studies is in the analytical 
methods. Multilevel modelling methods reported in the literature, have rarely investigated the 
time-lagged effects of anxiety. An exception was Bierman et al. (2008), which was 
mentioned above and is discussed further below. Bierman et al. introduced “previous” or 
lagged measures of anxiety. Structural equation modelling was also used to demonstrate 
lagged effects (Petkus et al., 2017). The more prominent alternative to MLM, for identifying 
the effects of prior anxiety, has been the regression studies drawing only upon a baseline 
 211 
measure of the predictor and its association with subsequent cognitive change. Such study 
design does test “prior” (or time-lagged) anxiety effects, and removes most unintended 
temporal confounding. However, this method also contains less information than those which 
contend with the trends in anxiety over time. For example, if as expected, persistence of 
anxiety was critical to the processes of cognitive ageing then this association would remain 
hidden to such baseline studies. 
6.4.2.1 Standard temporal treatment. 
Notwithstanding the importance of the analyses for alternative temporal treatments, the 
standard temporal models, for all DVs, are the most comparable with the literature. Final 
models reported above, using PATH data, and deploying standard, temporal treatment for 
anxiety as a predictor, were attenuated for the DVs: PPb, SDMT, and DSB. For the remaining 
DVs: IR, MMSE, StW, MCI, and dementia, adjustment was not required; the base models 
were not significant. These results from PATH (finding no association) are aligned with three 
of 16 previous studies looking at cognitive decline, and six of 24 studies examining incident 
cognitive impairment. See Tables 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. Some research (Gulpers et al., 
2016) has suggested there is no evidence of publication bias for the cognitive impairment 
research, but there is no comparable analysis of bias for the investigations of cognitive 
decline. 
6.4.2.2 Alternative temporal treatments. 
Two previous studies (Bierman et al., 2008; Petkus et al., 2017) featured time-lagged 
effects. Bierman et al. (2008) used MLM with models comparing lagged-anxiety (over three 
years) with standard temporal treatment, or, as they termed it, the effects of “present anxiety”.  
For the standard treatment, Bierman et al. found (as previously described at Chapter One), an 
inverted U-shaped curve for which cognitive performance was highest when anxiety was 
moderate and lowest when anxiety was low or high. They found that lagged-anxiety had no 
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significant effect on association with a variety of outcome variables, including MMSE, 
Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices (RCPM), Coding test (for processing speed), 
Auditory Verbal Learning Test (AVLT) learning and memory, AVLT recall, and AVLT 
retention.  Models were adjusted for age, sex, education, alcohol consumption, 
benzodiazepine use, number of chronic diseases, and depression symptoms. With different 
results, Petkus et al. (2017), using SEM, found significant anxiety effects were those time-
lagged by three years (one wave) for association with decline in attention, and, lagged by six 
years (two waves of data), for association with decline in processing speed. Reported SEM 
results were unadjusted but described as substantially equivalent to results adjusted for sex, 
depressive symptoms, and physical health. Both Bierman et al. and Petkus et al. tested 
processing speed but otherwise, their cognitive tests were different. Although the results of 
these two studies disagree, it may be that more options for time-lagging (one, two, and three 
waves), and options for cognitive measures, may have identified some agreement. 
The results in this chapter for significant interactions, included the time-lagged and 
autoregressive temporal treatments. If the further investigation at Chapter Seven confirms 
these findings, the time-lagged and autoregressive results are likely to have important 
implications. 
6.4.3 Interpretation of the Results 
6.4.3.1 Small effect size and insufficient variance. 
Small effect size is illustrated by Model B (the base model) from Table 1 at Appendix 
6.C, which yielded a significant coefficient for GAS, as an unadjusted predictor for PPb. The 
coefficient was -0.034, meaning that if there were a unit increase in the score for GAS, the 
predicted score for PPb would be reduced by 0.034. Here, PPb was on an effective scale of 0 
to 30 (30 being the maximum score achieved throughout the study). Therefore, to obtain a 
predicted, unit decrease in this scale of zero to 30, would require an increase in GAS score of 
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1/0.034 = 29.4 points. This 29.4 points exceeds the entire GAS scale of 0 to 9, which would, 
therefore, be an impossibility at an individual level. The coefficient could become meaningful 
only as an average result so that, in a sample, some individuals might change over time more 
than others, but on average only a small fraction of one point on the PPb scale would be 
observed as the difference.  
This small effect is consistent with the observations above, that models typically 
explained only small proportions of variances in the outcome variables. For example, on this 
same model (Model B from Table 1 at Appendix 6.C), the variance explained was just 
0.24%.  
As small as this explained variance is, and as small as the predicted change in cognitive 
outcome might be, a further level of analysis renders the effect of even smaller impact. Twisk 
(2013) noted that in models for time-variant CVs and DVs, the variance is ambiguously 
distributed within- and between-subjects, and that the components cannot be separated. If 
each type of change (within and between) applied individually then for the example above (a 
GAS coefficient of -0.34), for the within-subject change, it would mean that over the 12 years 
of the study, for the average individual, a unit change in GAS would predict a decline in PPb 
score of 0.34 points. Therefore, at this rate, a unit change in PPB would take 35.3 years. For 
between-subject it would mean that a unit difference in GAS score between any two 
individuals, at any time point, would predict an average -0.34 difference in PPb score 
between these two individuals. Therefore, within any one model, the total variance explained 
would be divided between the within- and between-subject variance, and with insubstantial 
effect in either category. Such small effects are consistent with the result that all models were 
attenuated when adjusted by short lists of CVs. 
An exception was noted in the results for the auto-regressive model for Model C, at 
Table 3, Appendix 6.C, for associations with PPb. Here, there was a larger proportion of 
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variance explained (29.86%) by the model which introduced lagged-PPb as a CV. It was 
noted at Appendix 6.C, this relatively large figure suggested the dominant part of the variance 
in PPb could be attributed to the auto-regressive effect, and, therefore, was not related to the 
influence of the primary predictor, GAS.  
Notwithstanding this exception, the pattern of results points to small effect sizes for 
associations between anxiety and cognitive ageing. Such results are not a consequence of low 
power of the PATH data. For example, Appendix 6.G provides a table of projected power 
ratios for future waves of the PATH project. (This table was reproduced from a grant 
proposal, as specified at the appendix.) It demonstrates the dataset has sufficient power to 
“detect a wide range of associations”.   
6.4.3.2 Attenuated lagged-GAS models. 
Results implied lagged-GAS models (temporal treatment 2), were occasionally less 
indicative of association than the standard temporal treatment. For example, at Table 1, 
Appendix 6.D, for PPb, the final model for the standard treatment required adjustment by five 
CVs before attenuation was reported, while the time-lagged treatment was non-significant, 
without adjustment. This is only an approximate comparison. The standard and lagged 
treatments cannot strictly be compared because they are based on a different number of 
waves of data and a different sample size due to loss to follow-up of participants. However, it 
may be that any effect of time-lagging has been disguised or distorted by the small variance 
explained within any one model. More importantly, such comparison of effect between GAS 
and lagged-GAS, does not imply that one is more relevant or more valid than the other; the 
two methods attempt to identify different relationships as described above at Methods. It is 
necessary to discover only whether the fully adjusted , time-lagged effect was established, in 
order to determine whether it was relevant. Because all final models were attenuated, and 
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these were adjusted by fewer CVs than the fully adjusted models, the time-lagged association 
between GAS and cognitive change was not established. 
The remaining temporal treatments (autoregressive and cognitive change) were similarly 
unhelpful in supporting conclusions about the effects of time-lagged associations between 
GAS and any of the outcome variables. As mentioned, only the significant interactions may 
provide further insight into the alternative temporal treatments. 
6.4.3.3 Attenuation reported with inclusion of depression in models. 
Depression has been identified earlier as an important, potential confounder. For 
example, at Chapter One, I noted that,  
“Depression is highly comorbid with anxiety (Burton et al., 2013) and predicts 
cognitive ageing (Diniz et al., 2013), so may be a confounding variable . . .” 
I also noted that anxiety and depression share a genetic aetiology (Zimmerman & 
Chelminski, 2003). Depression was described in Chapter One as possibly ambiguously 
identified with anxiety, particularly by the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. In the 
PATH data, the comorbidity (anxiety and depression) varied over time between 3.5% and 
2.2%. Chapter Four noted depression was strongly correlated cross-sectionally with GAS at 
all waves. GDS is also a candidate for confounding multilevel models because it was 
correlated with both GAS and most measures of cognition for all waves (Tables 4.13 to 4.16). 
The case for confounding by depression was not confirmed by association with cognitive 
change from Wave 1 to 4 (Tables 4.18 and 4.25) but considering the weight of evidence 
elsewhere, provision must be made for the prospect that GDS is a confounder in PATH.  
Considering these many connections between anxiety and depression, in the present 
investigation of the associations of anxiety with cognition, the effects of depression are 
important to identify. 
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In the present analyses of MLM, models for outcome variables, PPb, SDMT, and DSB, 
required adjustment for depression before attenuation was reported. Of these, only SDMT 
required the adjustment across all temporal treatments. The results in this chapter confirm the 
importance of depression in testing the associations, but only for the outcome variables: PPb, 
SDMT, and DSB. Depression was not a critical covariate for the outcome variables, IR, 
MMSE, StW, MCI, or dementia. 
6.4.3.4 Effects of time. 
A feature of the results was that in all models, there was insufficient effect by time to 
alter which model was identified as the final model. From the fully adjusted models, it is 
noteworthy that linear time was significant only for the DVs, SDMT and StW, although 
quadratic time was associated with these two DVs as well as PPb and IR. Association of 
linear time means only that the DV was changing over time. Association of quadratic time 
means there was a quadratic trend in the DV, which may or may not have also overlayed a 
linear trend. Time interactions with GAS were not associated with the DVs in any fully 
adjusted or final models. Therefore, no association between GAS and a DV, was observed in 
these models, to vary over the duration of the study. This is most likely a consequence of the 
fact that associations between GAS and DVs were observed to be limited to base models or 
models with elementary adjustments, and that such associations were with inconsequential 
effect size.  
Twisk (2013) had recommended investigating models with and without adjustment for 
time but noted adjustment removes variance associated with change in the DV over time and 
could, therefore, confound the results. The outcome here that time made little or no difference 
to the models, places doubt on whether there was enough variance due to time, to change the 
results for other predictors. 
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In the literature on anxiety and cognitive ageing, time has been entered into most models 
but without comparison of effects with and without this inclusion. Twisk (2013) observed 
generally in the literature that often the inclusion of time into multilevel models was 
unspecified. 
6.4.3.5 Attenuation reported with inclusion in models of subjective memory 
complaint, and physical health. 
At Chapter Four, subjective memory complaint (as represented by Consulted Dr Re 
memory) at baseline, was noted as a probable confounder. In Tables at Appendix 6.D for final 
models, consulting Dr Re memory was a critical attenuating covariate only for PPb standard 
temporal treatment. Although it was important for clarifying this specific model, in general it 
was not as influential as expected. Similarly, physical health (another confounder identified 
at Chapter Four) was required only for PPb standard temporal treatment models before 
attenuation was reported. 
6.4.5.6 GAS interactions other than with time. 
As mentioned, the only significant interactions in fully adjusted models were for 
anxiolytics*GAS (or lagged-GAS). The significant effect of the interaction was a 
consequence only of the difference between subgroups (described at Section 6.3.2.2.1) and 
their predicted DSB outcomes. These different outcomes appear to have been driven not by 
different slopes in the fully adjusted models, but only by different intercepts, meaning there 
was no difference in effect (on DSB) over time, only in the attributes of the participants in 
each subgroup. What these differences between groups are, and their implications, will be 
examined in the next chapter.  
6.4.4 Methods 
In this chapter I have examined both present effects and time-lagged effects of the main 
predictor, GAS. Lagged effects were structured to test the association between GAS at one 
 218 
wave with the DV measurement at the following wave. It is possible also to consider effects 
that were lagged by two or more measurements (waves) instead of one. Petkus et al. (2017) 
included, lagged and double-lagged effects of the anxiety predictor into one model. However, 
this was using SEM rather than multilevel modelling, and the results were complex. For the 
analyses in this chapter, because of the low variance available and the dearth of significant 
results, examination of time-lagged effects by two or more measures were not presented in 
the results. Nonetheless, a representative sample of models were tested for the double-lagged 
GAS predictor, and all results were non-significant (for base models) or were attenuated.  
6.5 Conclusions 
There was no fully adjusted association between GAS and cognitive change except that 
an interaction with GAS was significantly in association with DSB. The interaction was 
anxiolytics*GAS, and was significant in standard, lagged-GAS, and autoregressive, fully 
adjusted models. Because of missing data, analyses were limited and at times contradictory. 
However, it appears the significant interaction may reflect only different intercepts between 
categories of participants, rather than a change over time. The following chapter will 
investigate subgroups in greater depth. 
There were interesting observations revealed by these analyses. Inclusion of Time and 
time-interaction terms made no difference to the identification of final models. Depression 
was confirmed as an important confounder for some outcome variables. And, variance 
explained by most models was trivially small, implying the larger, unexplained proportion of 
variance in the DVs could be influenced by, as yet, unknown confounding effects.  
From the literature, time-lagged models are rare. Had there been more comprehensive 
analyses in the past, using such methods, or if there are more such analyses in future, meta-
analyses may have greater potential to identify and differentiate the present and lagged 
effects of anxiety upon cognitive ageing. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN:   
Stratifications of Multilevel Models 
Abstract 
Background: This chapter investigates a scoped selection of stratifications (or subgroups) for 
possible associations between Goldberg Anxiety Scale (GAS) and cognition, and extends the 
analysis of the anxiolytics subgroup, identified in the previous chapter. 
Methods: Subgrouping variables were those identified at Chapter Six as predictors which 
remained in significant association with cognition, in fully adjusted models. As foreshadowed 
at Chapter Three, additional subgrouping variables were those quantifying levels of persistent 
GAS. Models were analysed using SPSS Linear Mixed Models (LMM). Alternative temporal 
treatments, introduced in the previous chapter, were included in the analyses by subgroup. 
Results: Only the mentioned anxiolytics subgroup was identified with significant association 
between GAS and cognition. For the anxiolytics subgroup the association was with working 
memory (digit span backwards), with coefficient = 0.215 (0.001–0.429), p = .049.  
Discussion: Examination of these results included evaluation of credibility criteria for 
subgroup analysis, available in the literature. This examination placed doubt on the credibility 
of the result for the anxiolytics subgroup.  
Conclusion: Within the PATH data, there remains only marginal, and possibly unreliable 
evidence for association between anxiety and age associated cognitive change. 
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7.1 Introduction 
This chapter extends the analysis of Chapter Six, by investigating stratifications of the 
regression models for time-varying anxiety.  
Here and in the literature, “stratifications” and “subgroups” are interchangeable terms. 
Subgroups within subgroups are referred to as “compounded”. This is a similar concept to 
“layering” of stratifications.  
Interactions (considered in the previous chapter) can be interpreted as subgroups when at 
least one of the variables is categorical (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Interactions were constructed 
in Chapter Six from the covariates (CVs) which remained in significant association with the 
dependent variables (DVs) in relevant, fully adjusted models (Table 6.1). This chapter 
deploys the same CVs as subgrouping variables, but only for models involving DVs selected 
for their relatively high level of variance explained by the fully adjusted models. The 
significant interaction reported at Chapter Six, for the categorical variable anxiolytics, 
remains relevant to the present chapter. 
This scoping was because of the need to minimise the models to be analysed. A 
challenge with analysis by stratification is that there are endless permutations possible, which 
can lead to over analysis, yielding poor reliability of results because of the potential for 
highly situational specifics (Epstein, 1983). Additionally, Sun, Briel, Walter, and Guyatt 
(2010) recommended investigation of subgroups only upon a priori hypotheses. Interpreting 
Sun et al., such short-listing is a necessary precaution partly to confirm validity of the result 
(upon a priori criteria) and partly because of the prospect of Type One Error (false positive) 
arising by chance from a long list of similar tests. Thus, analyses in this chapter were limited 
by restricting subgroupings to prospective associations suggested by theory or previous 
results.  
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Stratifications have been limited to two categories: subgroups by variable identified at 
Table 6.1; and, subgroups by levels of persistent anxiety. These subgroups based on 
persistence of anxiety will be defined in Methods, consistently with previous chapters. 
Persistence of anxiety was described (Chapter One) as likely to be necessary for anxiety to be 
a risk factor for cognitive ageing.  
Except to consider more deeply any significant findings, compound subgroups were 
limited to a depth of two levels (subgroups within subgroups), and not all level two 
permutations were investigated. Small cell sizes also, excluded some permutations. 
Alternative temporal treatments (Section 6.2.4.4) were not investigated except where 
significant findings in the standard temporal treatment suggested further investigation. This 
was considered reasonable, based on the results in Chapter Six which revealed no results 
from alternative temporal treatment that were not already apparent in the standard treatment 
for the similar model. 
Because of these necessary constraints the analyses by stratification of multilevel models 
is intrinsically limited and does not attempt exhaustively to investigate all possibilities. 
However, within these limits, subgroup analysis is an important attempt to identify classes of 
participants for whom an association between anxiety and cognition might otherwise remain 
hidden. 
7.2 Methods 
7.2.1 Research Questions 
This chapter addresses both primary research questions and secondary research question 
C, as defined at Chapter Three (Section 3.2.2). The primary questions were: 
(5) Is anxiety a risk factor for the rate of age-associated cognitive decline? 
(6) Is anxiety a risk factor for incident cognitive impairment?  
The secondary question was: 
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“Are there subsets of participants for whom associations are different?  
Firstly, comparisons will be performed between groups with and without chronic 
anxiety, defined by persistence of anxiety at various symptom levels, for two or more 
waves of data. Secondly, subsets may be identified by confounding variables (Section 
3.2.1.d.iii).” 
7.2.2 Scoping of Subgroups 
Selections of DVs for investigation were drawn from Table 6.1 and based on the level of 
variance explained (the higher the better) in the relevant fully adjusted models at Appendix 
6.E. These DVs were: symbol digit modality test (SDMT); digit span backwards (DSB); and, 
spot the word (StW). For these DVs, the variance explained by fully adjusted models were, 
respectively: 7.3%; 5.7%; and 17.1%. Models for remaining DVs at Appendix 6.E, explained 
less than 5%. The subgrouping variables were baseline CVs indicated at Table 6.1 for each of 
these selected DVs. These resulting subgrouping variables are listed at Appendix 7.B, Tables 
1 to 3 respectively, for each of the DVs.  
The CVs drawn from Table 6.1 for subgrouping, were supplemented by dichotomised 
variables for persistence of anxiety, which were configured to indicate whether the 
participant had at least two measurements (over the four waves) of a high level of anxiety 
(GAS≥5 symptoms) or a clinical level of anxiety (GAS≥7 symptoms). Persistent, clinical 
GAS is referred to here also as “chronic GAS”. These additional grouping variables were 
foreshadowed at Chapter Three, and the cut-points were based on previous research (Chapter 
Two). 
Relevant to the scoping of subgroups, was a set of principles identified in the literature. 
Sun et al. (2010) addressed the question of whether subgroup effects were believable. They 
placed some doubt on subgroup analysis and provided criteria for judging the credibility of 
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such effects. Based on these criteria, the authors recommended limiting the scope of 
subgroups. Their criteria are reproduced at Section 7.2.3.  
There is need to take precautions with this analysis not only from the theoretical 
perspective offered by Sun et al. but also from consideration of the data. One of the 
characteristics of the PATH data for the variables considered here, is that there are data 
missing from one or more variables for a high proportion of cases and the level of 
missingness is exacerbated by the length of the list of covariates. Multilevel modelling can 
cope well with missing data but when subgrouping, and particularly compound subgrouping 
divides the data into small cells, such a heavy burden of missing data may yield many cells 
void or close to void of data. Results from stratified analysis may then be appropriately 
regarded as of limited validity, unless demonstrated otherwise. 
Three layers of stratification often produced a preponderance of small and empty cells. 
Level 3 compounding was, therefore, not investigated beyond this finding. There was a 
further limitation placed on the permutations of StW models. Mean StW scores were 
demonstrated at Chapter Four to trend upwards over the four waves of data. This trend is 
different to other cognitive measures and may be explainable as a consequence of new 
learning by participants (see description at Table 4.1), but this DV is of less interest to 
investigation of anxiety as a predictor of cognitive ageing. StW was investigated only to the 
first level of subgrouping, with the open contingency to investigate more deeply if a 
significant association were found. 
7.2.3 Credibility Criteria for Subgroup Analyses 
Eleven criteria for assessing the credibility of subgroup analysis were recommended by 
Sun et al. (2010). These criteria, addressing the perspectives of design, analysis, and context, 
are reproduced below (with author permission). 
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Credibility Criteria for Results of Subgroup Analysis  
 
 
7.2.4 Linear Mixed Models 
General estimating equations (GEE), the main modelling method selected in the previous 
chapter, was vulnerable to small cell sizes. Linear mixed models (LMM) were adopted for the 
present chapter, as a more stable method for the analysis required for the greater, cell-size 
problem presented by the stratifications. LMM provides the additional advantage of allowing 
calculation of random effects, (provided fixed effects are demonstrated). LMM methods are 
detailed at Appendix 7.A. 
7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Subgroup Results 
Results are reported at Appendix 7.B, Tables 1 to 3 respectively for the DVs: SDMT, 
DSB, and StW.  Each table provides, for each subgroup and sub-subgroup, the 
unstandardised coefficient, 95% confidence interval (CI), and sample size, for the association 
 
Design 
1. Is the subgroup variable a characteristic measured at baseline or after randomisation? 
2. Is the effect suggested by comparisons within rather than between studies? 
3. Was the hypothesis specified a priori? 
4. Was the direction of the subgroup effect specified a priori? 
5. Was the subgroup effect one of a small number of hypothesised effects tested? 
 
Analysis 
6. Does the interaction test suggest a low likelihood that chance explains the apparent 
subgroup effect? 
7. Is the significant subgroup effect independent? 
 
Context 
8. Is the size of the subgroup effect large? 
9. Is the interaction consistent across studies? 
10. Is the interaction consistent across closely related outcomes within the study? 
11. Is there indirect evidence that supports the hypotheses interaction (biological 
rationale)? 
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of GAS with the nominated DV. Following each table is a summary and interpretation of the 
key findings. 
The single significant finding was for the baseline anxiolytics subgroup, for outcome 
variable, DSB: coefficient = 0.215 (0.001–0.429), p = .049, n = 126. 
Layering of anxiolytics with education produced a mixture of invalid and non-significant 
models (results not shown). The only other DV at Table 6.1 with anxiolytics as a significant 
CV, was immediate recall (IR). Subgroup tests on IR did not yield any significant association 
between GAS and the DV (results not shown). 
7.3.2 Further Investigation of Anxiolytics Subgroup 
7.3.2.1 Effect size. 
The effect size for the anxiolytics = Yes subgroup was 0.215 (.001–.429). This means, 
for a unit difference in predicted DSB, there would need to be a 1/0.215 (= 4.65) difference in 
GAS score (on a scale of 0 to 9). A unit difference in DSB (scale of 0 to 10) over 12 years 
represents a mean 2.5% change in score per wave, or 0.6% a year. Therefore, the effect on 
DSB was small, for large differences in GAS. 
7.3.2.2 Random effects 
For the anxiolytics (Yes) subgroup, upon introduction of random effects for GAS to the 
model, fixed effects were attenuated, and the random effects were non-significant or 
redundant (results not shown).  
7.3.2.3 Graphical interpretations. 
Table 7.1 provides the mean (centred) GAS score, by wave, for each of the anxiolytics 
subgroups. Figure 7.1 is a graph of the same figures. There is little significant change in GAS 
for the anxiolytics = Yes group, and no change over time for the anxiolytics = No group. 
There is a difference in intercept between the two subgroups. The Yes subgroup has a 
significantly higher level of GAS symptoms. 
 227 
 
Table 7.1 
Centred GAS Score for each Anxiolytics Subgroup 
Baseline 
Anxiolytics 
Subgroup 
GAS: centred on baseline mean  
Mean (95% CI), n for non-missing data 
W1 W2 W3 W4 
No 
-.139 (-.229–-.049), 
n = 2289 
-.176 (-.271–-.081), n 
=2016 
-.184 (-.278–-.090), n 
= 1804 
-.070 (-.174–.034), n 
= 1515 
Yes 
2.584 (2.10–3.07), n 
= 125 
2.202 (1.671–2.733), 
n = 102 
1.767 (1.240–2.293), 
n = 90 
1.225 (0.639–1.810), 
n = 73 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Centred GAS Score for each Anxiolytics Subgroup 
 
At Table 7.2 and Figure 7.2, the DSB scores, predicted by LMM, are presented for the same 
anxiolytics subgroups (Yes & No), as in Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1. There is an apparent 
difference in intercept but not in slope. The predicted DSB for the Yes group at Table 7.2 
indicates a small but non-significant, positive slope. This is in apparent contradiction to the 
mixed models result which was positive and significant (Section 7.3.1), although only 
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marginally so, with p = .049. Also, the mixed models effect size was small (Section 7.3.2.1). 
Table 7.2 and Figure 7.2 were both produced by different software (SPSS Explore & Line 
Graph by Legacy Dialogue) to the mixed model (SPSS Mixed Models; Appendix 7.A). The 
apparent contradiction between the two sets of results is possibly due to different treatment of 
small cell sizes and missing data.   
 
Table 7.2 
Predicted DSB Scores by Anxiolytics Subgroup 
Baseline 
Anxiolytics 
Subgroup 
DSB: predicted by LMM  
Mean (95% CI), n for non-missing data 
W1 W2 W3 W4 
No 
5.348 (5.289–5.407), 
n = 323 
5.346 (5.283–5.409), 
n = 286 
5.338 (5.271–5.404) 
n = 262 
5.350 (5.280–5.421) 
n = 216 
Yes 
4.390 (4.101–4.677), 
n = 20 
4.516 (4.179–4.853), 
n = 16 
4.504 (4.70–4.838), 
n = 16 
4.685 (4.349–5.020), 
n = 11 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Predicted DSB Scores by Anxiolytics Subgroup 
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7.3.2.4 Credibility criteria. 
For evaluations of the credibility criteria from Section 7.2.3, see Table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.3 
Evaluation of Credibility Criteria 
Feature 
Criterion 
Number 
Criteria Evaluation 
Design 1 Is the subgroup variable a 
characteristic measured at baseline 
or after randomisation? 
Yes. The subgrouping variable, anxiolytics, was 
measured at Baseline. 
2 Is the effect suggested by 
comparisons within rather than 
between studies? 
No. This subgrouping has not been observed in 
other studies, and is not suggested by previous 
observations within PATH. 
3 Was the hypothesis specified a priori? No. 
4 Was the direction of the subgroup 
effect specified a priori? 
No.  
5 Was the subgroup effect one of a 
small number of hypothesised effects 
tested? 
No. Considering the analyses here, and in the 
interactions examined in the previous chapter, a 
moderately large group of effects were tested. 
Analysis 6 Does the interaction test suggest a 
low likelihood that chance explains 
the apparent subgroup effect? 
Yes. The interaction reported at Chapter Six, 
found a highly significant effect p = .002.  
7 Is the significant subgroup effect 
independent? 
Yes. The subgroup effect was determined within a 
fully adjusted  model. 
Context 8 Is the size of the subgroup effect 
large? 
No. The subgroup effect size was moderate.  
The effect size of the subgroup was 0.215 (.001–
.429), p = .049.  
9 Is the interaction consistent across 
studies? 
No. There is no other known study on this 
subgroup effect. 
10 Is the interaction consistent across 
closely related outcomes within the 
study? 
No. There was no closely related association. 
11 Is there indirect evidence that 
supports the hypotheses interaction 
(biological rationale)? 
Marginal. See arguments regarding validity, at 
Section 7.4.3.2. There was no sustainable 
argument to support a predictive association 
between GAS and anxiety within this subgroup. 
 
Regarding item 11 of Table 7.3, a relevant observation of the results is that study 
participants who consumed anxiolytics at baseline, had higher GAS scores at baseline (Table 
7.1 and Figure 7.1) and these GAS scores declined over time. Also, they had lower DSB 
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scores at baseline, and these DSB scores improved slightly but not significantly (Table 7.2 
and Figure 7.2).  
7.3.3 Assumptions 
Assumption tests were accepted. Notable, was that residuals produced by MLM models, 
often had only marginally normal distribution when cell sizes were small. However, no result 
was rejected on these grounds. 
7.4 Discussion 
7.4.1 Overview 
One subgroup was identified, for which a significant association was found between 
GAS and cognition; in this case the outcome variable was working memory (DSB). The 
subgroup was for participants who reported, at baseline: consumption of anxiolytics. The 
result will be evaluated, but firstly it is useful to consider perspectives from the literature.  
7.4.2 Literature 
From Table 2.2, few previous studies (5 of 37) examining associations between anxiety 
and cognitive ageing, accounted either for anxiolytics or benzodiazepines. These analyses 
typically involved only controlling for such consumption, within models which were 
focussed on other results. None of these studies that I am aware of, performed moderation or 
stratification analysis to identify such a class of participants. More generally, subgroup 
analysis appears to be a rarely adopted method. 
In the context of this thesis, and particularly after the results of Chapter Six, subgroup 
analysis was important to consider. However, Sun et al. (2010) offered insights into the 
credibility of subgroup analysis. Adopting the criteria of Sun et al., the evaluation below, of 
the results from this chapter, will serve to confirm their cautionary note. 
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Although not based on subgroup analysis, Cherbuin et al. (2009) considered anxiolytics 
within PATH data, and found baseline anxiolytics predicted progression to MCI at Wave 2. 
Their modelling method was logistic regression, and they adjusted for a long list of CVs, as I 
have here. The same study did not find an association between anxiety and cognitive change.  
7.4.3 Interpretation and Evaluation of Results for the Anxiolytics Subgroup 
7.4.3.1 Comparison with Cherbuin et al. (2009). 
The result in this chapter, for the anxiolytics subgroup, implies that for these participants 
only, there was a marginally significant, positive association between GAS and DSB scores, 
over the four waves of the study. This is on a different time scale than the analysis by 
Cherbuin et al. (2009), which considered only two waves, the outcome variable was different 
(diagnosis of MCI, rather than DSB score), the result indicated an effect in the opposite 
direction, and importantly, the result by Cherbuin et al. was for association between 
anxiolytics and cognition, not between GAS and cognition. So, there appears little on which 
to make a comparison. However, if anxiolytics as a predictor in the Cherbuin et al. study were 
regarded as a proxy for anxiety then the apparently, opposite, cognitive effects would call for 
further evaluation of the results. This evaluation is presented next. But firstly, it should be 
noted from Appendix 6.E, Model S, that for the full four waves of the PATH data, in the fully 
adjusted  model for MCI (the DV reported by Cherbuin et al) there was no association 
between either GAS or anxiolytics, and MCI. Thus, the association reported by Cherbuin et 
al. between waves 1 and 2, was attenuated over the full length of the study. 
7.4.3.2 Validity of the anxiolytics subgroup results. 
Following are alternative perspectives or rationales, for and against acceptance of the 
reported association between anxiety (GAS scores) and DSB for the subgroup which 
consumed anxiolytics at baseline: 
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A. Prescription for anxiolytics may be an alternative measure of anxiety. However, 
prescription of anxiolytics (reflecting a diagnosis of anxiety) is not the same as 
consumption of anxiolytics, which is a treatment, and as such would be expected 
to modify anxiety levels, and therefore, protect against the effects of anxiety upon 
cognition. Within the four-yearly Waves, the PATH data do not record the 
relative timing of GAS and cognition scores, and anxiolytics prescription by a 
doctor. Additionally, PATH does not provide data on the period of consumption 
of the medication. Therefore, there were insufficient data to analyse the effects of 
anxiolytics as though its administration were an element of a treatment 
intervention trial. Notwithstanding these limitations, an apparent protection 
against the effects of anxiety is indicated in the data. See Figures 7.1, for effects 
on anxiety, and Figure 7.2 for effects on DSB scores. In the anxiolytics subgroup, 
anxiety trends downward and DSB scores improve (although not significantly so 
in the graph, but according to the LMM result). This rationale supports the 
credibility of the PATH results, disposes of the interpretation of anxiolytics as a 
proxy for anxiety, and questions the plausibility of the results from Cherbuin et 
al. (2009) because of an effect in the reverse direction.  
B. If the rationale at A were true, and anxiolytics successfully protected against 
anxiety, then two other effects might be expected: (1) Other cognitive scores for 
the same subgroup (anxiolytics), might be expected also to improve; and, (2) The 
harmful influence of anxiety should be visible elsewhere, so that there would be 
an indication of a predictive association between anxiety and cognitive decline, 
independently of anxiolytics. These other effects were not apparent in the data.  
C. From Appendix 6.E, Model G for the fully adjusted model predicting DSB, 
anxiolytics predicted DSB with coefficient = -0.958 (-1.873 – -0.042), p = .040. 
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This is the reverse sign of the effect of GAS upon DSB within the anxiolytics = 
Yes, subgroup. Model G refers to the full sample, and the subgroup results refer 
only to a sample of 126, and which includes a burden of missing data. However, 
these results with opposite effect place doubt, each upon the other. If the rationale 
at A, were accepted then it would be unlikely for the independent effect of 
anxiolytics upon DSB to be negative. This apparent contradiction may be a 
consequence of the combination of the weak association (of GAS with DSB in 
the anxiolytics subgroup) as delineated below at rationale D. If, however, the 
negative effect, in the full model G, were accurate then this would align with the 
result from Cherbuin et al. (2009) for the effect of anxiolytics upon MCI. 
D. As noted elsewhere but summarised here, the finding of association (between 
GAS and DSB) for the anxiolytics = Yes, subgroup, was weak in six respects: (1) 
Small cell sizes; (2) Missing data (Section 7.2.2); (3) Small effect size (Section 
7.3.2.1); (4) Marginal significance (p = .049); (5) Entry of random effects into the 
mixed models, produced attenuation of the fixed effects (Section 7.3.2.2); and, 
(6) By different software, calculation of mean (predicted) DSB by wave, with 
confidence intervals, produced (predicted) slope which was not significant 
(Section 7.3.2.3). 
Considering these arguments for and against the plausibility of the reported result, the 
anxiolytics subgroup association with DSB should be qualified as a marginal effect that may 
not be reliable. Additionally, the subgroup was defined upon a binary variable, with limited 
information. It is, therefore, correct and important to evaluate the effect by criteria established 
for subgroups. This follows. 
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7.4.3.3 Subgroup credibility criteria applied to Anxiolytics results. 
At Table 7.3 there were affirmative responses (in support of acceptance of the validity of 
the anxiolytics subgrouping) only for criteria 1, 6, and 7. Eight other criteria were negative, 
or in one case (11), marginal. Sun et al. (2010) did not attempt to weight the criteria for 
relative importance. They explained acceptance of a subgroup result would rarely be a binary 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ but would more accurately be placed on a continuum which reflected relative 
uncertainty. On these criteria, the result appears to be of doubtful credibility. 
7.4.3.4 Implications of association between anxiety and working memory. 
Notwithstanding this doubtful credibility of an association between anxiety with working 
memory within the anxiolytics subgroup, the prospect that the result indicates a valid 
association remains to be interpreted.  
The result implied that for higher but subsequently declining GAS scores, DSB scores 
improved over time (Section 7.4.3.2 A). This was only for individuals who reported 
consumption of anxiolytics at baseline. Speculatively, if anxiolytics were protective against 
the cognitive effects of anxiety then cognitive scores might be expected either to improve (as 
only DSB did), or to decline less rapidly. There may have been additional effects, hidden 
within the noise, of improvement or reduced decline, in other cognitive measures. Such 
hidden effects might be revealed only by further research, perhaps when more waves of the 
PATH data become available. 
Without the benefit of such additional research, and considering the effect (anxiety X 
anxiolytics upon DSB) in isolation, the question remains as to what this isolated result might 
mean. For example, could DSB, as a measure of working memory, be unusually sensitive 
both to the damaging effects of anxiety and the remedial effects of anxiolytics? Might this 
mean that when both conditions apply, a result emerges? Although arguable, this prospect 
must remain as conjecture until further research can clarify the many unresolved issues, such 
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as whether a range of working memory tests may explain the dynamics more fully. Ideally 
such research would include a larger sample, and complete information on the drugs 
involved, their dosage, duration of treatment, and repeated measures for any return to 
treatment. 
It is worth being reminded at this point, that there appears to be no other study with a 
similar result. Notwithstanding speculation about meaning, the finding is likely to be only an 
artefact of the data and the statistical tests applied. 
7.4.4 Interpretation and Evaluation of Results for Consulting Dr Re. Memory Subgroup 
The subgrouping variable, Dr Re Memory reflected cognitive change reported at 
baseline, and thus introduced temporal confounding because cognitive change preceded or 
coincided with any reported anxiety. Ideally, either these participants should be excluded 
from the sample (as others were at Chapter Four, for diagnosis of cognitive impairment), or 
regression models should be controlled for these effects. All fully adjusted models were 
indeed controlled for Dr Re Memory and, therefore, there is neither a need for further 
adjustment of the data or the results, nor a meaningful result that the subgroup on Dr Re 
memory implies anything about anxiety as a predictor of cognitive change. 
7.4.5 Limitations 
Stratification by persistent GAS does not permit a strictly valid, longitudinal analysis. 
Establishing persistent GAS included examination of GAS scores across all waves of the 
data. This method introduced the possibility, for example, that a GAS score at Wave 4 would 
contribute to establishing the presence or absence of persistent GAS. However, cognitive 
change may have commenced before Wave 4. Therefore, outcome would have preceded the 
presumed cause. Nonetheless, the persistence of anxiety was a central factor in the theory for 
a causal connection (Chapter One), and therefore persistence needed to be considered, even if 
by such methods. Despite these limitations, it remains of value to establish even this 
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methodology identified no significant association. Alternatives are possible, such as 
establishing a degree of persistence (in GAS) based only on data from the early waves and 
establishing cognitive change from data based only in the later waves. However, this reduces 
the longitudinal time frame for each calculation. Nonetheless, such computations were 
undertaken, but without identifying significant results (results not shown). 
An additional limitation was the high proportion of missing data, particularly for 
analyses requiring modelling within small cell sizes. Consequently, many models were 
inconclusive. They produced either no result or warning messages such as failure to 
converge. 
7.5 Conclusions 
The significant result for association between GAS and DSB for the anxiolytics subgroup 
has not been invalidated but it has been demonstrated to be a marginal effect that may not be 
reliable, and there remains doubt about its credibility.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT:   
Overview of Statistical Analyses, and Revised Meta-Analysis Results 
Abstract 
Background: This chapter provides a Summary and interpretation of statistical results from 
PATH, plus revision of the meta-analysis from Chapter Two with results from the PATH 
analyses.  
Results: Key results were: (1) Meta-analysis of association between anxiety and MCI, based 
on six studies (including PATH) with relative risk (RR) = 1.024 (0.944–1.112), p = 0.565, I2 
= 63.9%; (2) Meta-analysis for association between anxiety and dementia, based on five 
studies (excluding PATH, from which a result was unavailable), with relative risk (RR) = 
1.81 (1.22–2.70), p = 0.003, I2 = 78.6%; and, (3) For PATH participants who consumed 
anxiolytics at baseline (n = 126), an association of the Goldberg Anxiety Scale (GAS) with 
working memory (digit span backwards; DSB) over 4 waves and 12 years, was coefficient = 
0.215 (0.001–.429), p = .049.  
Discussion & Conclusion: All results were inconclusive. The meta-analyses were unreliable 
because of the diversity of sample characteristics and methodologies within the small samples 
of studies from which they were drawn, and the anxiolytics subgroup result was evaluated as 
unreliable because of the combination of small effect size, marginal significance, missing 
data & small cell sizes, and this being an isolated result without corroboration from other 
sources or closely related models. 
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8.1 Introduction 
The methods strategy at Chapter Three, delineated the research questions for this thesis, and 
presented the plan for analysis of the PATH data (Table 3.1). These statistical analyses 
followed, in Chapters Four to Seven. This chapter briefly overviews the analyses and re-
presents the results in summary form.  
8.2 Overview of Analysis of PATH Data  
8.2.1 Chapter Four: The Data 
The PATH project was introduced in Chapter Four with extensive descriptive 
information, and unadjusted correlations, both cross-sectional and between various time 
points. From these correlations, a set of variables was identified (Section 4.4.9.1), 
representing potential confounders for longitudinal associations between anxiety and 
cognitive change. This set of variables was progressively refined in following chapters. 
8.2.2 Chapter Five: Is Anxiety a Baseline Predictor of Cognitive Ageing? 
Chapter Five provided the first, adjusted, regression analyses of the PATH data. All 
predictors were entered into models at baseline values only, and outcome variables 
represented change in cognitive performance (between Waves 1 and 4) or incident cognitive 
impairment (by Wave 4). Methods were linear and logistic regression, except for a single test 
by Generalized Estimation Equations (GEE) to challenge one significant result, by 
considering repeated measures of the outcome variable. Variables tested as predictors 
representing anxiety, were the Goldberg Anxiety Scale (GAS), its items, its derivatives, and 
its proxies. One fully adjusted association was found, between GAS, item 2 (worry) and 
change between waves 1 and 4 in Spot the Word (StW). The result was coefficient = 2.447 
(0.734–4.161), p = .005. However, this association was attenuated within a fully adjusted, 
GEE model. 
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8.2.3 Chapter Six: As a Time-Varying Variable, Does the Goldberg Anxiety Scale 
Predict Cognitive Ageing? 
This was the first analysis considering association based on repeated measures of both 
anxiety and outcome variables. Only GAS was examined, as the primary measure for anxiety. 
Multilevel models were examined for association with Purdue Pegboard both hands (PPb), 
Symbol Digit Modality Test (SDMT), Digit Symbol Backwards (DSB), Immediate Recall 
(IR), Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE), and Spot the Word (StW). Similarly, binary 
outcomes by wave, were incident MCI and dementia. Models were fully adjusted by the set 
of variables at Section 6.2.5. The exception was dementia, for which a fully adjusted model 
did not converge, possibly due to missing data and small cell sizes. 
Models were examined also for alternative temporal treatments (Section 6.2.4.4), which 
were principally about investigating delayed effects of GAS upon the outcome variables. 
These alternative temporal treatments were: time-lagged; autoregressive; and, cognitive 
change.  
No fully adjusted model was significant for association between GAS and any cognitive 
measure. 
Covariates remaining in significant association with outcome variables in fully adjusted 
models, were tested also in interactions with GAS. One, such interaction remained significant 
when fully adjusted. This was anxiolytics*GAS in association with DSB. Anxiolytics was a 
binary variable representing the consumption, or not, of prescribed anxiolytics at baseline. 
The result was, odds ratio (OR) = 1.382 (1.132 to 1.688), p = .002. Two, alternative, temporal 
models for the same interaction were also significant. They were for the time-lagged and 
autoregressive treatments. Investigation of this interaction, with all temporal treatments, 
demonstrated the association reflected different intercepts for the binary values of anxiolytics, 
but did not represent change over time. The interaction was identified as representing 
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subgroups of participants and further investigation was deferred to Chapter Seven, which was 
planned for the wider and specialised investigation of stratifications, or subgroups 
(interchangeable terms). 
8.2.4 Chapter Seven: Stratifications of Multilevel Models 
This was an extension of the analysis by models investigating time-varying anxiety, 
commenced in Chapter Six. Subgrouping variables were those identified at Table 6.1 as 
predictors which remained in significant association with cognition, in fully adjusted, 
multilevel models. As mentioned at Chapter Three, additional subgrouping variables were 
those quantifying levels of persistent GAS. The primary analytical method was linear mixed 
models (LMM). Alternative temporal treatments, introduced in the previous chapter, were 
included in the analyses by subgroup but only where the standard temporal treatment 
identified an association. 
One subgroup was identified, with significant association between GAS and cognition. 
This was the anxiolytics subgroup with outcome variable, DSB. The result was: coefficient = 
0.215 (0.001–0.429), p = .049. Upon analysis of the direction and size of the effect, and the 
marginal significance, the conclusion was the result was likely to be unreliable and may not 
be credible.  
8.3 Summary & Revision of Meta-analysis 
8.3.1 Summary of Meta-Analysis Results from Chapter Two 
At Chapter Two, meta-analysis of results from the literature, for rate of cognitive decline, 
was not possible due to heterogeneity of methodology. For the association between anxiety 
and incident cognitive impairment, meta-analyses were presented at Chapter Two, in three 
parts: (1) from Gulpers et al. (2016), with a census date of January, 2015, and after removing 
studies which were not adjusted for depression (Section 2.4); and, (2) My updated meta-
analysis based on a systematic review, and including studies published until the census date 
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of July, 2017 (Section 2.3.2). Both sets of results, which are re-presented here, excluded 
studies unadjusted for baseline cases with cognitive impairment. These results were: 
(1) From Gulpers et al. after removing studies without adjustment for depression: 
i. Progression from cognitively normal to MCI:  
Relative risk (RR) = 1.92 (1.41–2.63), p = 0.001, I2 = 0.00%. Based on 3 
studies; and 
ii. Progression from cognitively normal to dementia:  
RR = 1.68 (0.94–3.02), p = 0.081, I2 = 87.5%. Based on 2 studies. 
(2) My updated meta-analysis at Chapter Two: 
i. Progression from cognitively normal to MCI:  
RR = 1.07 (0.90–1.26), p = 0.440, I2 = 70.8%. Based on 5 studies; and 
ii. Progression from cognitively normal to dementia:  
RR = 1.81 (1.22–2.70), p = 0.003, I2 = 78.6%. Based on 5 studies 
Results at (1) and (2), are contradictory, with association demonstrated for MCI only, at 
(1), and for dementia only, at (2). Both sets of results were based on a small number of 
studies which are inadequate for meta-regression to determine if differences between studies 
were related to important parameters such as: age range of participants; sex distribution; 
method of measurement of anxiety by diagnosis or self-report; and, the set of covariates 
identified for adjustment. All these results were based on small samples of studies and may 
not be reliable. 
8.3.2 Revision of Meta-Analysis 
The only result available from PATH for updating the previous meta-analyses, was for 
GAS as a predictor of MCI. The result from Chapter Six, for the fully adjusted model for 
dementia, did not converge and was discarded. As mentioned earlier, meta-analysis for the 
rate of cognitive decline was not possible. 
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For MCI, the single-study result at Appendix 6.E, Model S, was equivalent to RR = 
1.015 (0.950–1.077), p = 0.642. Including this result in my meta-analysis for MCI, yielded a 
new result of: RR = 1.024 (0.944–1.112), p = 0.565, I2 = 63.9%. This confirmed my previous 
result that no association with MCI was identified. The significant association for dementia, 
by my meta-analysis at Chapter Two, remained unrevised by the PATH data. 
8.4 Discussion & Conclusion 
A single, subgroup result indicating an association between GAS and DSB was 
marginally significant but of questionable reliability and credibility. The sequence of meta-
analysis results also points to questionable reliability and credibility. The most recently 
published meta-analysis (until the census date for this thesis, of July 2017) was by Gulpers et 
al. (2016). When excluding studies for which there was no adjustment for depression, the 
single significant result from Gulpers et al., was for MCI (based on only three studies). 
Contrary to this, my updated meta-analysis at Chapter Two, including more recent studies 
than those in Gulpers et al., found no association with incident MCI and this (non-result) was 
confirmed after inclusion of results from PATH. For incident dementia, my updated meta-
analysis (at Chapter Two) found an association, which was contrary to results from Gulpers 
et al. (2016). My updated result for dementia was not revised with results from PATH and 
remains as the only significant, meta-analysis finding from this thesis. However, this result 
for dementia may also be unreliable. As noted at Section 2.3.2.2, the high dispersion 
indicated real, methodological or sample differences between studies. These important 
differences were illustrated at Table 2.7.  
From analysis of published results and PATH data, there was no, conclusive finding for a 
predictive association between anxiety and cognitive change. 
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CHAPTER NINE:   
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Abstract 
This final chapter overviews the theoretical, methodological, and statistical findings of 
this PhD project, to describe the current state of research, its limitations, implications, and 
possible future. Chapter Eight summarised the statistical results from PATH and from the 
research literature. These results were evaluated as inconclusive. This chapter attributes these 
weak results to limitations, both in the PATH data and in data and methods reported in the 
literature. A longitudinal association between anxiety and cognitive ageing may not be 
possible to identify without strategic changes to the methodology, particularly for measuring 
anxiety and in the longitudinal analysis of associations with cognitive ability. Extending the 
research to investigate causality would require additionally a method for random control 
trials. Recommendations are provided for strategic development of research methods. 
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9.1 Introduction 
 The question was whether anxiety is a risk factor for cognitive ageing. This is an 
important question because it suggests an opportunity to mitigate risk of cognitive decline 
and dementia. This thesis has placed doubt on published results and highlighted important 
limitations in the published methodology. In this chapter, I discuss the strengths and 
limitations, and necessary changes in research methodologies. 
9.2 Discussion 
9.2.1 Results 
Chapter Eight summarised the results from the analyses here of PATH data, and from the 
literature. Essentially, these outcomes were: (1) an unreliable result with small effect, that 
anxiety predicted improved working memory, based on a small subgroup within PATH of 
participants who consumed anxiolytics at baseline; and, (2) an unreliable meta-analysis result 
based on just five previous studies, that anxiety predicted incident dementia. All other results 
were either non-significant or dismissed as invalid. The necessary inquiry at this point is to 
determine why the results, from both PATH and the literature, were inconclusive.  
9.2.2 Possible Reasons for Inconclusive Results 
In addition to the insufficiency of studies to allow adequate meta-analysis, there are two 
possibilities to explain the results in this thesis: (1) There was no effect to be found; or (2) 
Measures deployed were inadequate to detect an association.   
More specifically, within PATH, associations may have been undetected because of: 
missing data; small cell sizes; inadequacies of the anxiety measure (Sections 1.2 and 9.2.2.1); 
relatively young age of participants (60 to 76 years); unavailability of data to verify 
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persistence of anxiety (between four-yearly waves); unavailability to follow-up of some 
participants who, on average, were more anxious, more depressed and less cognitively able 
than participants who remained within the study; or any combination of these limitations.  
Within the literature, as pointed out in the first two chapters of this thesis, there were 
many important limitations, some of which were: 
1) A gap was apparent between the formal definition of anxiety, and the 
operationalisation of anxiety in self-report measures. There are also biological 
ambiguities. Without these distinctions in the operationalisations of anxiety 
measures, there is apparent risk of confusing stress and anxiety (Section 1.2.1.2). 
2) The only alternative to self-report of anxiety was diagnosis, which has its own 
limitation of being a binary result, one implication of which is that sub-clinical 
levels of anxiety have been grouped with zero anxiety. 
3) There is the possibility that anxiety instruments need to be reconfigured for the 
aged (Section 1.2.2) and may need to account for stages in development of 
anxiety disorders (Section 1.2.3.2). 
4) There has been almost a complete absence in the various methodologies, of 
attempted identification of the persistence of anxiety levels and delayed effects of 
anxiety. Studies which have targeted “state” or acute anxiety as the central 
predictor, cannot have measured long-term effects of anxiety by this measure 
alone. Similarly, studies which have not distinguished between acute or chronic 
anxiety, have introduced unknown error. Studies which have targeted chronic 
anxiety by use of the Spielberger state-trait anxiety inventory (Section 1.2.3.1) 
have also introduced an unknown degree of ambiguity with the measure of 
depression (Section 1.2.1.3). If correctly measured, persistence of anxiety could 
be analysed by stratification of participants according to the persistence of their 
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symptom levels. Multilevel modelling can incorporate the longitudinal effects of 
anxiety, testing it as a time-varying variable, but such modelling does not 
distinguish between effects from short- and long-term exposure to anxiety 
without additional analysis (such as the suggested stratification) which has been 
absent from published studies. Additionally, standard multilevel modelling 
assumes only an immediate effect (Section 6.2.4.4) at each measure. Studies 
which look for delayed effects are rare (Section 6.4.2). If the theory presented at 
Chapter One is correct, that cognitive damage from anxiety is a long-term process 
(Section 1.4.3), then most research has not investigated the essential mechanisms. 
Finding a longitudinal effect without identifying the nature of the anxiety 
(persistence and delayed effects) which predicts the cognitive outcome, opens the 
potential for misinterpretation. For example, if it is true that only long-term, or 
chronic anxiety (and not acute anxiety) predicts cognitive ageing, but a statistical 
association were found (without distinguishing the nature of the anxiety), then the 
apparent association may have been produced not by anxiety but by other effects. 
These other effects could include symptoms interpreted as anxiety, but which 
may have been caused by underlying stress or depression (Section 1.2.1.3). Or, 
there may have been essential covariates overlooked. On this last point it is worth 
noting most published studies have not provided statistics on unexplained 
variance in their models. From the PATH data, I have noted the explained 
variance was small. 
5) Prospective lists of covariates and modifiers need also to consider the possibly 
confounding biological measures such as cortisol and DHEAS 
(dehydroepiandrosterone sulphate) levels, key genetic predictors of dementia 
(particularly APOE e4), and hippocampal volume. These measures (except 
 247 
DHEAS which was unavailable) were not indicated as confounding covariates in 
the PATH analysis (possibly due to data limitations). However, this biological 
information does need to be tested for confounding effects before excluding such 
covariates from regression models. Most studies have not considered these 
measures. 
6) Covariates need also to consider the confounding effects of anxiolytics and the 
subset, benzodiazepines, which have been shown to modify anxiety and may be 
associated with long term cognitive decline (Section 1.4.4). 
7) There have been relatively few studies which were acceptable for meta-analysis. 
Meta-analysis on five studies (for association with incident dementia) produced 
an unreliable result, as indicated at Chapter Eight by the dispersion parameter, I2 
= 78.6%, and as demonstrated by a diversity of sample and methods 
characteristics, at Table 2.7. Meta-regression was unavailable (for such a small 
sample of studies) to verify effects of major differences in methodology and 
effects of important covariates such as sex, age, education, and depression. 
Without being able, categorically and definitively, to identify causes of the inconclusive 
results, these strong limitations in the methods would place doubt, even upon apparently 
stronger results.  
9.2.3 Addressing Weaknesses in the Methodology 
There is a manifest requirement for more studies which qualify for meta-analysis. 
However, before this happens it would be necessary to resolve methodological difficulties as 
described above. Chiefly, research is needed to establish improved measurement of anxiety, 
which: 
1) distinguishes between anxiety and stress response; 
2) Recognises all definitional elements of anxiety;   
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3) Recognises any different elements of anxiety experienced by the aged; and, 
4) Provides a mechanism to record duration of anxiety symptoms. 
Item 2) may not be possible within a self-report procedure. If this is so then self-report 
could be supplemented with diagnosis. Diagnosis alone, however, would need to be extended 
from a binary to a dimensional result, possibly with a symptom count. 
Analytical methods need also to reflect the long term and delayed effects of anxiety, 
assuming the theory at Chapter One is a correct description of the neuropsychological 
mechanisms. Additionally, analysis should routinely consider a wide diversity of covariates 
and modifiers, as it was here.  
9.2.4 The Neuropsychological Mechanisms 
The Diathesis-Anxiety Heuristic of Cognitive Ageing, presented at Figure 1.5, remains 
hypothetical. Further research is required to verify the many links and effects, as well as the 
validity of the combined effects as represented by the overall model. The prospect of 
feedback loops needs to be investigated at both biological and psychological levels. Further 
research will be required to establish if these reciprocal paths function collectively as 
complex feedback loops, and if they do, whether anxiety and cognitive change might be 
modifiable through some form of intervention within such loops. If a feedback style of 
system-control is identified, then this will be key to much future research and clinical 
practice.  
The causal paths suggested by Figure 1.5 are complex. An assumption of a simpler 
system of causal links may be incorrect and may lead to research which misses essential 
information. If this is so then conclusive evidence of whether anxiety predicts cognitive 
ageing, may continue to be illusive. 
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9.2.5 Establishing Causality 
The title for this thesis introduced the phrase “risk factor”, implying not just prediction 
but causality. Investigating prediction, has been the sole objective of all prior research. To 
establish causality, it will be necessary to investigate further the neuropsychological 
mechanisms as suggested, and to introduce a form of randomised control trial (RCT). 
Although the random assignment of persistent anxiety would be neither practical nor ethical, 
RCT intervention studies would be feasible, by randomly assigning a variety of anxiety 
treatments including placebo treatment (Section 1.1.2.2.2).  
Blind, placebo controlled, random intervention trials, would need to observe the same 
protocols as improved observational studies, by employing better measures of anxiety, 
establishing persistence of anxiety, and controlling for a well-developed and comprehensive 
set of covariates (Section 9.2.3). Such a study could evaluate both the efficacy of the 
treatment compared to placebo, and the changes in cognitive performance. Possible research 
questions might include: 
1. Does treatment of anxiety change the experience of anxiety? 
2. Does treatment of anxiety protect the individual from cognitive decline or 
cognitive impairment? 
3. Are anxiety level and persistence associated with cognitive change, 
independently of anxiety treatment? 
4. Which anxiety measures have strongest association with results for questions 1 to 
3? 
Each of these questions could be explored more deeply by looking at covariate effects, 
moderation, and mediation. For example, does age moderate answers to the above questions? 
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9.2.6 Strengths 
The important limitations have been expressed above (particularly in Sections 9.2.2 & 
9.2.4), both for the present study and for the published reports on associations between 
anxiety and cognitive ageing. It is important also to outline the strengths of this PhD 
investigation and report. These are principally: 
1. The comprehensive overview in Chapter One, of the neuropsychological 
mechanisms for anxiety and for linking anxiety with cognitive ageing.  
2. Figure 1.5 particularly, provided an important heuristic of the association 
between anxiety and cognitive ageing while also demonstrating the prospect for 
feedback control. 
3. Identification in Chapters Two and Eight, of the inconclusive nature of the meta-
analysis of published results. This provides fresh motivation of further research 
and improved methods. 
4. Identification of the prospect for an RCT by introducing treatment interventions. 
5.  Identification of weaknesses in the measurement of anxiety. 
6. Identification of weaknesses in the analytical methods applied in the literature to 
identifying association, when this is theoretically likely to depend on the 
influence of anxiety over extended time periods. 
7. Analysis of PATH data included investigation of possible delayed effects of 
anxiety upon cognition, and the possible influence of trait, persistent, or chronic 
anxiety in contrast to acute or state anxiety. These methods were unusual and in 
part unique. 
8. Analysis of the PATH data included a comprehensive set of potentially 
confounding covariates. This was not always the case in published studies. 
 251 
9. The finding from PATH data was inconclusive. Because PATH is a moderately 
large, population-based study, the result that there may be no association provides 
important corroboration with the conclusion from meta-analysis which also 
indicated an inconclusive result.  
9.3 Conclusions 
Whether anxiety predicts cognitive ageing remains unknown and may be unknowable in 
the present state of development of the research methodology. However, a plausible, 
theoretical explanation is available for such association. This theory needs further research to 
develop a more complete explanation of the neuropsychological mechanisms, including the 
prospect of feedback loops which may influence the effects of anxiety upon cognitive change. 
The contrast between theory and empirical results underlines the need for clarity and 
refinement of the research methods as delineated above. Finally, to establish causality would 
require not only the necessary developments recommended for valid analysis of association, 
but also blind, placebo controlled, random intervention trials, testing a variety of anxiety 
treatments.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 4.A:   
Exploratory Factor Analysis: Goldberg Anxiety Scale: Wave 1 
 
A principal axis factor analysis was applied with oblique rotation (direct oblimin). 
Oblique rotation was chosen because any latent factors were not expected to be independent 
within this well-defined, single construct. The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) measure reported 
the sampling adequacy with, KMO = .82 (‘meritorious’, according to Hutcheson & 
Sofroniou, 1999)  and all KMO values for individual items were greater than .73 (from the 
diagonal of the anti-image correlation matrix at Table 1), which is above the acceptable limit 
of .5 (Field, 2013). For reference, a correlation matrix is presented at Table 2. Eigenvalues 
were obtained for each factor in the data. Three factors had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s 
criterion of 1 and in combination explained 61.16% of the variance. The scree plot showed an 
inflexion justifying only one factor. See Figure 1. Three factors were retained in order to 
interpret these differing results conservatively. Table 3 shows the factor loadings after 
rotation, together with internal consistency (using Maximum Guttmann’s Lambda) along 
with Eigenvalues, and percentage of variance for each factor. The consistency test on factor 3 
indicated inadequate consistency. The items that cluster on the same factor suggest that: 
Factor 1 - WORRY: represents being keyed up, worried, irritable and difficulty in relaxing; 
Factor 2 - SLEEP: represents sleep issues; and Factor 3 - SOMATIC: represents somatic 
issues including worry about health.  
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Table 4.A.1:   
Anti-image correlation matrix for Goldberg Anxiety Scale, Wave 1 
 
Keyed-
up Worrying Irritable 
Difficulty 
relaxing 
Sleeping 
poorly 
Headaches/ 
neckaches 
Trembling, 
tingling 
etc. 
Worried 
about 
health 
Difficulty 
falling 
asleep 
Keyed-up .815a -.344 -.228 -.169 -.001 -.020 -.051 -.025 .009 
Worrying -.344 .836a -.147 -.173 -.077 -.028 -.025 -.105 -.008 
Irritable -.228 -.147 .868a -.171 -.031 -.028 -.062 -.100 .018 
Difficulty 
relaxing 
-.169 -.173 -.171 .874a -.175 -.099 -.015 -.074 -.128 
Sleeping poorly -.001 -.077 -.031 -.175 .745a -.043 -.040 .003 -.488 
Headaches/ 
neckaches 
-.020 -.028 -.028 -.099 -.043 .888a -.151 -.061 -.068 
Trembling, 
tingling etc 
-.051 -.025 -.062 -.015 -.040 -.151 .842a -.208 -.044 
Worried about 
health 
-.025 -.105 -.100 -.074 .003 -.061 -.208 .866a -.065 
Difficulty falling 
asleep 
.009 -.008 .018 -.128 -.488 -.068 -.044 -.065 .730a 
Note:  a. Measures of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) 
 
Table 4.A.2:   
Correlation Matrix 
 Keyed-up Worrying Irritable 
Difficulty 
relaxing 
Sleeping 
poorly 
Headaches/ 
neckaches 
Trembling, 
tingling 
etc. 
Worried 
about 
health 
Difficulty 
falling 
asleep 
Keyed-up 1.000 .528 .445 .430 .233 .180 .211 .243 .192 
Worrying .528 1.000 .415 .448 .293 .196 .212 .289 .236 
Irritable .445 .415 1.000 .407 .233 .180 .218 .273 .185 
Difficulty 
relaxing 
.430 .448 .407 1.000 .410 .257 .219 .280 .366 
Sleeping poorly .233 .293 .233 .410 1.000 .211 .194 .193 .578 
Headaches/ 
neckaches 
.180 .196 .180 .257 .211 1.000 .243 .193 .213 
Trembling, 
tingling etc 
.211 .212 .218 .219 .194 .243 1.000 .306 .191 
Worried about 
health 
.243 .289 .273 .280 .193 .193 .306 1.000 .208 
Difficulty falling 
asleep 
.192 .236 .185 .366 .578 .213 .191 .208 1.000 
Notes: 
Determinant = .133 
All correlations are single tailed, p < .001 
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Figure 1.  Scree plot from exploratory factor analysis of Goldberg Anxiety Scale for Wave 1 
data of PATH, 60+ cohort (n = 2,409) 
 
Table 3:   
Summary of exploratory factor analysis of Goldberg Anxiety Scale for Wave 1 data of PATH, 
60+ cohort (n = 2,409) 
Items 
Rotated Factor Loadings 
1 2 3 
Keyed-up .774 -.058 -.035 
Worrying .695 .031 .000 
 Irritable .568 -.023 .095 
Difficulty relaxing .483 .276 .043 
Sleeping poorly .052 .764 -.026 
Difficulty falling asleep -.051 .745 .050 
Trembling, tingling etc. -.063 -.036 .671 
Worried about health .146 .002 .421 
Headaches/neckaches .049 .118 .312 
Maximum Guttmann’s λ on rotated factors, using items 
bolded in factor loadings. 
λ 2 = .764 λ 2 = .730 λ 2 = .487 
Statistics for non-rotated factors 1 2 3 
Eigenvalues 3.302 1.183 1.020 
% of variance explained 36.683 13.143 11.330 
Notes: major factor loadings over .3 appear in bold 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
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Appendix 4.B:   
Exploratory Factor Analysis: Goldberg Depression Scale: Wave 1 
A principal axis factor analysis was applied with oblique rotation (direct oblimin). 
Oblique rotation was chosen because any underlying factors were not expected to be 
independent within this well-defined, single construct. The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) 
measure reported the sampling adequacy with, KMO = .83 (‘meritorious’, according to 
Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999)  and all KMO values for individual items were > .76 (from 
the diagonal of the anti-image correlation matrix, at Table 1), which is above the acceptable 
limit of .5 (Field, 2013). For reference, a correlation matrix is presented at Table 2. 
Eigenvalues were obtained for each factor in the data. Two factors had eigenvalues over 
Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and in combination explained 47.99% of the variance. The scree plot 
showed an inflexion justifying only one factor. See Figure 1. Two factors were retained in 
order to interpret these differing results conservatively. Table 3 shows the factor loadings 
after rotation, together with internal consistency (using Maximum Guttmann’s Lambda) 
along with Eigenvalues, and percentage of variance for each (non-rotated) factor. The 
consistency test on factor 2 indicated inadequate consistency. The items that cluster on the 
same factor suggest that: factor 1 was primarily about slowing down and lacking energy; 
factor 2 represented loss of confidence and interest, and feeling hopeless. Two items did not 
load onto either factor. They were Waking Early, and Lost Weight. 
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Table 1:   
Anti-image Correlation Matrix 
 
Lacking 
energy 
Lost 
interest 
Lost 
confidence 
Felt 
hopeless 
Difficulty 
concentr
ating 
Lost 
weight 
Waking 
early 
Slowed 
up 
Feel worse 
in 
mornings 
Lacking energy .787a -.123 -.048 .011 -.162 -.043 .027 -.463 -.101 
Lost interest -.123 .851a -.304 -.144 -.185 -.011 -.019 -.038 -.026 
Lost confidence -.048 -.304 .809a -.345 -.057 -.042 -.013 -.058 -.039 
Felt hopeless .011 -.144 -.345 .830a -.127 -.035 .006 -.059 -.067 
Difficulty 
concentrating -.162 -.185 -.057 -.127 .885a -.061 -.111 -.077 -.074 
Lost weight -.043 -.011 -.042 -.035 -.061 .926a .000 -.019 -.021 
Waking early .027 -.019 -.013 .006 -.111 .000 .763a -.108 .047 
Felt slowed up -.463 -.038 -.058 -.059 -.077 -.019 -.108 .781a -.206 
Feel worse in 
mornings -.101 -.026 -.039 -.067 -.074 -.021 .047 -.206 .887a 
a. Measures of Sampling Adequacy(MSA) 
 
 
Table 2:   
Correlation Matrix 
 
Lacking 
energy 
Lost 
interest 
Lost 
confidence 
Felt 
hopeless 
Difficulty 
concen-
trating 
Lost 
weight 
Waking 
early 
Slowed 
up 
Feel 
worse in 
mornings 
Lacking energy 1.000 .377 .327 .275 .402 .141 .096 .605 .345 
Lost interest .377 1.000 .509 .418 .411 .121 .104 .341 .242 
Lost confidence .327 .509 1.000 .516 .347 .137 .091 .328 .243 
Felt hopeless .275 .418 .516 1.000 .348 .127 .075 .298 .241 
-Difficulty 
concentrating 
.402 .411 .347 .348 1.000 .146 .166 .369 .266 
Lost weight .141 .121 .137 .127 .146 1.000 .031 .127 .097 
Waking early .096 .104 .091 .075 .166 .031 1.000 .158 .034 
Felt slowed up .605 .341 .328 .298 .369 .127 .158 1.000 .390 
Feel worse in 
mornings 
.345 .242 .243 .241 .266 .097 .034 .390 1.000 
Notes: 
Determinant = .140 
All correlations are single tailed, p < .001 
 
 
 257 
 
Figure 1. Scree plot from exploratory factor analysis of Goldberg Depression Scale for Wave 
1 data of PATH, 60+ cohort (n = 2,409) 
 
Table 3:   
Summary of exploratory factor analysis of Goldberg Depression Scale for Wave 1 data of 
PATH, 60+ cohort (n = 2,409) 
Items 
Rotated Factor Loadings 
1 2 
Felt slowed up .855 -.100 
Lacking energy .787 -.046 
Feel worse in mornings .431 .065 
Difficulty concentrating .323 .321 
Waking early .136 .051 
Lost confidence -.056 .788 
Felt hopeless -.029 .682 
Lost interest .111 .598 
Lost weight .107 .121 
Maximum Guttmann’s λ on rotated factors, using 
items bolded in factor loadings. 
λ 5 = .755 λ 4 = .733 
Statistics for non-rotated factors 1 2 
Eigenvalues 3.273 1.046 
% of variance explained 36.368 11.618 
Notes: major factor loadings over .4 appear in bold 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization 
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Appendix 6.A:   
Settings For GEE 
An example of syntax provided by these settings is available at the end of the following 
description of settings. 
 
Settings in General Estimating Equations (GEE), were: 
 
1. At the panel, “Repeated”: Working Correlation Matrix: Unstructured. 
2. At the panel: “Type of Model”: Scale Response / Linear, or for binary outcomes 
(MCI & Dementia), Binary logistic. 
3. At the panel, “Response”: Dependent Variable, variously: PPb; SDMT; DSB; IR; 
MMSE; StW; MCI; and, Dementia. Each of these variables was prepared on 
SPSS “long” format, representing repeated measures over four or three waves, 
depending on the temporal treatment (see Section 6.2.4.4). For binary outcomes 
the reference category was set as “First (lowest value)” which refers to the zero 
values representing “no”. 
4. At the panel, “Predictors”: Repeated measures (in SPSS long format), over four 
or three waves, depending on the temporal treatment (see Section 6.2.4.4), were 
entered as the main predictors as a covariate (CV) in each model. For temporal 
treatment calling on GAS as a lagged predictor (see Section 6.2.5), these lagged 
variables replaced the standard GAS variables by wave. Similarly, where an 
autoregressive model called for the dependent variable (DV) to be entered as a 
lagged predictor, this was entered in SPSS long format as a CV. Results (below) 
compare models with and without time entered as a CV. Time was not 
investigated in these models as a “Factor”. To facilitate interpretation of 
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interactions including time, this categorical variable was transformed as 0, 1, 2, 3 
to represent Waves 1, 2, 3, 4. 
5. At the panel, “Model”: All effects considered were entered as “Main Effects”. 
Some interactions were also considered.  
6. At the panel, “Estimations”: all settings were nominal, including the scale 
parameter method which was set as, “Maximum Likelihood Estimate”. 
7. At the panel, “Statistics”: Analysis Type was Type I, which is described by SPSS 
as required when there are, “priori reasons for ordering predictors in the model”. 
The central predictor GAS was entered last, in order to establish its effect after all 
other CVs had been controlled. The exception was when a time-lagged DV was 
also entered as a CV. This was sequenced after the CV, lagged-GAS. Some of the 
other CVs were entered as closely as possible to the temporal and/or probable, 
causative precedence of the items in the CV list. For example, sex was entered 
before age. The strict order of other variables was not always determinable on 
such rational ground, but nor, therefore, did their sequence matter, provided the 
sequence order was kept consistent, which is was.  
8. At the panel, “Save”: Residuals (raw and Pearson) were saved to the dataset for 
subsequent analysis of distribution. 
9. At the other panels, settings were nominal. 
 
The syntax for Model A of Appendix 6.C (models for PPb) is provided here as an 
exemplar of the coding produced by the GEE model setting described at Appendix 6.A: 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
* Generalized Estimating Equations. 
GENLIN PPb_allWaves WITH Time 
  /MODEL Time INTERCEPT=YES 
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 DISTRIBUTION=NORMAL LINK=IDENTITY 
  /CRITERIA SCALE=MLE PCONVERGE=1E-006(ABSOLUTE) SINGULAR=1E-012 
ANALYSISTYPE=1(WALD) CILEVEL=95  
    LIKELIHOOD=FULL 
  /REPEATED SUBJECT=pathid WITHINSUBJECT=Index1 SORT=YES 
CORRTYPE=UNSTRUCTURED ADJUSTCORR=YES  
    COVB=ROBUST MAXITERATIONS=100 PCONVERGE=1e-006(ABSOLUTE) 
UPDATECORR=1 
  /MISSING CLASSMISSING=EXCLUDE 
  /PRINT CPS DESCRIPTIVES MODELINFO FIT SUMMARY SOLUTION 
(EXPONENTIATED). 
 
 
  
 261 
Appendix 6.B:   
Adjustment for Time 
 
Twisk (2013) discussed adjustment of multilevel models for time. Twisk noted a 
common misunderstanding in GEE analysis that adjustment for time, permits the 
interpretation of the regression coefficient of the covariate (CV) as limited to within-subject 
effects. On the contrary, when both the CV and the dependent variable (DV) are time-
dependent, with or without adjustment for time, the coefficient remains as an effect of the 
combined influences of within- and between-subject associations. This combined effect is 
complex and difficult to interpret. Twisk further noted that adjustment for time could 
unnecessarily attenuate the association between predictor and outcome because it removes 
the variance between time points. On this basis, time can be an unintentional and unnecessary 
confounder in analysing associations between time-variant, CVs and DVs. Twisk 
recommended running models with and without adjustment for time, and interpreting the 
differences between the results. Accordingly, models to be examined here will be considered, 
with and without time-adjustment. Because final models were attenuated, random effects 
(isolated between-subject effects) were not required and so the combined influence of within- 
and between-subject was not identified as an issue in interpreting results. 
A further recommendation by Twisk (2013) was that adjustments for time not be 
attempted by including time as a factor in the models, when there is more than a trivial 
content of missing data. Time, treated as a factor, in such circumstances, can produce 
misleading results. Missing data in PATH may be sufficient to be such an issue. Accordingly, 
the analyses reported here were restricted to entering time as a CV. 
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Appendix 6.C:   
Detailed Models for Purdue Pegboard - Both Hands (PPb) 
All standard temporal models were based on the full sample of participants who were 
cognitively healthy at baseline (n = 2,390). Alternative temporal treatments relied on outcome 
values at Wave 2 which had a reduced sample size due to attrition (n = 2,117). Therefore, 
standard and alternative temporal treatments are not comparable. CVs were at baseline values 
only, except for GAS which was a time-varying variable, as were all DVs. 
Observations from Tables 1 to 4: 
Table 1 demonstrated the standard temporal treatment (as explained at Chapter Six) for 
PPb as the DV.  
Model A established that PPb declined over time.  
Model B represented the base model for the main predictor GAS (as a time-varying 
variable, as explained at Chapter Six), in which an unadjusted but small association was 
shown, between GAS and PPb. As the base model, Model B also provided the model fit 
statistic (quasi -2 log likelihood) for comparison with other models.  
Model C established that the inclusion of time improved the model fit (compared to B), 
and that GAS remained a significant predictor of PPb.  
At Model D, the time interaction with GAS was introduced, and this slightly improved 
the model fit. As noted at Section 6.2.7, effects of lower order terms reported by interaction 
models are not main effects but conditional effects. The non-significance of the variable 
GAS, in this model (D), means only that at time = 0 (Wave 1), the GAS association with PPb 
was non-significant. The time interaction remained significant in this model, meaning the 
interaction of time and GAS was associated with PPb. The interaction was negative. 
Therefore, the relationship between time and GAS became weaker over duration of the study. 
The further, important comment here is that the fully adjusted models reported below 
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demonstrated that for the outcome variable, PPb, the time interaction with GAS was 
attenuated. Therefore, the observation from Table 6.1, Model D, that time*GAS 
demonstrated a significant interaction, is of relevance only within this restricted model and 
does not extend to an interpretation of the fully adjusted association between GAS and PPb. 
At Model E, time and time interactions were temporarily dropped to investigate other 
effects. Model E introduced the core CVs, sex, age, and education – after which the model 
remained significant for association between GAS and PPb, although the model fit was not as 
good as for any previous model.  
Model F demonstrated that adding time to Model E did not attenuate the model and time 
itself was significant, and the fit was better than for any previous model. Thus, the association 
between GAS and PPb was significant, and the model was a better fit, even when variance 
due to change in the DV over time, was excluded (See Section 6.2.4.2 regarding removal of 
variance between time points).   
Model G demonstrated that adding the CVs, time, consulted doctor Re memory and 
physical health, attenuated the effect of GAS.  
Intermediate models (not reported) investigating depression, found no effect on 
attenuation of the main effect of GAS.  
Compared to Model G, the further addition in Model H of the time interaction (with 
GAS), improved the model fit but the effect of GAS remained attenuated.  
Finally, for Model I, even upon removing time and the time interaction, (which were 
introduced in Models G & H), the model continued to attenuate the main effect of GAS. 
Model I was the simplest, model for which the association between GAS and DSB was 
attenuated, and, therefore, the final model for the associations between GAS and PPb. 
To summarise Table 1, the base and final models were respectively models B and I. For 
Model I, the main effect of GAS was attenuated by the core CVs (sex, age, education, and 
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depression – although the last of these was not required), plus consulted a doctor Re. 
memory, and physical health. Adjustments for time (Models C, F, G) did not change the 
conclusions about which CVs would attenuate the effects of GAS. 
Table 1:   
Temporal Treatment 1: Standard Multilevel Models by GEE, for PPb, predicted by GAS 
Model CVs B SE 
95% CI P 
For 
Predictor 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Lower Upper 
A Intercept 10.603 0.0354 10.533 10.672 0.000 25571.779 
 Time -0.548 0.0164 -0.581 -0.516 0.000  
        
B Intercept 9.947 0.0325 9.883 10.010 0.000 27620.489 
 GAS -0.034 0.0106 -0.055 -0.013 0.001  
        
C Intercept 10.601 0.0354 10.532 10.671 0.000 25498.690 
 Time -0.547 0.0164 -0.579 -0.515 0.000  
 GAS -0.033 0.0102 -0.053 -0.013 0.001  
        
D Intercept 10.601 0.0354 10.532 10.671 0.000 25475.796 
 Time -0.548 0.0164 -0.580 -0.516 0.000  
 GAS -0.010 0.0126 -0.035 0.014 0.408  
 Time*GAS -0.019 0.0074 -0.033 -0.005 0.010  
        
E Intercept 9.700 0.0692 9.564 9.835 0.000 26560.962 
 Sex  0.742 0.0643 0.616 0.868 0.000  
 Age -0.044 0.0209 -0.085 -0.003 0.036  
 Education 0.071 0.0126 0.047 0.096 0.000  
 GAS -0.041 0.0106 -0.062 -0.021 0.000  
        
F Intercept 10.350 0.0703 10.213 10.488 0.000 24379.660 
 Time -0.551 0.0165 -0.583 -0.519 0.000  
 Sex  0.750 0.0641 0.624 0.876 0.000  
 Age -0.044 0.0208 -0.084 -0.003 0.036  
 Education 0.085 0.0126 0.061 0.110 0.000  
 GAS -0.040 0.0101 -0.060 -0.020 0.000  
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Model CVs B SE 
95% CI P 
For 
Predictor 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Lower Upper 
G Intercept 9.037 0.1987 8.648 9.426 0.000 24044.964 
 Time -0.555 0.0164 -0.587 -0.523 0.000  
 Sex 0.782 0.0635 0.658 0.907 0.000  
 Age -0.043 0.0206 -0.083 -0.003 0.037  
 Education 0.071 0.0125 0.047 0.096 0.000  
 Consulted 
Dr Re Mem  
-0.042 0.0808 -0.200 0.116 0.604  
 Physical 
Health 
0.027 0.0036 0.019 0.034 0.000  
 GAS -0.017 0.0106 -0.037 0.004 0.113  
        
H Intercept 9.000 0.199 8.610 9.390 0.000 24012.356 
 Time -0.557 0.016 -0.589 -0.525 0.000  
 Sex 0.780 0.063 0.656 0.905 0.000  
 Age -0.043 0.021 -0.083 -0.002 0.038  
 Education 0.072 0.012 0.047 0.096 0.000  
 Consulted 
Dr Re Mem 
-0.047 0.081 -0.205 0.112 0.564  
 Physical 
Health 
0.027 0.004 0.020 0.034 0.000  
 GAS 0.012 0.013 -0.013 0.037 0.344  
 Time*GAS -0.023 0.007 -0.038 -0.009 0.002  
        
I Intercept 8.597 0.196 8.212 8.983 0.000 26322.192 
 Sex 0.769 0.064 0.644 0.894 0.000  
 Age -0.044 0.021 -0.084 -0.003 0.036  
 Education 0.060 0.013 0.035 0.084 0.000  
 Consulted 
Dr Re Mem 
-0.058 0.081 -0.216 0.101 0.476  
 Physical 
Health 
0.022 0.004 0.015 0.029 0.000  
 GAS -0.020 0.011 -0.042 0.002 0.075  
The -2 Log Likelihood statistics are from the SPSS report, “Quasi Likelihood under Independence 
Model Criterion (QIC) using the full log quasi-likelihood function. This provides an estimate of 
goodness of fit based on the criteria that “smaller-is-better”, but does not facilitate Chi Square 
estimates of probability. GAS and Lagged-GAS data were baseline-centred, for all models. 
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Tables 2 to 4 provided similar reports of results for each of the remaining temporal 
treatments, for the outcome variable, PPb.  
At Table 2, the focus was on the association between PPb and prior GAS (lagged to the 
previous wave), as the primary predictor. Table 6.2 is much shorter than Table 6.1 because 
more basic models, than for the standard temporal treatment, demonstrated attenuation of the 
association between lagged-GAS and DSB. So the complex models were unnecessary.  
Model B was both the “base model” and the final model, demonstrating lagged-GAS was not 
associated with PPb even when unadjusted. At models C and D, adjustment for time and the 
time interaction, both demonstrated no association between lagged-GAS and DSB. 
 
Table 2 
Temporal Treatment 2: by GEE, PPb predicted by Lagged-GAS 
Model CVs B SE 
95% CI P 
For 
Predictor 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Lower Upper 
A Intercept 10.378 0.039 10.301 10.454 0.000 19533.863 
 Time -0.763 0.025 -0.812 -0.714 0.000  
        
B Intercept 9.783 0.036 9.713 9.853 0.000 19333.407 
 Lagged-GAS -0.016 0.014 -0.044 0.011 0.246  
        
C Intercept 10.383 0.039 10.307 10.460 0.000 19349.512 
 Time -0.761 0.025 -0.810 -0.711 0.000  
 Lagged-GAS -0.021 0.013 -0.046 0.004 0.096  
        
D Intercept 10.386 0.0392 10.309 10.462 0.000 19333.407 
 Time -0.766 0.0255 -0.815 -0.716 0.000  
 Lagged-GAS 0.003 0.0153 -0.027 0.033 0.858  
 Time* 
Lagged-GAS 
-0.030 0.0139 -0.057 -0.003 0.031  
The -2 Log Likelihood statistics are from the SPSS report, “Quasi Likelihood under Independence 
Model Criterion (QIC) using the full log quasi-likelihood function. This provides an estimate of 
goodness of fit based on the criteria that “smaller-is-better”, but does not facilitate Chi Square 
estimates of probability.  
GAS and Lagged-GAS data were baseline-centred, for all models. 
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Table 3 provided results for the auto-regressive temporal treatment, where the central 
predictor was lagged-GAS, and lagged-PPb was added as a CV. Note that the number of 
waves examined in time-lagged models is reduced. See Figures 6.1 to 6.4. 
Model A demonstrated that PPb (at Waves 2 to 4) changed over time.  
Model B, as the “base model”, showed lagged-GAS was a significant predictor of PPb 
when adjusted for lagged-PPb.  
At model C, adding time (to Model B) did not attenuate the association between lagged-
GAS and PPb, suggesting variance between time points was not critical to the associations 
reported for Model B.  
Model D, which included adjustment for time and the time interaction (with lagged-
GAS), was attenuated for both the time interaction and the association between lagged-GAS 
and PPb. The non-significance of the time interaction indicates only that any association of 
GAS with PPb did not vary over time.  
With or without time, at models E and F, adding the CVs, sex, age, and education, did 
not attenuate the model. However, at model F, the inclusion of time improved the model fit 
(compared to Model F).  
Models, G & H, with added CVs for depression, time and the time interaction, were 
attenuated.  
Model I was the final model for Table 6.3, demonstrating the minimum CVs required for 
attenuation were: sex, age, education, depression, and lagged-PPb.  
 
Table 3 
Temporal Treatment 3: Auto-Regressive by GEE, for PPb predicted by Lagged-GAS & 
Lagged-PPb 
Model CVs B SE 
95% CI P 
For 
Predictor 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Lower Upper 
A Intercept 10.378 0.0390 10.301 10.454 0.000 19533.863 
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Model CVs B SE 
95% CI P 
For 
Predictor 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Lower Upper 
 Time -0.763 0.0249 -0.812 -0.714 0.000  
        
B Intercept 1.802 0.1377 1.532 2.072 0.000 14544.773 
 Lagged-PPb 0.774 0.0128 0.749 0.799 0.000  
 Lagged-GAS -0.021 0.0090 -0.038 -0.003 0.021  
        
C Intercept 2.743 0.1535 2.442 3.043 0.000 13773.596 
 Time -0.390 0.0287 -0.446 -0.334 0.000  
 Lagged-PPb 0.715 0.0138 0.688 0.742 0.000  
 Lagged-GAS -0.024 0.0093 -0.042 -0.006 0.010  
        
D Intercept 2.748 0.1533 2.447 3.048 0.000 13767.415 
 Time -0.394 0.0289 -0.450 -0.337 0.000  
 Lagged-PPb 0.714 0.0137 0.687 0.741 0.000  
 Lagged-GAS -0.005 0.0137 -0.031 0.022 0.734  
 Time*Lagged-
GAS 
-0.023 0.0139 -0.050 0.005 0.104 
 
        
E Intercept 2.981 0.1644 2.659 3.303 0.000 12947.011 
 Time -0.396 0.0298 -0.454 -0.338 0.000  
 Sex 0.164 0.0412 0.084 0.245 0.000  
 Age -0.045 0.0128 -0.070 -0.020 0.000  
 Education 0.020 0.0077 0.005 0.035 0.008  
 Lagged-PPb 0.695 0.0149 0.666 0.724 0.000  
 Lagged-GAS -0.027 0.0096 -0.046 -0.008 0.005  
        
F Intercept 1.959 0.1474 1.670 2.248 0.000 13702.560 
 Sex 0.110 0.0385 0.035 0.186 0.004  
 Age -0.042 0.0120 -0.065 -0.018 0.000  
 Education 0.013 0.0071 -0.001 0.027 0.065  
 Lagged-PPb 0.763 0.0137 0.736 0.790 0.000  
 Lagged-GAS -0.023 0.0093 -0.042 -0.005 0.013  
        
G Intercept 3.050 0.1682 2.721 3.380 0.000 12931.391 
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Model CVs B SE 
95% CI P 
For 
Predictor 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Lower Upper 
 Time -0.398 0.0299 -0.457 -0.339 0.000  
 Sex 0.165 0.0413 0.084 0.246 0.000  
 Age -0.045 0.0128 -0.070 -0.020 0.000  
 Education 0.020 0.0077 0.004 0.035 0.011  
 Lagged-PPb 0.693 0.0149 0.663 0.722 0.000  
 Depression -0.029 0.0128 -0.054 -0.004 0.022  
 Lagged-GAS -0.013 0.0111 -0.035 0.008 0.226  
        
H Intercept 3.065 0.168 2.735 3.395 0.000 12920.660 
 Time -0.402 0.030 -0.462 -0.343 0.000  
 Sex 0.166 0.041 0.085 0.247 0.000  
 Age -0.045 0.013 -0.070 -0.020 0.000  
 Education 0.020 0.008 0.005 0.035 0.011  
 Lagged-PPb 0.692 0.015 0.663 0.721 0.000  
 Depression -0.032 0.013 -0.058 -0.007 0.014  
 Lagged-GAS 0.011 0.017 -0.022 0.043 0.520  
 Time*Lagged-
GAS 
-0.027 0.015 -0.056 0.002 0.069 
 
        
I Intercept 2.007 0.1501 1.713 2.302 0.000 13692.274 
 Sex 0.110 0.0386 0.035 0.186 0.004  
 Age -0.042 0.0120 -0.065 -0.018 0.001  
 Education 0.013 0.0071 -0.001 0.026 0.078  
 Lagged-PPb 0.762 0.0138 0.735 0.789 0.000  
 Depression -0.023 0.0121 -0.046 0.001 0.060  
 Lagged-GAS -0.012 0.0108 -0.034 0.009 0.249  
The -2 Log Likelihood statistics are from the SPSS report, “Quasi Likelihood under Independence 
Model Criterion (QIC) using the full log quasi-likelihood function. This provides an estimate of 
goodness of fit based on the criteria that “smaller-is-better”, but does not facilitate Chi Square 
estimates of probability.  
GAS and Lagged-GAS data were baseline-centred, for all models. 
 
Table 4 reported the temporal treatment for “change” in the measurement of the DV 
(PPb) between waves. The base model was Model B, which demonstrated a significant, 
unadjusted association between lagged-GAS and the change between waves in PPb. 
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However, the association was attenuated at model I, by the CVs: sex, age, education, and 
depression. Time and the time interaction had little effect, as can be seen by comparing 
models H and I, which were otherwise adjusted for the same CVs. 
Table 4 
Temporal Treatment 4: Cognitive-Change by GEE, for PPb-change (between waves), 
predicted by Lagged-GAS 
Model CVs B SE 
95% CI P 
For 
Predictor 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Lower Upper 
A Intercept -0.313 0.0306 -0.373 -0.253 0.000 16321.977 
 Time -0.251 0.0311 -0.312 -0.190 0.000  
        
B Intercept -0.538 0.016 -0.569 -0.506 0.000 16471.569 
 Lagged-GAS -0.018 0.008 -0.034 -0.001 0.038  
        
C Intercept -0.316 0.0306 -0.376 -0.256 0.000 16204.968 
 Time -0.253 0.0312 -0.314 -0.192 0.000  
 Lagged-GAS -0.019 0.0085 -0.036 -0.003 0.024  
        
D Intercept -0.314 0.031 -0.374 -0.254 0.000 16202.902 
 Time -0.256 0.031 -0.317 -0.194 0.000  
 Lagged-GAS -0.003 0.013 -0.029 0.024 0.845  
 Time*Lagged-
GAS 
-0.019 0.014 -0.047 0.009 0.176  
        
E Intercept -0.211 0.044 -0.298 -0.124 0.000 15320.589 
 Time -0.244 0.032 -0.308 -0.181 0.000  
 Sex -0.062 0.034 -0.129 0.005 0.070  
 Age -0.030 0.011 -0.052 -0.009 0.006  
 Education -0.005 0.007 -0.018 0.008 0.468  
 Lagged-GAS -0.017 0.009 -0.034 0.000 0.045  
        
F Intercept -0.423 0.036 -0.494 -0.352 0.000 15561.756 
 Sex -0.065 0.034 -0.131 0.002 0.056  
 Age -0.031 0.011 -0.052 -0.009 0.005  
 Education -0.006 0.006 -0.018 0.007 0.395  
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Model CVs B SE 
95% CI P 
For 
Predictor 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Lower Upper 
 Lagged-GAS -0.016 0.009 -0.033 0.001 0.063  
        
G Intercept -0.194 0.050 -0.292 -0.097 0.000 15561.119 
 Time -0.245 0.032 -0.308 -0.181 0.000  
 Sex -0.062 0.034 -0.129 0.005 0.068  
 Age -0.030 0.011 -0.052 -0.009 0.006  
 Education -0.005 0.007 -0.018 0.008 0.439  
 Depression -0.011 0.011 -0.033 0.012 0.348  
 Lagged-GAS -0.012 0.010 -0.032 0.007 0.223  
        
H Intercept -0.189 0.050 -0.287 -0.090 0.000 15315.899 
 Time -0.248 0.030 -0.312 -0.183 0.000  
 Sex -0.062 0.034 -0.129 0.005 0.068  
 Age -0.030 0.011 -0.052 -0.009 0.006  
 Education -0.005 0.007 -0.018 0.008 0.436  
 Depression -0.013 0.012 -0.036 0.010 0.265  
 Lagged-GAS 0.007 0.016 -0.025 0.038 0.675  
 Time*Lagged-
GAS 
-0.021 0.015 -0.050 0.009 0.171  
        
I Intercept -0.408 0.0409 -0.489 -0.328 0.000 15561.119 
 Sex -0.065 0.0339 -0.132 0.001 0.055  
 Age -0.031 0.0109 -0.052 -0.009 0.005  
 Education -0.006 0.0065 -0.019 0.007 0.372  
 Depression -0.010 0.0113 -0.032 0.013 0.398  
 Lagged-GAS -0.011 0.0100 -0.031 0.008 0.257  
The -2 Log Likelihood statistics are from the SPSS report, “Quasi Likelihood under Independence 
Model Criterion (QIC) using the full log quasi-likelihood function. This provides an estimate of 
goodness of fit based on the criteria that “smaller-is-better”, but does not facilitate Chi Square 
estimates of probability.  
GAS and Lagged-GAS data were baseline-centred, for all models. 
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Appendix 6.D:   
Final Models 
For all DVs, although there were small changes in the coefficients of GAS (or lagged-
GAS) and CVs, when time was included or excluded, there was no difference in the choice of 
simplest, final model to represent attenuation for the given DV and temporal treatment. 
Therefore, the summary models from Table 1 onward, presented only these simpler, final 
versions of the models, excluding time and the time interactions. 
At Table 1, the four temporal treatments, side-by-side, demonstrated there was no 
predictive associations between anxiety and PPb. Notable, is that for the unadjusted, time-
lagged treatment there was no association. 
For SDMT at Table 2, the four temporal treatments produced results similar to each 
other, with models attenuated by a short list of CVs. This list of CVs included baseline 
depression. 
Tables 3 to 6 report results respectively for the outcome variables, DSB, IR, MMSE, and 
StW. DSB required only a short list of CVs to establish attenuation, as did the lagged-GAS 
treatment for StW. Base models for all other DVs and temporal treatments, were non-
significant.  
For MCI and dementia, Tables 7 & 8 demonstrated all temporal treatments produced 
similar results. There was no association between GAS and cognitive impairment, even for 
unadjusted models. 
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Table 1 
Temporal Treatments 1 to 4 for PPb, predicted by GAS or Lagged-GAS 
CVs 
Standard MLM  Lagged-GAS  Auto-Regressive  Cognitive Change 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p Lower Upper  Lower Upper  Lower Upper  Lower Upper 
Intercept 0.188 8.189 8.927 0.000  9.783 9.713 9.853 0.000  2.007 1.713 2.302 0.000  -0.408 -0.489 -0.328 0.000 
Sex 0.064 0.648 0.898 0.000       0.110 0.035 0.186 0.004  -0.065 -0.132 0.001 0.055 
Age 0.021 -0.084 -0.003 0.037       -0.042 -0.065 -0.018 0.001  -0.031 -0.052 -0.009 0.005 
Education 0.012 0.035 0.084 0.000       0.013 -0.001 0.026 0.078  -0.006 -0.019 0.007 0.372 
Depression           -0.023 -0.046 0.001 0.060  -0.010 0.0113 -0.032 0.013 
Physical Health 0.004 0.016 0.030 0.000                
Lagged-PPb           0.762 0.735 0.789 0.000      
GAS or Lagged-
GAS 
0.011 -0.042 0.001 0.060  -0.016 -0.044 0.011 0.246  -0.012 -0.034 0.009 0.249  -0.011 -0.031 0.008 0.257 
GAS and Lagged-GAS data were baseline-centred, for all models. 
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Table 2 
Temporal Treatments 1 to 4 for SDMT, predicted by GAS or Lagged-GAS 
CVs 
Standard MLM  Lagged-GAS  Auto-Regressive  Cognitive Change 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p Lower Upper  Lower Upper  Lower Upper  Lower Upper 
Intercept 49.421 48.658 50.185 0.000  48.928 48.113 49.743 0.000  4.213 0.4663 3.299 0.000  -1.048 -1.392 -0.704 0.000 
Sex 1.316 0.640 1.991 0.000  1.299 0.573 2.025 0.000  0.425 0.1259 0.179 0.001  -0.749 -0.954 -0.544 0.000 
Age -0.361 -0.582 -0.141 0.001  -0.409 -0.642 -0.176 0.001  -0.089 0.0413 -0.169 0.032  0.284 0.047 0.521 0.019 
Education 0.839 0.711 0.966 0.000  0.808 0.668 0.947 0.000  0.096 0.0239 0.049 0.000  -0.052 -0.133 0.028 0.201 
Depression -0.435 -0.633 -0.236 0.000  -0.375 -0.607 -0.143 0.002  -0.104 0.0462 -0.194 0.025  0.009 -0.033 0.052 0.661 
Lagged-SDMT           0.883 0.866 0.900 0.000      
GAS or Lagged-
GAS 
-0.068 -0.151 0.015 0.109  -0.062 -0.172 0.048 0.272  -0.052 -0.129 0.025 0.188  -0.033 -0.111 0.045 0.405 
GAS and Lagged-GAS data were baseline centred for all models. 
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Table 3 
Temporal Treatments 1 to 4 for DSB, predicted by GAS or Lagged-GAS 
CVs 
Standard MLM  Lagged-GAS  Auto-Regressive  Cognitive Change 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p Lower Upper  Lower Upper  Lower Upper  Lower Upper 
Intercept 5.256 5.095 5.417 0.000  5.145 5.061 5.228 0.000  1.367 1.242 1.491 0.000  -1.048 -1.392 -0.704 0.000 
Sex -0.120 -0.271 0.032 0.121       -0.036 -0.107 0.035 0.317  -0.749 -0.954 -0.544 0.000 
Age -0.053 -0.103 -0.003 0.040       -0.030 -0.053 -0.007 0.011  0.284 0.047 0.521 0.019 
Education 0.192 0.164 0.220 0.000       0.040 0.027 0.054 0.000  -0.052 -0.133 0.028 0.201 
Depression                0.009 -0.033 0.052 0.661 
Lagged DSB           0.754 0.735 0.772 0.000      
GAS or Lagged-
GAS 
-0.013 -0.034 0.009 0.248  -0.022 -0.048 0.005 0.111  -0.015 -0.032 0.002 0.085  -0.034 -0.161 0.013 0.096 
GAS and Lagged-GAS data were baseline-centred, for all models. 
 
Table 4 
Temporal Treatments 1 to 4 for IR, predicted by GAS or Lagged-GAS 
CVs 
Standard MLM  Lagged-GAS  Auto-Regressive  Cognitive Change 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p Lower Upper  Lower Upper  Lower Upper  Lower Upper 
Intercept 6.657 6.573 6.741 0.000  6.335 6.260 6.411 0.000  1.301 1.169 1.434 0.000  -0.658 -0.693 -0.624 0.000 
Lagged-IR           0.720 0.701 0.739 0.000      
GAS or Lagged-
GAS 
0.006 -0.043 0.054 0.821  -0.007 -0.034 0.021 0.645  -0.013 -0.030 0.004 0.139  -0.001 -0.019 0.016 0.880 
GAS and Lagged-GAS data were baseline-centred, for all models. 
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Table 5 
Temporal Treatments 1 to 4 for MMSE, predicted by GAS or Lagged-GAS 
CVs 
Standard MLM  Lagged-GAS  Auto-Regressive  Cognitive Change 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p Lower Upper  Lower Upper  Lower Upper  Lower Upper 
Intercept 30.660 30.435 30.886 0.000  29.122 29.080 29.165 0.000  11.367 8.488 14.246 0.000  -0.169 -0.193 -0.145 0.000 
Lagged-MMSE           0.606 0.509 0.704 0.000      
GAS or Lagged-
GAS 
0.113 -0.017 0.244 0.088  -0.003 -0.020 0.013 0.684  0.005 -0.008 0.017 0.455  0.009 -0.002 0.021 0.108 
GAS and Lagged-GAS data were baseline-centred, for all models. 
 
Table 6 
Temporal Treatments 1 to 4 for StW, predicted by GAS or Lagged-GAS 
CVs 
Standard MLM  Lagged-GAS  Auto-Regressive  Cognitive Change 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p Lower Upper  Lower Upper  Lower Upper  Lower Upper 
Intercept 52.65 52.44 52.85 0.000  52.85 52.43 53.27 0.000  3.950 2.683 5.216 0.000  0.275 0.231 0.320 0.000 
Sex      0.05 -0.34 0.45 0.792           
Age      0.11 -0.02 0.25 0.093           
Education      0.80 0.72 0.88 0.000           
Lagged-StW           0.931 0.908 0.954 0.000      
GAS or Lagged-
GAS 
0.00 -0.04 0.03 0.820  -0.0 -0.07 0.01 0.097  -0.010 -0.031 0.011 0.353  -0.004 -0.024 0.016 0.698 
GAS and Lagged-GAS data were baseline-centred, for all models. 
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Table 7 
Temporal Treatments 1 to 4 for MCI, predicted by GAS or Lagged-GAS 
CVs 
Standard MLM  Lagged-GAS  Auto-Regressive 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p Lower Upper  Lower Upper  Lower Upper 
Intercept 4.034 3.856 4.212 0.000  3.613 3.430 3.796 0.000  -3.720 -3.894 -3.546 0.000 
Lagged-MCI           3.462 2.846 4.078 0.000 
GAS or Lagged-
GAS 
-0.040 -0.113 0.032 0.278 
 
-0.048 -0.119 0.023 0.183 
 
0.061 -0.007 0.129 0.079 
GAS and Lagged-GAS data were baseline-centred, for all models. The cognitive change panel is not provided because these data were not meaningful for MCI. 
 
Table 8 
Temporal Treatments 1 to 4 for Dementia, predicted by GAS or Lagged-GAS 
CVs 
Standard MLM  Lagged-GAS  Auto-Regressive  Cognitive Change 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p 
 
B 
95% CI 
p Lower Upper  Lower Upper  Lower Upper  Lower Upper 
Intercept -5.804 0.2117 -6.219 0.000  -5.427 0.2123 -5.843 0.000  -5.427 -5.843 -5.011 0.000  -5.086 -5.423 -4.748 0.000 
Lagged-Dementia           0^         
GAS or Lagged-
GAS 
-0.138 0.0945 -0.323 0.144  -0.128 0.1202 -0.364 0.287  -0.128 -0.364 0.108 0.287  -0.050 -0.260 0.159 0.637 
GAS and Lagged-GAS data were baseline-centred, for all models.  ^ Set to zero because this parameter is redundant.  
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Appendix 6.E:   
Fully adjusted  Models, Standard Temporal Treatment 
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Model A: 
DV: PPb 
Full Model: Excluding Time and all interactions with GAS 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 
95% Wald CI for 
Exp(B) 
-2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upper  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept 6.028 1.6507 2.793 9.263  13.335 1.000 0.000 414.805 16.323 10540.978 4109.307 1.955 2.400 
Sex 0.580 0.1943 0.200 0.961  8.923 1.000 0.003 1.787 1.221 2.615    
Age -0.079 0.0601 -0.197 0.039  1.725 1.000 0.189 0.924 0.821 1.040    
Education 0.055 0.0383 -0.020 0.130  2.061 1.000 0.151 1.056 0.980 1.139    
Depression 0.064 0.0544 -0.043 0.170  1.362 1.000 0.243 1.066 0.958 1.186    
Dr Re Mem. 0.040 0.2104 -0.372 0.453  0.037 1.000 0.848 1.041 0.689 1.573    
Anxiolytics 0.604 0.3586 -0.099 1.306  2.834 1.000 0.092 1.829 0.906 3.693    
Physical Health 0.023 0.0113 0.001 0.046  4.310 1.000 0.038 1.024 1.001 1.047    
Soc Supp Gen Neg -0.065 0.0450 -0.153 0.023  2.080 1.000 0.149 0.937 0.858 1.024    
Soc Supp Gen Pos -0.002 0.0515 -0.103 0.099  0.002 1.000 0.967 0.998 0.902 1.104    
Soc Supp Partner Neg -0.020 0.0451 -0.108 0.068  0.200 1.000 0.654 0.980 0.897 1.071    
Soc Supp Partner Pos 0.040 0.0465 -0.051 0.131  0.745 1.000 0.388 1.041 0.950 1.140    
Mastery 0.029 0.0295 -0.029 0.086  0.942 1.000 0.332 1.029 0.971 1.090    
Freq Phys Act  Mild 0.231 0.1422 -0.048 0.510  2.639 1.000 0.104 1.260 0.953 1.665    
Freq Phys Act  Mod -0.003 0.1165 -0.231 0.225  0.001 1.000 0.980 0.997 0.794 1.253    
Freq Phys Act  Vig -0.007 0.0815 -0.167 0.152  0.008 1.000 0.928 0.993 0.846 1.164    
Alcohol -0.063 0.0771 -0.214 0.088  0.671 1.000 0.413 0.939 0.807 1.092    
Life Events -0.021 0.0749 -0.167 0.126  0.076 1.000 0.783 0.980 0.846 1.135    
Smoker 0.439 0.3096 -0.168 1.046  2.007 1.000 0.157 1.551 0.845 2.845    
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 
95% Wald CI for 
Exp(B) 
-2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upper  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
GAS 0.015 0.0295 -0.042 0.073  0.276 1.000 0.599 1.016 0.959 1.076    
(Scale) 3.731              
Note: SD of DV = standard deviation of the dependent variable 
 
  
 281 
Model B: 
DV: PPb 
Full Model:  Including Time and Time interactions; Excluding other interactions with GAS 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept 6.046 1.6753 2.762 9.329  13.024 1 0.000 422.368 15.838 11264.015 3751.590 1.955 11.086 
Time -0.159 0.1304 -0.414 0.097  1.483 1 0.223 0.853 0.661 1.102    
Sex 0.593 0.1964 0.208 0.978  9.119 1 0.003 1.809 1.231 2.659    
Age -0.067 0.0599 -0.185 0.050  1.262 1 0.261 0.935 0.831 1.051    
Education 0.063 0.0395 -0.014 0.141  2.554 1 0.110 1.065 0.986 1.151    
Depression 0.072 0.0544 -0.035 0.178  1.730 1 0.188 1.074 0.966 1.195    
Dr Re Mem. 0.028 0.2077 -0.379 0.435  0.018 1 0.894 1.028 0.684 1.545    
Anxiolytics 0.584 0.3620 -0.125 1.294  2.603 1 0.107 1.793 0.882 3.646    
Physical Health 0.027 0.0115 0.005 0.049  5.561 1 0.018 1.027 1.005 1.051    
Soc Supp Gen Neg -0.052 0.0457 -0.142 0.038  1.296 1 0.255 0.949 0.868 1.038    
Soc Supp Gen Pos -0.001 0.0534 -0.106 0.103  0.001 1 0.981 0.999 0.899 1.109    
Soc Supp Partner Neg -0.027 0.0450 -0.115 0.061  0.359 1 0.549 0.973 0.891 1.063    
Soc Supp Partner Pos 0.040 0.0454 -0.049 0.129  0.768 1 0.381 1.041 0.952 1.137    
Mastery 0.037 0.0293 -0.021 0.094  1.581 1 0.209 1.037 0.980 1.099    
Freq Phys Act  Mild 0.228 0.1441 -0.055 0.510  2.502 1 0.114 1.256 0.947 1.666    
Freq Phys Act  Mod 0.014 0.1152 -0.212 0.239  0.014 1 0.906 1.014 0.809 1.270    
Freq Phys Act  Vig -0.002 0.0838 -0.166 0.163  0.000 1 0.985 0.998 0.847 1.177    
Alcohol -0.039 0.0765 -0.189 0.111  0.256 1 0.613 0.962 0.828 1.118    
Life Events -0.025 0.0758 -0.174 0.123  0.111 1 0.739 0.975 0.840 1.131    
Smoker 0.422 0.3178 -0.201 1.045  1.763 1 0.184 1.525 0.818 2.843    
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
GAS 0.001 0.0372 -0.072 0.074  0.000 1 0.989 1.001 0.930 1.076    
Time*Time -0.136 0.0425 -0.219 -0.052  10.191 1 0.001 0.873 0.803 0.949    
Time*GAS 0.044 0.0523 -0.058 0.146  0.712 1 0.399 1.045 0.943 1.158    
Time*Time*GAS -0.018 0.0175 -0.053 0.016  1.083 1 0.298 0.982 0.949 1.016    
(Scale) 3.399              
Note: SD of DV = standard deviation of the dependent variable 
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Model C:  
DV: PPb:   
Full Model:  Including Interactions with GAS; Excluding Time and Time interactions 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained by 
Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept 6.477 1.6991 3.146 9.807  14.530 1 0.000 649.766 23.254 18155.652 4108.956 1.955 2.333 
Sex 0.573 0.1968 0.187 0.959  8.469 1 0.004 1.773 1.206 2.608    
Age -0.080 0.0600 -0.198 0.037  1.793 1 0.181 0.923 0.820 1.038    
Education 0.059 0.0378 -0.015 0.133  2.445 1 0.118 1.061 0.985 1.143    
Depression 0.066 0.0545 -0.041 0.172  1.448 1 0.229 1.068 0.960 1.188    
Dr Re Mem. 0.059 0.2134 -0.359 0.477  0.077 1 0.781 1.061 0.698 1.612    
Anxiolytics 0.572 0.3596 -0.133 1.277  2.532 1 0.112 1.772 0.876 3.585    
Physical Health 0.018 0.0116 -0.005 0.041  2.471 1 0.116 1.018 0.996 1.042    
Soc Supp Gen Neg -0.065 0.0450 -0.153 0.023  2.106 1 0.147 0.937 0.858 1.023    
Soc Supp Gen Pos -0.002 0.0511 -0.102 0.098  0.002 1 0.965 0.998 0.903 1.103    
Soc Supp Partner Neg -0.023 0.0453 -0.112 0.066  0.258 1 0.611 0.977 0.894 1.068    
Soc Supp Partner Pos 0.037 0.0462 -0.054 0.128  0.639 1 0.424 1.038 0.948 1.136    
Mastery 0.027 0.0295 -0.031 0.085  0.857 1 0.355 1.028 0.970 1.089    
Freq Phys Act  Mild 0.239 0.1422 -0.040 0.517  2.816 1 0.093 1.269 0.961 1.677    
Freq Phys Act  Mod -0.003 0.1172 -0.233 0.227  0.001 1 0.981 0.997 0.793 1.255    
Freq Phys Act  Vig -0.012 0.0814 -0.172 0.147  0.022 1 0.881 0.988 0.842 1.159    
Alcohol -0.067 0.0775 -0.219 0.085  0.746 1 0.388 0.935 0.804 1.089    
Life Events -0.021 0.0751 -0.168 0.126  0.079 1 0.778 0.979 0.845 1.134    
Smoker 0.442 0.3117 -0.169 1.053  2.008 1 0.156 1.555 0.844 2.866    
GAS -0.168 0.1283 -0.420 0.083  1.720 1 0.190 0.845 0.657 1.087    
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained by 
Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Sex*GAS -0.011 0.0559 -0.121 0.098  0.042 1 0.837 0.989 0.886 1.103    
Physical Health*GAS 0.004 0.0026 -0.001 0.009  2.259 1 0.133 1.004 0.999 1.009    
(Scale) 3.734              
Note: SD of DV = standard deviation of the dependent variable 
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Model D: 
DV: SDMT 
Full Model:  Excluding Time and all interactions with GAS 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained by 
Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept 38.296 7.7810 23.046 53.547  24.224 1 0.000 4.284E+16 1.020E+10 1.799E+23 81735.716 8.968 7.297 
Sex 0.941 0.9561 -0.933 2.815  0.969 1 0.325 2.563 0.394 16.696    
Age -0.892 0.2982 -1.476 -0.307  8.944 1 0.003 0.410 0.229 0.735    
Education 0.577 0.1630 0.258 0.896  12.533 1 0.000 1.781 1.294 2.451    
Depression 0.002 0.2565 -0.500 0.505  0.000 1 0.993 1.002 0.606 1.657    
Dr Re Mem. -1.041 0.9216 -2.847 0.765  1.276 1 0.259 0.353 0.058 2.150    
Anxiolytics 1.774 1.9422 -2.033 5.581  0.834 1 0.361 5.894 0.131 265.231    
Physical Health 0.088 0.0514 -0.013 0.189  2.916 1 0.088 1.092 0.987 1.208    
Soc Supp Gen Neg -0.476 0.2376 -0.942 -0.011  4.021 1 0.045 0.621 0.390 0.989    
Soc Supp Gen Pos 0.329 0.2512 -0.163 0.821  1.716 1 0.190 1.390 0.849 2.273    
Soc Supp Partner Neg -0.036 0.2247 -0.476 0.405  0.025 1 0.874 0.965 0.621 1.499    
Soc Supp Partner Pos -0.066 0.2150 -0.487 0.355  0.094 1 0.759 0.936 0.614 1.427    
Mastery 0.049 0.1254 -0.196 0.295  0.155 1 0.694 1.051 0.822 1.343    
Freq Phys Act  Mild 0.329 0.5633 -0.775 1.433  0.341 1 0.559 1.390 0.461 4.192    
Freq Phys Act  Mod 0.611 0.5906 -0.547 1.768  1.069 1 0.301 1.842 0.579 5.861    
Freq Phys Act  Vig 0.017 0.4485 -0.862 0.896  0.001 1 0.970 1.017 0.422 2.450    
Alcohol 0.585 0.4670 -0.330 1.500  1.570 1 0.210 1.795 0.719 4.483    
Life Events -0.294 0.4238 -1.125 0.536  0.482 1 0.488 0.745 0.325 1.710    
Smoker 0.829 1.3058 -1.730 3.389  0.403 1 0.525 2.292 0.177 29.628    
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained by 
Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
GAS 0.099 0.0941 -0.085 0.283  1.106 1 0.293 1.104 0.918 1.328    
(Scale) 74.556              
Note: SD of DV = standard deviation of the dependent variable 
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Model E:  
DV: SDMT:  
Standard Temporal Treatment, Including Time and Time interactions; Excluding other interactions with GAS 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept 38.557 7.8423 23.186 53.928  24.173 1 0.000 5.560E+16 1.174E+10 2.633E+23 77129.697 8.968 12.217 
Time -1.169 0.3781 -1.910 -0.428  9.564 1 0.002 0.311 0.148 0.652    
Sex 0.989 0.9554 -0.883 2.862  1.072 1 0.300 2.689 0.413 17.491    
Age -0.812 0.2970 -1.394 -0.229  7.467 1 0.006 0.444 0.248 0.795    
Education 0.575 0.1629 0.256 0.895  12.469 1 0.000 1.778 1.292 2.446    
Depression 0.006 0.2501 -0.485 0.496  0.001 1 0.982 1.006 0.616 1.642    
Dr Re Mem. -0.954 0.9562 -2.828 0.920  0.996 1 0.318 0.385 0.059 2.509    
Anxiolytics 1.883 1.9443 -1.928 5.694  0.938 1 0.333 6.572 0.145 296.955    
Physical Health 0.112 0.0515 0.012 0.213  4.773 1 0.029 1.119 1.012 1.238    
Soc Supp Gen Neg -0.462 0.2368 -0.926 0.002  3.801 1 0.051 0.630 0.396 1.002    
Soc Supp Gen Pos 0.318 0.2498 -0.172 0.807  1.617 1 0.204 1.374 0.842 2.242    
Soc Supp Partner Neg -0.067 0.2264 -0.510 0.377  0.087 1 0.768 0.935 0.600 1.458    
Soc Supp Partner Pos -0.049 0.2161 -0.472 0.375  0.051 1 0.821 0.952 0.624 1.454    
Mastery 0.066 0.1276 -0.184 0.316  0.270 1 0.603 1.069 0.832 1.372    
Freq Phys Act  Mild 0.298 0.5589 -0.798 1.393  0.284 1 0.594 1.347 0.450 4.028    
Freq Phys Act  Mod 0.544 0.5887 -0.609 1.698  0.855 1 0.355 1.723 0.544 5.463    
Freq Phys Act  Vig 0.014 0.4528 -0.873 0.902  0.001 1 0.975 1.014 0.418 2.464    
Alcohol 0.662 0.4701 -0.259 1.584  1.985 1 0.159 1.939 0.772 4.874    
Life Events -0.259 0.4207 -1.084 0.565  0.379 1 0.538 0.772 0.338 1.760    
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Smoker 0.684 1.3611 -1.984 3.352  0.253 1 0.615 1.982 0.138 28.560    
GAS 0.216 0.1301 -0.039 0.472  2.766 1 0.096 1.242 0.962 1.602    
Time*Time -0.256 0.1276 -0.506 -0.006  4.022 1 0.045 0.774 0.603 0.994    
Time*GAS -0.225 0.1405 -0.501 0.050  2.571 1 0.109 0.798 0.606 1.051    
Time*Time*GAS 0.056 0.0497 -0.042 0.153  1.264 1 0.261 1.057 0.959 1.166    
(Scale) 70.599              
Note: SD of DV = standard deviation of the dependent variable 
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Model F:  
DV: SDMT:  
Standard Temporal Treatment. Including Interactions with GAS; Excluding: Time and Time interactions 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept 38.165 7.7723 22.931 53.398  24.111 1 0.000 3.756E+16 9.097E+09 1.551E+23 81816.668 8.968 7.039 
Sex 0.946 0.9570 -0.930 2.822  0.977 1 0.323 2.576 0.395 16.805    
Age -0.859 0.3045 -1.456 -0.262  7.953 1 0.005 0.424 0.233 0.770    
Education 0.578 0.1634 0.257 0.898  12.493 1 0.000 1.782 1.293 2.454    
Depression 0.009 0.2579 -0.497 0.514  0.001 1 0.974 1.009 0.608 1.672    
Dr Re Mem. -1.054 0.9265 -2.870 0.762  1.294 1 0.255 0.349 0.057 2.143    
Anxiolytics 1.830 1.9500 -1.992 5.652  0.881 1 0.348 6.233 0.136 284.782    
Physical Health 0.088 0.0517 -0.013 0.190  2.910 1 0.088 1.092 0.987 1.209    
Soc Supp Gen Neg -0.477 0.2377 -0.942 -0.011  4.019 1 0.045 0.621 0.390 0.989    
Soc Supp Gen Pos 0.320 0.2508 -0.171 0.812  1.631 1 0.202 1.377 0.843 2.252    
Soc Supp Partner Neg -0.035 0.2253 -0.477 0.407  0.024 1 0.877 0.966 0.621 1.502    
Soc Supp Partner Pos -0.064 0.2156 -0.487 0.358  0.089 1 0.766 0.938 0.615 1.431    
Mastery 0.048 0.1258 -0.198 0.295  0.147 1 0.701 1.049 0.820 1.343    
Freq Phys Act  Mild 0.305 0.5678 -0.808 1.417  0.288 1 0.592 1.356 0.446 4.126    
Freq Phys Act  Mod 0.629 0.5927 -0.533 1.791  1.126 1 0.289 1.876 0.587 5.993    
Freq Phys Act  Vig 0.004 0.4518 -0.881 0.890  0.000 1 0.992 1.004 0.414 2.435    
Alcohol 0.598 0.4683 -0.319 1.516  1.633 1 0.201 1.819 0.727 4.555    
Life Events -0.306 0.4241 -1.137 0.525  0.520 1 0.471 0.737 0.321 1.691    
Smoker 0.834 1.3068 -1.727 3.396  0.408 1 0.523 2.303 0.178 29.836    
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
GAS 0.201 0.1541 -0.101 0.503  1.701 1 0.192 1.223 0.904 1.654    
Age*GAS -0.045 0.0514 -0.145 0.056  0.751 1 0.386 0.956 0.865 1.058    
Education*GAS -0.003 0.0431 -0.087 0.082  0.004 1 0.949 0.997 0.916 1.085    
(Scale) 74.763              
Note: SD of DV = standard deviation of the dependent variable 
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Model G:  
DV: DSB:  
Full Model:  Excluding Time and all interactions with GAS 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept 5.518 1.6370 2.309 8.726  11.362 1 0.001 249.114 10.069 6163.140 5411.185 2.256 5.743 
Sex -0.162 0.2388 -0.630 0.307  0.458 1 0.499 0.851 0.533 1.359    
Age -0.110 0.0675 -0.243 0.022  2.674 1 0.102 0.896 0.785 1.022    
Education 0.145 0.0384 0.069 0.220  14.162 1 0.000 1.156 1.072 1.246    
Depression 0.019 0.0634 -0.105 0.144  0.094 1 0.759 1.020 0.900 1.155    
Dr Re Mem. 0.513 0.2063 0.109 0.917  6.190 1 0.013 1.671 1.115 2.503    
Anxiolytics -0.958 0.4673 -1.873 -0.042  4.199 1 0.040 0.384 0.154 0.959    
Physical Health 0.014 0.0127 -0.011 0.038  1.172 1 0.279 1.014 0.989 1.039    
Soc Supp Gen Neg -0.091 0.0544 -0.198 0.015  2.809 1 0.094 0.913 0.820 1.016    
Soc Supp Gen Pos -0.005 0.0625 -0.128 0.118  0.006 1 0.937 0.995 0.880 1.125    
Soc Supp Partner Neg -0.016 0.0505 -0.115 0.083  0.095 1 0.758 0.985 0.892 1.087    
Soc Supp Partner Pos -0.028 0.0526 -0.131 0.075  0.288 1 0.591 0.972 0.877 1.078    
Mastery -0.016 0.0365 -0.088 0.055  0.202 1 0.653 0.984 0.916 1.057    
Freq Phys Act  Mild -0.080 0.1351 -0.345 0.185  0.353 1 0.553 0.923 0.708 1.203    
Freq Phys Act  Mod 0.080 0.1213 -0.158 0.317  0.431 1 0.511 1.083 0.854 1.374    
Freq Phys Act  Vig 0.023 0.1022 -0.177 0.223  0.050 1 0.824 1.023 0.837 1.250    
Alcohol 0.170 0.1037 -0.033 0.373  2.690 1 0.101 1.185 0.967 1.453    
Life Events 0.102 0.0845 -0.063 0.268  1.461 1 0.227 1.108 0.939 1.307    
Smoker 0.066 0.3855 -0.690 0.821  0.029 1 0.864 1.068 0.502 2.274    
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
GAS -0.006 0.0298 -0.064 0.052  0.041 1 0.840 0.994 0.938 1.054    
(Scale) 4.797              
Note: SD of DV = standard deviation of the dependent variable 
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Model H:  
DV: DSB:  
Full Model:  Including Time and Time interactions; Excluding other interactions with GAS 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 
95% Wald CI for 
Exp(B) 
-2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained by 
Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept 5.488 1.6346 2.284 8.692  11.273 1 0.001 241.794 9.820 5953.829 5396.585 2.256 5.733 
Time 0.027 0.1379 -0.244 0.297  0.037 1 0.847 1.027 0.784 1.346    
Sex -0.155 0.2376 -0.621 0.310  0.427 1 0.513 0.856 0.537 1.364    
Age -0.110 0.0673 -0.242 0.022  2.688 1 0.101 0.896 0.785 1.022    
Education 0.143 0.0383 0.068 0.218  13.986 1 0.000 1.154 1.070 1.244    
Depression 0.015 0.0629 -0.108 0.138  0.055 1 0.814 1.015 0.897 1.148    
Dr Re Mem. 0.507 0.2068 0.102 0.913  6.022 1 0.014 1.661 1.108 2.491    
Anxiolytics -0.966 0.4683 -1.883 -0.048  4.252 1 0.039 0.381 0.152 0.953    
Physical Health 0.014 0.0127 -0.011 0.039  1.208 1 0.272 1.014 0.989 1.040    
Soc Supp Gen Neg -0.089 0.0541 -0.195 0.017  2.727 1 0.099 0.915 0.823 1.017    
Soc Supp Gen Pos -0.006 0.0621 -0.128 0.115  0.010 1 0.919 0.994 0.880 1.122    
Soc Supp Partner Neg -0.017 0.0504 -0.115 0.082  0.111 1 0.739 0.983 0.891 1.085    
Soc Supp Partner Pos -0.025 0.0525 -0.128 0.077  0.234 1 0.629 0.975 0.880 1.081    
Mastery -0.018 0.0364 -0.089 0.053  0.246 1 0.620 0.982 0.915 1.055    
Freq Phys Act  Mild -0.081 0.1346 -0.345 0.183  0.361 1 0.548 0.922 0.708 1.201    
Freq Phys Act  Mod 0.080 0.1212 -0.158 0.317  0.432 1 0.511 1.083 0.854 1.373    
Freq Phys Act  Vig 0.020 0.1018 -0.180 0.219  0.037 1 0.847 1.020 0.835 1.245    
Alcohol 0.173 0.1034 -0.030 0.376  2.795 1 0.095 1.189 0.971 1.456    
Life Events 0.101 0.0843 -0.064 0.266  1.438 1 0.230 1.106 0.938 1.305    
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 
95% Wald CI for 
Exp(B) 
-2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained by 
Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Smoker 0.054 0.3835 -0.698 0.806  0.020 1 0.888 1.055 0.498 2.238    
GAS 0.036 0.0396 -0.041 0.114  0.838 1 0.360 1.037 0.959 1.121    
Time*Time 0.007 0.0454 -0.082 0.096  0.022 1 0.883 1.007 0.921 1.100    
Time*GAS -0.058 0.0615 -0.178 0.063  0.886 1 0.347 0.944 0.837 1.065    
Time*Time*GAS 0.011 0.0207 -0.030 0.051  0.272 1 0.602 1.011 0.971 1.053    
(Scale) 4.797              
Note: SD of DV = standard deviation of the dependent variable 
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Model I:  
DV: DSB:  
Full Model:  Including Interactions with GAS; Excluding Time and Time interactions 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained by 
Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept 5.529 1.6277 2.339 8.719  11.538 1 0.001 251.862 10.367 6118.885 5326.3766 2.256 7.064 
Sex -0.123 0.2387 -0.591 0.345  0.264 1 0.607 0.885 0.554 1.412    
Age -0.106 0.0671 -0.237 0.026  2.489 1 0.115 0.900 0.789 1.026    
Education 0.152 0.0381 0.077 0.227  15.929 1 0.000 1.164 1.081 1.255    
Depression 0.013 0.0633 -0.111 0.137  0.044 1 0.834 1.013 0.895 1.147    
Dr Re Mem. 0.541 0.2148 0.121 0.962  6.357 1 0.012 1.718 1.128 2.618    
Anxiolytics -1.805 0.4466 -2.680 -0.929  16.330 1 0.000 0.165 0.069 0.395    
Physical Health 0.013 0.0129 -0.012 0.038  1.050 1 0.306 1.013 0.988 1.039    
Soc Supp Gen Neg -0.090 0.0542 -0.196 0.016  2.769 1 0.096 0.914 0.822 1.016    
Soc Supp Gen Pos -0.019 0.0623 -0.141 0.103  0.091 1 0.763 0.981 0.869 1.109    
Soc Supp Partner Neg -0.014 0.0504 -0.113 0.085  0.078 1 0.780 0.986 0.893 1.088    
Soc Supp Partner Pos -0.019 0.0523 -0.122 0.083  0.135 1 0.713 0.981 0.885 1.087    
Mastery -0.016 0.0364 -0.088 0.055  0.197 1 0.657 0.984 0.916 1.057    
Freq Phys Act  Mild -0.069 0.1311 -0.326 0.188  0.279 1 0.597 0.933 0.722 1.206    
Freq Phys Act  Mod 0.072 0.1206 -0.165 0.308  0.353 1 0.552 1.074 0.848 1.361    
Freq Phys Act  Vig 0.017 0.1019 -0.183 0.217  0.028 1 0.866 1.017 0.833 1.242    
Alcohol 0.160 0.1020 -0.040 0.359  2.450 1 0.118 1.173 0.961 1.433    
Life Events 0.090 0.0831 -0.073 0.253  1.174 1 0.279 1.094 0.930 1.288    
Smoker 0.102 0.3757 -0.634 0.839  0.074 1 0.785 1.108 0.530 2.314    
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained by 
Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
GAS -0.014 0.0331 -0.079 0.051  0.172 1 0.678 0.986 0.924 1.053    
Education*GAS -0.012 0.0108 -0.033 0.010  1.141 1 0.285 0.989 0.968 1.010    
Anxiolytics*GAS 0.324 0.1020 0.124 0.523  10.073 1 0.002 1.382 1.132 1.688    
Dr Re Memory*GAS -0.018 0.0506 -0.118 0.081  0.133 1 0.715 0.982 0.889 1.084    
(Scale) 4.730              
Note: SD of DV = standard deviation of the dependent variable 
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Model J: 
DV: IR 
Full Model:  Excluding: Time and all interactions with GAS 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained by 
Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept 1.697 1.6751 -1.586 4.980  1.026 1 0.311 5.458 0.205 145.488 11568.415 3.287 4.781 
Sex 0.948 0.2757 0.408 1.489  11.835 1 0.001 2.581 1.504 4.431    
Age -0.127 0.0706 -0.265 0.011  3.243 1 0.072 0.881 0.767 1.011    
Education 0.142 0.0385 0.067 0.218  13.612 1 0.000 1.153 1.069 1.243    
Depression 0.048 0.0755 -0.100 0.196  0.407 1 0.523 1.049 0.905 1.217    
Dr Re Mem. -0.119 0.1603 -0.433 0.195  0.551 1 0.458 0.888 0.648 1.216    
Anxiolytics 1.260^ 0.4303 0.416 2.103  8.568 1 0.003 3.524 1.516 8.192    
Physical Health 0.020 0.0122 -0.004 0.044  2.626 1 0.105 1.020 0.996 1.045    
Soc Supp Gen Neg 0.026 0.0478 -0.067 0.120  0.305 1 0.581 1.027 0.935 1.128    
Soc Supp Gen Pos 0.097 0.0609 -0.022 0.217  2.558 1 0.110 1.102 0.978 1.242    
Soc Supp Partner Neg -0.029 0.0489 -0.125 0.067  0.360 1 0.549 0.971 0.882 1.069    
Soc Supp Partner Pos -0.066 0.0486 -0.161 0.029  1.857 1 0.173 0.936 0.851 1.029    
Mastery 0.023 0.0338 -0.044 0.089  0.442 1 0.506 1.023 0.957 1.093    
Freq Phys Act  Mild -0.137 0.1361 -0.404 0.129  1.018 1 0.313 0.872 0.668 1.138    
Freq Phys Act  Mod 0.230 0.1668 -0.097 0.557  1.898 1 0.168 1.258 0.907 1.745    
Freq Phys Act  Vig -0.026 0.0977 -0.217 0.165  0.071 1 0.790 0.974 0.805 1.180    
Alcohol 0.240 0.1323 -0.020 0.499  3.285 1 0.070 1.271 0.981 1.647    
Life Events 0.068 0.0810 -0.091 0.226  0.694 1 0.405 1.070 0.913 1.254    
Smoker -0.227 0.3569 -0.926 0.473  0.404 1 0.525 0.797 0.396 1.604    
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained by 
Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
GAS 0.096 0.1222 -0.143 0.336  0.621 1 0.430 1.101 0.867 1.399    
(Scale) 10.290              
^ Coefficients for anxiolytics were reverse coded for these analyses. So, for example, if reverse coding had been removed, anxiolytics predicted a negative 
effect on IR scores. SD of DV = standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
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Model K: 
DV: IR 
Full Model:  Including: Time and Time interactions; Excluding: other interactions with GAS 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 
95% Wald CI for 
Exp(B) 
-2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained by 
Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept 1.764 1.6670 -1.503 5.031  1.120 1 0.290 5.835 0.222 153.129 11557.843 3.287 9.675 
Time 0.252 0.1768 -0.094 0.599  2.036 1 0.154 1.287 0.910 1.820    
Sex 0.954 0.2749 0.415 1.492  12.037 1 0.001 2.595 1.514 4.448    
Age -0.118 0.0714 -0.258 0.022  2.713 1 0.100 0.889 0.773 1.023    
Education 0.143 0.0387 0.068 0.219  13.729 1 0.000 1.154 1.070 1.245    
Depression 0.046 0.0747 -0.101 0.192  0.374 1 0.541 1.047 0.904 1.212    
Dr Re Mem. .217 0.2823 -0.336 0.771  0.593 1 0.441 1.243 0.715 2.161    
Anxiolytics -1.288 0.4354 -2.141 -.434  8.748 1 0.003 .276 .118 .648    
Physical Health 0.024 0.0122 8.724E-05 0.048  3.870 1 0.049 1.024 1.000 1.049    
Soc Supp Gen Neg 0.036 0.0478 -0.058 0.129  0.557 1 0.455 1.036 0.944 1.138    
Soc Supp Gen Pos 0.109 0.0595 -0.008 0.225  3.334 1 0.068 1.115 0.992 1.253    
Soc Supp Partner Neg -0.034 0.0492 -0.131 0.062  0.487 1 0.485 0.966 0.877 1.064    
Soc Supp Partner Pos -0.076 0.0495 -0.173 0.021  2.350 1 0.125 0.927 0.841 1.021    
Mastery 0.030 0.0335 -0.036 0.096  0.808 1 0.369 1.031 0.965 1.100    
Freq Phys Act  Mild -0.124 0.1377 -0.394 0.146  0.812 1 0.367 0.883 0.674 1.157    
Freq Phys Act  Mod 0.250 0.1611 -0.065 0.566  2.415 1 0.120 1.285 0.937 1.761    
Freq Phys Act  Vig -0.035 0.0954 -0.222 0.152  0.138 1 0.711 0.965 0.801 1.164    
Alcohol 0.262 0.1308 0.006 0.519  4.024 1 0.045 1.300 1.006 1.680    
Life Events 0.054 0.0825 -0.107 0.216  0.434 1 0.510 1.056 0.898 1.241    
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 
95% Wald CI for 
Exp(B) 
-2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained by 
Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Smoker -0.281 0.3498 -0.967 0.404  0.646 1 0.422 0.755 0.380 1.499    
GAS 0.083 0.0808 -0.075 0.241  1.054 1 0.305 1.086 0.927 1.273    
Time*Time -0.292 0.0620 -0.413 -0.170  22.162 1 0.000 0.747 0.662 0.843    
Time*GAS 0.176 0.2603 -0.334 0.686  0.457 1 0.499 1.192 0.716 1.986    
Time*Time*GAS -0.071 0.0944 -0.256 0.114  0.561 1 0.454 0.932 0.774 1.121    
(Scale) 9.761              
^ Coefficients for anxiolytics were reverse coded for these analyses. So, for example, if reverse coding had been removed, anxiolytics predicted a negative 
effect on IR scores. SD of DV = standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
 
  
 301 
Model L: 
DV: IR 
Full Model:  Including: Interactions with GAS; Excluding: Time and Time interactions 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 
95% Wald CI for 
Exp(B) 
-2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained by 
Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept 1.581 1.8653 -2.075 5.237  0.719 1 0.397 4.861 0.126 188.155 11554.160 3.287 4.877 
Sex 0.835 0.2236 0.397 1.273  13.956 1 0.000 2.305 1.487 3.573    
Age -0.124 0.0703 -0.262 0.013  3.133 1 0.077 0.883 0.769 1.013    
Education 0.135 0.0359 0.065 0.205  14.127 1 0.000 1.144 1.067 1.228    
Depression 0.046 0.0777 -0.106 0.198  0.347 1 0.556 1.047 0.899 1.219    
Dr Re Mem. -0.057 0.1762 -0.402 0.288  0.104 1 0.747 0.945 0.669 1.334    
Anxiolytics 1.314^ 0.4538 0.425 2.204  8.389 1 0.004 3.722 1.530 9.058    
Physical Health 0.020 0.0124 -0.005 0.044  2.514 1 0.113 1.020 0.995 1.045    
Soc Supp Gen Neg 0.023 0.0488 -0.073 0.118  0.213 1 0.644 1.023 0.929 1.125    
Soc Supp Gen Pos 0.097 0.0596 -0.020 0.213  2.631 1 0.105 1.101 0.980 1.238    
Soc Supp Partner Neg -0.020 0.0476 -0.114 0.073  0.180 1 0.672 0.980 0.893 1.076    
Soc Supp Partner Pos -0.062 0.0490 -0.158 0.034  1.623 1 0.203 0.940 0.854 1.034    
Mastery 0.031 0.0331 -0.034 0.096  0.885 1 0.347 1.032 0.967 1.101    
Freq Phys Act  Mild -0.122 0.1424 -0.401 0.157  0.734 1 0.391 0.885 0.669 1.170    
Freq Phys Act  Mod 0.205 0.1864 -0.160 0.571  1.213 1 0.271 1.228 0.852 1.769    
Freq Phys Act  Vig -0.023 0.1021 -0.223 0.177  0.049 1 0.825 0.978 0.800 1.194    
Alcohol 0.212 0.1151 -0.014 0.438  3.395 1 0.065 1.236 0.987 1.549    
Life Events 0.071 0.0818 -0.089 0.231  0.752 1 0.386 1.074 0.915 1.260    
Smoker -0.302 0.3570 -1.001 0.398  0.714 1 0.398 0.740 0.367 1.489    
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 
95% Wald CI for 
Exp(B) 
-2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained by 
Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
GAS 0.149 0.2567 -0.354 0.652  0.338 1 0.561 1.161 0.702 1.920    
Sex*GAS 0.225 0.2842 -0.332 0.782  0.628 1 0.428 1.253 0.718 2.186    
Education*GAS 0.025 0.0336 -0.041 0.091  0.545 1 0.460 1.025 0.960 1.095    
Anxiolytics*GAS -0.074 0.1319 -0.332 0.185  0.314 1 0.575 0.929 0.717 1.203    
(Scale) 10.280              
 ^ Coefficients for anxiolytics were reverse coded for these analyses. So, for example, if reverse coding had been removed, anxiolytics predicted a negative 
effect on IR scores. SD of DV = standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
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Model M: 
DV: MMSE 
Full Model:  Excluding: Time and all interactions with GAS 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept -3.201 60.6175 -122.009 115.607  0.003 1 0.958 0.041 1.028E-53 1.612E+50 618445.741 11.358 -322.338 
Sex 3.642 8.4322 -12.885 20.169  0.187 1 0.666 38.177 2.537E-06 574566027.782    
Age 2.459 1.6690 -0.812 5.730  2.171 1 0.141 11.694 0.444 308.057    
Education 0.772 1.2206 -1.620 3.164  0.400 1 0.527 2.164 0.198 23.670    
Depression -5.774 2.1819 -10.050 -1.497  7.002 1 0.008 0.003 4.317E-05 0.224    
Dr Re Mem. 0.082 8.3794 -16.342 16.505  0.000 1 0.992 1.085 7.996E-08 14724737.145    
Anxiolytics 20.356 19.4938 -17.851 58.563  1.090 1 0.296 6.926E+08 1.767E-08 2.714E+25    
Physical Health -0.244 0.3591 -0.948 0.460  0.461 1 0.497 0.784 0.388 1.584    
Soc Supp Gen Neg -0.465 1.3005 -3.014 2.084  0.128 1 0.721 0.628 0.049 8.036    
Soc Supp Gen Pos -2.210 1.6433 -5.431 1.011  1.809 1 0.179 0.110 0.004 2.747    
Soc Supp Partner Neg -0.656 1.2153 -3.038 1.726  0.292 1 0.589 0.519 0.048 5.616    
Soc Supp Partner Pos 0.752 1.6589 -2.500 4.003  0.205 1 0.650 2.121 0.082 54.769    
Mastery -0.148 1.1549 -2.411 2.116  0.016 1 0.898 0.863 0.090 8.296    
Freq Phys Act  Mild 1.340 3.2652 -5.060 7.739  0.168 1 0.682 3.818 0.006 2296.841    
Freq Phys Act  Mod 6.810 3.6973 -0.436 14.057  3.393 1 0.065 907.234 0.647 1273078.477    
Freq Phys Act  Vig -1.767 2.8586 -7.370 3.836  0.382 1 0.536 0.171 0.001 46.323    
Alcohol 8.128 4.1549 -0.015 16.271  3.827 1 0.050 3387.977 0.985 11657536.233    
Life Events 0.093 2.5100 -4.826 5.013  0.001 1 0.970 1.098 0.008 150.354    
Smoker -4.569 11.1139 -26.352 17.214  0.169 1 0.681 0.010 3.593E-12 29914262.995    
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
GAS 0.313 0.5163 -0.699 1.325  0.367 1 0.545 1.367 0.497 3.760    
(Scale) 544.829              
SD of DV = standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
 
Model N: 
DV: MMSE 
Full Model:  Including: Time and Time interactions; Excluding: other interactions with GAS 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept -5.643 59.7562 -122.763 111.477  0.009 1 0.925 0.004 4.840E-54 2.594E+48 488348.086 11.358 -234.378 
Time 0.685 1.0351 -1.344 2.714  0.438 1 0.508 1.984 0.261 15.087    
Sex 3.982 8.3842 -12.450 20.415  0.226 1 0.635 53.642 3.916E-06 734734744.697    
Age 2.436 1.6009 -0.702 5.574  2.315 1 0.128 11.427 0.496 263.434    
Education 0.779 1.1895 -1.553 3.110  0.429 1 0.513 2.179 0.212 22.425    
Depression -5.333 1.8954 -9.048 -1.618  7.916 1 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.198    
Dr Re Mem. 1.283 8.1991 -14.787 17.353  0.024 1 0.876 3.608 3.786E-07 34389564.010    
Anxiolytics 20.715 18.6862 -15.909 57.339  1.229 1 0.268 9.917E+08 1.232E-07 7.982E+24    
Physical Health -0.184 0.3474 -0.864 0.497  0.279 1 0.597 0.832 0.421 1.644    
Soc Supp Gen Neg -0.082 1.2509 -2.534 2.369  0.004 1 0.948 0.921 0.079 10.692    
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Soc Supp Gen Pos -1.996 1.6530 -5.236 1.244  1.458 1 0.227 0.136 0.005 3.468    
Soc Supp Partner Neg -0.571 1.1601 -2.845 1.703  0.242 1 0.622 0.565 0.058 5.488    
Soc Supp Partner Pos 0.706 1.6361 -2.501 3.912  0.186 1 0.666 2.025 0.082 50.017    
Mastery -0.117 1.1690 -2.408 2.175  0.010 1 0.921 0.890 0.090 8.799    
Freq Phys Act  Mild 1.324 3.2205 -4.988 7.636  0.169 1 0.681 3.758 0.007 2071.395    
Freq Phys Act  Mod 7.121 3.7136 -0.158 14.399  3.676 1 0.055 1237.073 0.854 1792451.013    
Freq Phys Act  Vig -2.085 2.9736 -7.913 3.743  0.492 1 0.483 0.124 0.000 42.226    
Alcohol 8.778 3.9670 1.003 16.554  4.897 1 0.027 6492.918 2.727 15456844.906    
Life Events -0.230 2.4885 -5.107 4.647  0.009 1 0.926 0.795 0.006 104.320    
Smoker -5.372 10.8397 -26.617 15.874  0.246 1 0.620 0.005 2.756E-12 7831191.564    
GAS 0.437 0.8551 -1.239 2.113  0.261 1 0.609 1.548 0.290 8.272    
Time*Time 0.280 0.3548 -0.415 0.976  0.623 1 0.430 1.323 0.660 2.653    
Time*GAS -0.558 0.8955 -2.314 1.197  0.389 1 0.533 0.572 0.099 3.310    
Time*Time*GAS 0.192 0.2472 -0.292 0.677  0.604 1 0.437 1.212 0.747 1.967    
(Scale) 431.358              
SD of DV = standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
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Model O: 
DV: MMSE: 
Full Model:  Including: Interactions with GAS; Excluding: Time and Time interactions 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL SD of DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept 2.081 60.3807 -116.263 120.425  0.001 1 0.973 8.012 3.218E-51 1.995E+52 557837.915 11.358 -281.461 
Sex 1.715 7.8499 -13.671 17.100  0.048 1 0.827 5.555 1.156E-06 26700818.515    
Age 2.020 1.5537 -1.025 5.065  1.690 1 0.194 7.538 0.359 158.419    
Education 0.922 1.2223 -1.474 3.317  0.568 1 0.451 2.513 0.229 27.582    
Depression -4.890 2.1560 -9.116 -0.664  5.144 1 0.023 0.008 0.000 0.515    
Dr Re Mem. -0.305 8.1321 -16.243 15.634  0.001 1 0.970 0.737 8.823E-08 6162396.614    
Anxiolytics 17.360 16.9642 -15.890 50.609  1.047 1 0.306 3.461E+07 1.257E-07 9.531E+21    
Physical Health -0.275 0.3534 -0.967 0.418  0.604 1 0.437 0.760 0.380 1.519E+00    
Soc Supp Gen Neg -0.272 1.2627 -2.746 2.203  0.046 1 0.830 0.762 0.064 9.055    
Soc Supp Gen Pos -1.858 1.5034 -4.804 1.089  1.527 1 0.217 0.156 0.008 2.971    
Soc Supp Partner Neg -0.747 1.1710 -3.042 1.548  0.407 1 0.523 0.474 0.048 4.700    
Soc Supp Partner Pos 0.684 1.6637 -2.576 3.945  0.169 1 0.681 1.983 0.076 51.682    
Mastery -0.183 1.1611 -2.459 2.093  0.025 1 0.875 0.833 0.086 8.106    
Freq Phys Act  Mild 2.254 3.0534 -3.730 8.239  0.545 1 0.460 9.528 0.024 3785.026    
Freq Phys Act  Mod 7.277 3.5370 0.345 14.210  4.233 1 0.040 1447.072 1.412 1483032.418    
Freq Phys Act  Vig -1.952 2.8341 -7.507 3.603  0.474 1 0.491 0.142 0.001 36.703    
Alcohol 7.533 4.1809 -0.662 15.727  3.246 1 0.072 1868.363 0.516 6764535.143    
Life Events -0.496 2.5058 -5.407 4.415  0.039 1 0.843 0.609 0.004 82.704    
Smoker -3.895 11.2788 -26.001 18.211  0.119 1 0.730 0.020 5.103E-12 81088970.002    
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL SD of DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
GAS -0.038 1.7403 -3.449 3.373  0.000 1 0.982 0.962 0.032 29.158    
Depression*GAS -0.250 0.2715 -0.782 0.282  0.849 1 0.357 0.779 0.457 1.326    
Alcohol*GAS 0.280 0.5128 -0.725 1.285  0.298 1 0.585 1.323 0.484 3.614    
(Scale) 492.096              
SD of DV = standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
 
  
 308 
Model P:  
DV: StW:   
Full Model:  Excluding: Time and all interactions with GAS 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept 49.296 4.7815 39.924 58.668  106.289 1 0.000 2.564E+21 2.182E+17 3.013E+25 21348.541 4.879 17.116 
Sex 0.409 0.6145 -0.795 1.614  0.444 1 0.505 1.506 0.452 5.021    
Age 0.017 0.1627 -0.302 0.335  0.010 1 0.919 1.017 0.739 1.398    
Education 0.717 0.1005 0.520 0.914  50.910 1 0.000 2.049 1.682 2.495    
Depression 0.210 0.1470 -0.078 0.498  2.037 1 0.153 1.234 0.925 1.646    
Dr Re Mem. -0.108 0.5486 -1.183 0.967  0.039 1 0.844 0.898 0.306 2.631    
Anxiolytics -0.288 0.8837 -2.020 1.444  0.106 1 0.744 0.750 0.133 4.237    
Physical Health 0.087 0.0313 0.026 0.149  7.781 1 0.005 1.091 1.026 1.160    
Soc Supp Gen Neg -0.005 0.1285 -0.257 0.246  0.002 1 0.967 0.995 0.773 1.280    
Soc Supp Gen Pos -0.094 0.1578 -0.403 0.215  0.356 1 0.551 0.910 0.668 1.240    
Soc Supp Partner Neg -0.192 0.1412 -0.469 0.085  1.845 1 0.174 0.825 0.626 1.089    
Soc Supp Partner Pos -0.002 0.1413 -0.279 0.275  0.000 1 0.987 0.998 0.756 1.316    
Mastery 0.022 0.0836 -0.141 0.186  0.072 1 0.789 1.023 0.868 1.205    
Freq Phys Act  Mild -0.599 0.3613 -1.307 0.109  2.751 1 0.097 0.549 0.271 1.115    
Freq Phys Act  Mod 0.261 0.3116 -0.350 0.872  0.701 1 0.402 1.298 0.705 2.391    
Freq Phys Act  Vig 0.193 0.2410 -0.279 0.665  0.643 1 0.423 1.213 0.757 1.945    
Alcohol 0.598 0.2259 0.155 1.040  7.000 1 0.008 1.818 1.168 2.830    
Life Events 0.067 0.2106 -0.346 0.480  0.101 1 0.750 1.069 0.708 1.616    
Smoker -0.534 1.0196 -2.532 1.465  0.274 1 0.601 0.586 0.079 4.326    
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
GAS -0.001 0.0408 -0.081 0.079  0.001 1 0.982 0.999 0.922 1.082    
(Scale) 19.730              
SD of DV = standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
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Model Q: 
DV: StW:   
Full Model:  Including: Time and Time interactions; Excluding: other interactions with GAS 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept 49.285 4.7637 39.948 58.622  107.038 1 0.000 2.537E+21 2.236E+17 2.879E+25 21173.494 4.879 17.499 
Time 0.701 0.1591 0.389 1.013  19.421 1 0.000 2.016 1.476 2.753    
Sex 0.381 0.6121 -0.818 1.581  0.388 1 0.533 1.464 0.441 4.860    
Age 0.009 0.1624 -0.309 0.327  0.003 1 0.955 1.009 0.734 1.387    
Education 0.715 0.1006 0.518 0.912  50.527 1 0.000 2.044 1.678 2.490    
Depression 0.190 0.1474 -0.099 0.479  1.665 1 0.197 1.209 0.906 1.614    
Dr Re Mem. -0.110 0.5478 -1.184 0.964  0.040 1 0.841 0.896 0.306 2.622    
Anxiolytics -0.260 0.8727 -1.970 1.451  0.089 1 0.766 0.771 0.139 4.267    
Physical Health 0.085 0.0312 0.024 0.146  7.449 1 0.006 1.089 1.024 1.157    
Soc Supp Gen Neg -0.011 0.1283 -0.263 0.240  0.008 1 0.931 0.989 0.769 1.272    
Soc Supp Gen Pos -0.098 0.1575 -0.407 0.211  0.389 1 0.533 0.906 0.666 1.234    
Soc Supp Partner Neg -0.197 0.1405 -0.472 0.078  1.970 1 0.160 0.821 0.623 1.081    
Soc Supp Partner Pos -0.007 0.1408 -0.283 0.269  0.003 1 0.959 0.993 0.753 1.308    
Mastery 0.021 0.0835 -0.143 0.185  0.063 1 0.802 1.021 0.867 1.203    
Freq Phys Act  Mild -0.608 0.3592 -1.312 0.096  2.864 1 0.091 0.544 0.269 1.101    
Freq Phys Act  Mod 0.265 0.3116 -0.345 0.876  0.725 1 0.395 1.304 0.708 2.401    
Freq Phys Act  Vig 0.192 0.2402 -0.278 0.663  0.641 1 0.423 1.212 0.757 1.941    
Alcohol 0.588 0.2258 0.145 1.030  6.778 1 0.009 1.800 1.156 2.802    
Life Events 0.067 0.2100 -0.344 0.479  0.103 1 0.748 1.070 0.709 1.614    
 311 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Smoker -0.531 1.0116 -2.513 1.452  0.275 1 0.600 0.588 0.081 4.271    
GAS 0.061 0.0539 -0.044 0.167  1.291 1 0.256 1.063 0.957 1.182    
Time*Time -0.166 0.0530 -0.270 -0.062  9.811 1 0.002 0.847 0.764 0.940    
Time*GAS -0.085 0.0684 -0.219 0.049  1.530 1 0.216 0.919 0.804 1.051    
Time*Time*GAS 0.021 0.0235 -0.025 0.067  0.791 1 0.374 1.021 0.975 1.069    
(Scale) 19.638              
SD of DV = standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
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Model R: 
DV: StW 
Full Model:  Including: Interactions with GAS; Excluding: Time and Time interactions 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept 50.198 4.8972 40.600 59.796  105.070 1 0.000 6.319E+21 4.287E+17 9.315E+25 21287.140 4.879 17.142 
Sex 0.434 0.6185 -0.778 1.646  0.492 1 0.483 1.543 0.459 5.187    
Age 0.022 0.1616 -0.295 0.339  0.018 1 0.892 1.022 0.745 1.403    
Education 0.721 0.1011 0.523 0.919  50.866 1 0.000 2.056 1.687 2.506    
Depression 0.208 0.1478 -0.082 0.497  1.972 1 0.160 1.231 0.921 1.644    
Dr Re Mem. -0.057 0.5511 -1.137 1.023  0.011 1 0.918 0.945 0.321 2.782    
Anxiolytics -0.483 0.8975 -2.242 1.276  0.289 1 0.591 0.617 0.106 3.584    
Physical Health 0.077 0.0340 0.010 0.144  5.094 1 0.024 1.080 1.010 1.154    
Soc Supp Gen Neg -0.006 0.1289 -0.259 0.247  0.002 1 0.964 0.994 0.772 1.280    
Soc Supp Gen Pos -0.097 0.1572 -0.405 0.211  0.380 1 0.538 0.908 0.667 1.235    
Soc Supp Partner Neg -0.186 0.1410 -0.462 0.091  1.734 1 0.188 0.831 0.630 1.095    
Soc Supp Partner Pos 0.002 0.1418 -0.276 0.280  0.000 1 0.989 1.002 0.759 1.323    
Mastery 0.020 0.0830 -0.143 0.183  0.058 1 0.810 1.020 0.867 1.200    
Freq Phys Act  Mild -0.614 0.3627 -1.325 0.096  2.870 1 0.090 0.541 0.266 1.101    
Freq Phys Act  Mod 0.254 0.3101 -0.354 0.862  0.669 1 0.413 1.289 0.702 2.367    
Freq Phys Act  Vig 0.180 0.2396 -0.290 0.650  0.563 1 0.453 1.197 0.748 1.915    
Alcohol 0.652 0.2291 0.203 1.101  8.092 1 0.004 1.919 1.225 3.007    
Life Events 0.078 0.2110 -0.336 0.491  0.136 1 0.713 1.081 0.715 1.634    
Smoker -0.589 1.0188 -2.585 1.408  0.334 1 0.563 0.555 0.075 4.089    
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
GAS -0.140 0.2943 -0.717 0.437  0.226 1 0.635 0.870 0.488 1.548    
Education*GAS 0.009 0.0164 -0.024 0.041  0.279 1 0.598 1.009 0.977 1.042    
Physical Health*GAS 0.008 0.0050 -0.002 0.017  2.303 1 0.129 1.008 0.998 1.017    
Alcohol*GAS -0.074 0.0425 -0.157 0.010  3.008 1 0.083 0.929 0.855 1.010    
(Scale) 19.724              
SD of DV = standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
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Model S: 
DV: MCI 
Full Model:  Excluding: Time and all interactions with GAS 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper  
Intercept -5.972 3.7525 -13.327 1.382  2.533 1 0.111 0.003 1.630E-06 3.985 ^ 
Sex 0.171 0.3981 -0.610 0.951  0.184 1 0.668 1.186 0.544 2.588  
Age 0.054 0.1078 -0.157 0.265  0.252 1 0.616 1.056 0.855 1.304  
Education -0.167 0.0962 -0.356 0.021  3.029 1 0.082 0.846 0.700 1.021  
Depression 0.133 0.1258 -0.114 0.379  1.114 1 0.291 1.142 0.892 1.461  
Dr Re Mem. -1.007 0.5046 -1.996 -0.018  3.984 1 0.046 0.365 0.136 0.982  
Anxiolytics -1.009 0.6445 -2.272 0.255  2.448 1 0.118 0.365 0.103 1.290  
Physical Health 0.062 0.0334 -0.004 0.127  3.428 1 0.064 1.064 0.996 1.136  
Soc Supp Gen Neg -0.072 0.0886 -0.246 0.101  0.665 1 0.415 0.930 0.782 1.107  
Soc Supp Gen Pos 0.183 0.1403 -0.092 0.458  1.693 1 0.193 1.200 0.912 1.580  
Soc Supp Partner Neg 0.109 0.1242 -0.134 0.353  0.772 1 0.380 1.115 0.874 1.423  
Soc Supp Partner Pos 0.196 0.1225 -0.044 0.437  2.571 1 0.109 1.217 0.957 1.547  
Mastery -0.046 0.0824 -0.208 0.115  0.313 1 0.576 0.955 0.812 1.122  
Freq Phys Act  Mild -0.217 0.2829 -0.772 0.337  0.590 1 0.442 0.805 0.462 1.401  
Freq Phys Act  Mod 0.290 0.2749 -0.249 0.829  1.115 1 0.291 1.337 0.780 2.291  
Freq Phys Act  Vig -0.167 0.1771 -0.514 0.181  0.884 1 0.347 0.847 0.598 1.198  
Alcohol -0.005 0.1936 -0.385 0.374  0.001 1 0.978 0.995 0.681 1.454  
Life Events 0.052 0.2104 -0.360 0.464  0.061 1 0.805 1.053 0.697 1.591  
Smoker -1.360 0.6329 -2.600 -0.119  4.617 1 0.032 0.257 0.074 0.887  
GAS 0.043 0.0924 -0.138 0.224  0.216 1 0.642 1.044 0.871 1.251  
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper  
(Scale) 1            
^ Invalid result for variance explained. 
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Model T: 
DV: MCI 
Full Model:  Including: Time and Time interactions; Excluding: other interactions with GAS 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper  
Intercept -7.427 4.4206 -16.091 1.237  2.823 1 0.093 0.001 1.027E-07 3.446 ^ 
Time 0.609 0.5953 -0.558 1.776  1.046 1 0.306 1.838 0.572 5.904  
Sex 0.305 0.4434 -0.564 1.174  0.473 1 0.492 1.357 0.569 3.235  
Age 0.028 0.1274 -0.221 0.278  0.050 1 0.824 1.029 0.801 1.321  
Education -0.189 0.1024 -0.390 0.012  3.407 1 0.065 0.828 0.677 1.012  
Depression 0.121 0.1389 -0.151 0.394  0.764 1 0.382 1.129 0.860 1.482  
Dr Re Mem. -1.128 0.6225 -2.348 0.092  3.283 1 0.070 0.324 0.096 1.097  
Anxiolytics -1.157 0.8295 -2.783 0.469  1.945 1 0.163 0.314 0.062 1.598  
Physical Health 0.056 0.0395 -0.022 0.133  2.000 1 0.157 1.057 0.979 1.142  
Soc Supp Gen Neg -0.117 0.0969 -0.307 0.073  1.449 1 0.229 0.890 0.736 1.076  
Soc Supp Gen Pos 0.225 0.1682 -0.104 0.555  1.798 1 0.180 1.253 0.901 1.742  
Soc Supp Partner Neg 0.141 0.1355 -0.125 0.406  1.077 1 0.299 1.151 0.883 1.501  
Soc Supp Partner Pos 0.242 0.1363 -0.025 0.509  3.147 1 0.076 1.274 0.975 1.664  
Mastery -0.071 0.0836 -0.235 0.093  0.713 1 0.398 0.932 0.791 1.098  
Freq Phys Act  Mild -0.244 0.3538 -0.937 0.450  0.475 1 0.491 0.784 0.392 1.568  
Freq Phys Act  Mod 0.230 0.3168 -0.391 0.851  0.526 1 0.468 1.258 0.676 2.341  
Freq Phys Act  Vig -0.153 0.1882 -0.522 0.216  0.659 1 0.417 0.858 0.594 1.241  
Alcohol -0.074 0.2143 -0.494 0.346  0.119 1 0.730 0.929 0.610 1.414  
Life Events 0.072 0.2264 -0.372 0.515  0.100 1 0.752 1.074 0.689 1.674  
Smoker -1.589 0.7047 -2.970 -0.208  5.085 1 0.024 0.204 0.051 0.812  
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper  
GAS 0.019 0.1678 -0.310 0.348  0.013 1 0.909 1.019 0.734 1.416  
Time*Time 0.221 0.1988 -0.169 0.610  1.231 1 0.267 1.247 0.844 1.841  
Time*GAS 0.240 0.1932 -0.139 0.618  1.540 1 0.215 1.271 0.870 1.856  
Time*Time*GAS -0.079 0.0720 -0.220 0.063  1.190 1 0.275 0.924 0.803 1.065  
(Scale) 1            
^ Invalid result for variance explained 
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Model U: 
DV: MCI 
Full Model:  Including: Interactions with GAS; Excluding: Time and Time interactions 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper  
Intercept -6.578 4.0741 -14.563 1.407  2.607 1 0.106 0.001 4.734E-07 4.082 ^ 
Sex 0.182 0.3939 -0.590 0.954  0.213 1 0.644 1.199 0.554 2.596  
Age 0.056 0.1017 -0.143 0.255  0.304 1 0.581 1.058 0.867 1.291  
Education -0.172 0.0947 -0.358 0.013  3.309 1 0.069 0.842 0.699 1.013  
Depression 0.111 0.1259 -0.136 0.358  0.778 1 0.378 1.117 0.873 1.430  
Dr Re Mem. -0.893 0.5456 -1.962 0.176  2.680 1 0.102 0.409 0.141 1.193  
Anxiolytics -1.137 0.6566 -2.424 0.150  2.999 1 0.083 0.321 0.089 1.162  
Physical Health 0.063 0.0351 -0.005 0.132  3.270 1 0.071 1.066 0.995 1.141  
Soc Supp Gen Neg -0.060 0.0877 -0.232 0.112  0.467 1 0.495 0.942 0.793 1.119  
Soc Supp Gen Pos 0.186 0.1431 -0.094 0.467  1.691 1 0.193 1.205 0.910 1.595  
Soc Supp Partner Neg 0.110 0.1213 -0.128 0.347  0.820 1 0.365 1.116 0.880 1.416  
Soc Supp Partner Pos 0.195 0.1224 -0.044 0.435  2.550 1 0.110 1.216 0.957 1.545  
Mastery -0.047 0.0847 -0.213 0.120  0.302 1 0.583 0.955 0.808 1.127  
Freq Phys Act  Mild -0.241 0.2998 -0.828 0.347  0.645 1 0.422 0.786 0.437 1.414  
Freq Phys Act  Mod 0.309 0.2813 -0.242 0.860  1.207 1 0.272 1.362 0.785 2.364  
Freq Phys Act  Vig -0.157 0.1814 -0.512 0.199  0.747 1 0.388 0.855 0.599 1.220  
Alcohol -0.033 0.1840 -0.394 0.328  0.032 1 0.858 0.968 0.675 1.388  
Life Events 0.082 0.2097 -0.329 0.493  0.152 1 0.696 1.085 0.720 1.637  
Smoker -1.014 0.8862 -2.751 0.722  1.310 1 0.252 0.363 0.064 2.060  
GAS 0.573 0.3693 -0.151 1.297  2.409 1 0.121 1.774 0.860 3.658  
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper  
Dr Re Memory*GAS -0.092 0.1375 -0.362 0.177  0.452 1 0.502 0.912 0.696 1.194  
Smoker*GAS -0.274 0.2038 -0.674 0.125  1.810 1 0.179 0.760 0.510 1.133  
(Scale) 1            
^ Invalid result for variance explained 
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Model V: 
DV: Dementia 
Maximum Model:  Excluding: Time and all interactions with GAS 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper  
Intercept -6.562 0.5070 -7.556 -5.569  167.526 1 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.004 ^ 
Sex -0.240 0.4338 -1.091 0.610  0.307 1 0.580 0.786 0.336 1.840  
Age 0.308 0.1272 0.059 0.558  5.880 1 0.015 1.361 1.061 1.746  
Education 0.017 0.0830 -0.146 0.180  0.041 1 0.839 1.017 0.864 1.197  
Depression 0.030 0.1180 -0.201 0.262  0.067 1 0.796 1.031 0.818 1.299  
GAS -0.146 0.1284 -0.398 0.106  1.292 1 0.256 0.864 0.672 1.112  
(Scale) 1            
Note: For Model V, the maximum model was limited to the CVs presented. Models attempted with additional CVs would not converge or would not run. This 
was possibly attributable to an excess of small cell sizes or empty cells, particularly in the early waves of data when there was small or zero conversion to 
dementia. For the fully adjusted  model, the SPSS warning was that maximum likelihood estimates do not exist. 
^ Invalid result for variance explained 
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Appendix 6.F:   
Fully adjusted, Interaction Models for DSB, Alternative Temporal Treatments 
 
DSB Interactions; Model A: Lagged-GAS 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 
95% Wald CI for 
Exp(B) 
-2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept 4.861 1.6724 1.583 8.138  8.447 1 0.004 129.100 4.869 3423.353 3579.379 2.235 7.939 
Sex -0.251 0.2542 -0.749 0.247  0.974 1 0.324 0.778 0.473 1.281    
Age -0.166 0.0737 -0.311 -0.022  5.094 1 0.024 0.847 0.733 0.978    
Education 0.176 0.0411 0.095 0.256  18.345 1 0.000 1.192 1.100 1.292    
Depression 0.055 0.0734 -0.089 0.199  0.569 1 0.450 1.057 0.915 1.221    
Dr Re Mem. 0.578 0.2436 0.100 1.055  5.627 1 0.018 1.782 1.106 2.873    
Anxiolytics -1.996 0.3581 -2.698 -1.294  31.066 1 0.000 0.136 0.067 0.274    
Physical Health 0.021 0.0149 -0.009 0.050  1.927 1 0.165 1.021 0.992 1.051    
Soc Supp Gen Neg -0.098 0.0589 -0.213 0.017  2.772 1 0.096 0.907 0.808 1.018    
Soc Supp Gen Pos -0.022 0.0645 -0.148 0.105  0.112 1 0.738 0.979 0.862 1.111    
Soc Supp Partner Neg 0.020 0.0546 -0.087 0.127  0.129 1 0.719 1.020 0.916 1.135    
Soc Supp Partner Pos -0.002 0.0537 -0.107 0.103  0.001 1 0.971 0.998 0.898 1.109    
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 
95% Wald CI for 
Exp(B) 
-2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept 4.861 1.6724 1.583 8.138  8.447 1 0.004 129.100 4.869 3423.353 3579.379 2.235 7.939 
Mastery -0.013 0.0380 -0.088 0.061  0.125 1 0.724 0.987 0.916 1.063    
Freq Phys Act  Mild 0.038 0.1481 -0.252 0.328  0.066 1 0.797 1.039 0.777 1.389    
Freq Phys Act  Mod -0.001 0.1264 -0.249 0.247  0.000 1 0.995 0.999 0.780 1.280    
Freq Phys Act  Vig 0.068 0.1105 -0.149 0.284  0.379 1 0.538 1.070 0.862 1.329    
Alcohol 0.152 0.1135 -0.070 0.375  1.806 1 0.179 1.165 0.932 1.455    
Life Events 0.055 0.0955 -0.132 0.242  0.335 1 0.563 1.057 0.876 1.274    
Smoker 0.037 0.4075 -0.761 0.836  0.008 1 0.927 1.038 0.467 2.307    
Lagged-GAS -0.046 0.0404 -0.125 0.033  1.311 1 0.252 0.955 0.882 1.033    
Anxiolytics*Lagged-
GAS 
0.241 0.0829 0.079 0.404  8.475 1 0.004 1.273 1.082 1.498    
(Scale) 4.601              
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DSB Interactions; Model B: Autoregressive 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained by 
Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept 1.366 0.7384 -0.081 2.813  3.421 1 0.064 3.919 0.922 16.662 2437.141 2.237 35.646 
Sex -0.042 0.1006 -0.239 0.155  0.173 1 0.678 0.959 0.787 1.168    
Age -0.047 0.0291 -0.104 0.010  2.613 1 0.106 0.954 0.901 1.010    
Education 0.048 0.0166 0.016 0.081  8.503 1 0.004 1.050 1.016 1.084    
Depression 0.023 0.0291 -0.033 0.080  0.653 1 0.419 1.024 0.967 1.084    
Dr Re Mem. 0.058 0.0936 -0.126 0.242  0.384 1 0.536 1.060 0.882 1.273    
Anxiolytics -0.602 0.1513 -0.899 -0.305  15.825 1 0.000 0.548 0.407 0.737    
Physical Health 0.006 0.0064 -0.007 0.018  0.848 1 0.357 1.006 0.993 1.019    
Soc Supp Gen Neg 0.007 0.0225 -0.037 0.051  0.098 1 0.755 1.007 0.964 1.052    
Soc Supp Gen Pos -0.033 0.0253 -0.083 0.016  1.727 1 0.189 0.967 0.921 1.016    
Soc Supp Partner Neg -0.008 0.0215 -0.050 0.034  0.125 1 0.723 0.992 0.952 1.035    
Soc Supp Partner Pos 0.020 0.0192 -0.017 0.058  1.104 1 0.293 1.020 0.983 1.059    
Mastery -0.006 0.0139 -0.033 0.022  0.158 1 0.691 0.994 0.968 1.022    
Freq Phys Act  Mild 0.053 0.0644 -0.073 0.180  0.689 1 0.407 1.055 0.930 1.197    
Freq Phys Act  Mod -0.025 0.0535 -0.130 0.080  0.223 1 0.637 0.975 0.878 1.083    
Freq Phys Act  Vig 0.018 0.0463 -0.073 0.109  0.153 1 0.695 1.018 0.930 1.115    
Alcohol -0.018 0.0422 -0.101 0.065  0.180 1 0.671 0.982 0.904 1.067    
Life Events 0.009 0.0364 -0.062 0.080  0.060 1 0.807 1.009 0.940 1.083    
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald CI for Exp(B) -2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained by 
Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Smoker -0.060 0.1769 -0.406 0.287  0.114 1 0.735 0.942 0.666 1.332    
Lagged-DSB 0.760 0.0222 0.716 0.803  1168.872 1 0.000 2.138 2.047 2.233    
Lagged-GAS -0.056 0.0262 -0.107 -0.004  4.512 1 0.034 0.946 0.899 0.996    
Anxiolytics*Lagged-
GAS 
0.115 0.0581 0.001 0.229  3.940 1 0.047 1.122 1.001 1.257    
(Scale) 3.220              
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DSB Interactions; Model C: Cognitive Change 
CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 
95% Wald CI for 
Exp(B) 
-2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Intercept -0.161 0.7327 -1.597 1.275  0.048 1 0.826 0.851 0.202 3.579 2977.907 1.968 -1.783 
Sex 0.015 0.0935 -0.168 0.198  0.025 1 0.875 1.015 0.845 1.219    
Age 0.000 0.0281 -0.055 0.055  0.000 1 0.991 1.000 0.946 1.056    
Education 0.011 0.0160 -0.020 0.043  0.497 1 0.481 1.011 0.980 1.044    
Depression 0.007 0.0262 -0.045 0.058  0.063 1 0.802 1.007 0.956 1.060    
Dr Re Mem. -0.062 0.0900 -0.238 0.114  0.477 1 0.490 0.940 0.788 1.121    
Anxiolytics 0.042 0.2238 -0.397 0.480  0.034 1 0.853 1.042 0.672 1.616    
Physical Health 0.003 0.0062 -0.009 0.016  0.304 1 0.581 1.003 0.991 1.016    
Soc Supp Gen Neg 0.030 0.0209 -0.011 0.071  2.055 1 0.152 1.030 0.989 1.073    
Soc Supp Gen Pos -0.014 0.0256 -0.064 0.036  0.305 1 0.581 0.986 0.938 1.037    
Soc Supp Partner Neg -0.021 0.0214 -0.063 0.021  0.979 1 0.322 0.979 0.939 1.021    
Soc Supp Partner Pos 0.027 0.0188 -0.010 0.064  2.079 1 0.149 1.028 0.990 1.066    
Mastery 0.000 0.0132 -0.026 0.025  0.001 1 0.975 1.000 0.974 1.026    
Freq Phys Act  Mild 0.070 0.0613 -0.050 0.190  1.315 1 0.251 1.073 0.951 1.210    
Freq Phys Act  Mod -0.045 0.0551 -0.152 0.063  0.654 1 0.419 0.956 0.859 1.065    
Freq Phys Act  Vig 0.026 0.0452 -0.062 0.115  0.335 1 0.563 1.027 0.939 1.122    
Alcohol -0.055 0.0388 -0.131 0.021  2.024 1 0.155 0.946 0.877 1.021    
Life Events 0.021 0.0350 -0.048 0.089  0.343 1 0.558 1.021 0.953 1.093    
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CV B SE 95% CI for B  Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 
95% Wald CI for 
Exp(B) 
-2LL 
SD of 
DV 
% Variance 
Explained 
by Model 
   Lower Upped  
Wald Chi-
Squared 
df Sig.  Lower Upper    
Smoker -0.113 0.1535 -0.414 0.188  0.545 1 0.460 0.893 0.661 1.206    
Lagged-GAS -0.026 0.0261 -0.077 0.025  1.017 1 0.313 0.974 0.926 1.025    
Anxiolytics*Lagged-
GAS 
-0.049 0.0654 -0.177 0.080  0.552 1 0.457 0.953 0.838 1.083    
(Scale) 3.943              
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Appendix 6.G:   
Table of Statistical Power from PATH Dataset 
This table and description are reproduced here (with author permission), from a 2018 Grant 
Proposal (application ID APP1159838; CIA Anstey, K.J.). The table describes PATH power 
ratios (for future projects) in the context of expected attrition levels. 
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Appendix 7.A:   
Methods for Linear Multilevel Modelling 
Data were in SPSS “long” format. A sample of source code follow the description of 
SPSS options selected.  
The following options were selected within the SPPSS LMM dialogue boxes: 
1. First Panel: 
a. Subjects: participant identifier 
b. “Repeated”: Wave 
c. Repeated Covariance Type: Diagonal (default setting) 
2. Second Panel: 
a. Dependent Variable: SDMT, DSB, or StW.   
b. Factors: None 
c. Covariates: See Section 7.2.2 and Table 6.13. All CVs were used unless 
they were both binary and for subgrouping. 
d. Residual Weight: None 
e. Fixed:  
i. all CVs entered into model as main effects only 
ii. Intercept Included 
iii. Sum of squares: Type III 
f. Random: 
i. Covariance Type: Unstructured 
ii. Model: None unless a significant result was found for fixed 
effects, in which case GAS would have been entered. 
iii. Intercept Included 
iv. Subject Groupings: Participant identifier added to “combinations” 
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g. Estimation: Nominal (default) 
h. Statistics: All options, except case processing summary and Descriptive 
statistics; Confidence interval: 95%. 
i. EM Means: none  
j. Save: Residuals 
k. Bootstrap: No. 
 
 
Example of LLM syntax follows. This is for the fully adjusted model for the 
anxiolytics=yes subgroup. 
MIXED DSB_allWaves WITH Sex Age Education goldberg_dep mem_doc Rand_phc 
SS_w1_gen_neg SS_w1_gen_pos 
    SS_w1_ptnr_neg SS_w1_ptnr_pos masteryb phy_act1 phy_act2 phy_act3 audit_class 
lifevent smoke_now 
    GAS_centred_allWaves 
  /CRITERIA=CIN(95) MXITER(100) MXSTEP(10) SCORING(1) 
SINGULAR(0.000000000001) HCONVERGE(0, 
    ABSOLUTE) LCONVERGE(0, ABSOLUTE) PCONVERGE(0.000001, 
ABSOLUTE) 
  /FIXED=Sex Age Education goldberg_dep mem_doc Rand_phc SS_w1_gen_neg 
SS_w1_gen_pos SS_w1_ptnr_neg 
    SS_w1_ptnr_pos masteryb phy_act1 phy_act2 phy_act3 audit_class lifevent 
smoke_now 
    GAS_centred_allWaves | SSTYPE(3) 
  /METHOD=REML 
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  /PRINT=SOLUTION 
  /RANDOM=INTERCEPT | SUBJECT(pathid) COVTYPE(UN) SOLUTION 
  /REPEATED=Index1 | SUBJECT(pathid) COVTYPE(DIAG). 
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Appendix 7.B:   
Subgroup Results 
Table 1 
Subgroups for Associations of GAS with SDMT. 
Subgroups by Coefficient (95% CI) n 
Age (A) Low  .298 (-.003 to .600) n = 723 
High .077 (-.171 to.325) n= 1,694 
Education (E) Low .279 (-.070 to .628) n = 1,061 
High .031 (-.205 to .267) n = 1,234 
Persistently High 
GAS (PHG) 
 
No .125 (-.116 to .366) n = 2,080 
Yes .192 (-.174 to.558) n = 337 
Chronic GAS (CG) 
 
No .089 (-.121 to .298) n = 2,328 
Yes .262 (-.197 to .721) n = 89 
A.PHG^ Low age 
Not PHG 
.317 (-.061 to .696) n = 634 
Low age 
yes, PHG 
.261 (-.243 to .764) n = 89 
High age 
Not PHG 
.018 (-.289 to .325) n = 1,446 
High age 
Yes PHG 
.125 (-.116 to .366) n = 248 
A.CG^ Low age 
Not PHG 
.317 (-.061 to .696) n = 589 
 Low age 
PHG 
Model did not converge; n = 89 
 High age 
Not PHG 
.018 (-.289 to .325) n = 1,446 
 High age 
PHG 
.262 (-.197 to .721) n = 248 
E.PHG^ Low E 
Not PHG 
.357 (-.082 to .796) n = 899 
 Low E 
yes, PHG 
.087 (-.511 to .685) n = 162 
 High E 
Not PHG 
-.026 (-.308 to .256) n= 1,075 
 High E 
Yes PHG 
.207 (-.265 to .678) n = 159 
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Subgroups by Coefficient (95% CI) n 
E.CG^ Low E 
Not CG 
.263 (-.114 to .640) n= 1,015 
 Low E 
yes, CG 
.650 (-.492 to 1.792) n = 46 
 High E 
Not CG 
-.029 (-.278 to .220) n = 1.199 
 High E 
Yes CG 
Not positive definite n = 35 
^ Sub-subgroups are nominated by reference to the subgroup  
abbreviations and a full-stop between these abbreviations. E.G.,  
E.PHG is the sub-subgroup formed from the subgroup  
Persistently High GAS, within the subgroup Education. 
 
At Table 7.1, the DV was SDMT, and the CVs remaining in significant association 
within the fully adjusted model (Chapter Six), were: age and education. These were 
dichotomised about their means to facilitate subgrouping and compounding with each of 
persistently-high GAS and chronic GAS (as defined at Methods). The compound model for 
lower age and chronic GAS did not converge. The compound model for higher education and 
chronic GAS was reported as “The final Hessian matrix is not positive definite . . .”. This 
outcome may have been a consequence of the small cell size (n = 35). Apart from these two 
exceptional results, all subgroups examined reported non-significant results. 
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Table 7.2 
Subgroups for Associations of GAS with DSB. 
Subgroups by Coefficient (95% CI) n 
Education (E) Low .014 (-.079 to .107) n = 1,061 
High -.004 (-.075 to .067) n = 1,234 
Anxiolytics (An) No -.013 (-.072 to .045) n = 2,289 
Yes .215 (.001 to .429) n = 126 
Dr Re Memory 
(Dr) 
No Hessian matrix not positive 
definite, n = 2,351 
Yes Hessian matrix not positive 
definite, n = 66 
Persistently High 
GAS (PHG) 
No .033 (-.036 to .102) n = 2,080 
Yes  -.048 (-.159 to .063) n = 337 
Chronic GAS (CG) No .016 (-.044 to .077) n = 2,328 
Yes  -.071 (-.267 to .126) n = 89 
E.PHG^ Low E 
Not PHG 
.026 (-.090 to .142) n = 899 
Low E  
PHG 
.022 (-.150 to .194) n = 81 
High E 
NOT PHG 
.031 (-.055 to .117) n = 1,075 
High E 
PHG 
-.086 (-.299 to .058) n = 159 
E.CG^ Low E 
Not CG 
.027 (-.072 to .126) n = 1,015 
Low E  
CG 
Not positive definite; n = 46 
High E 
Not CG 
.011 (-.065 to .087) n = 1,199 
High E 
CG 
Not positive definite; n = 35 
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Subgroups by Coefficient (95% CI) n 
An.PHG^ No An 
Not PHG 
.025 (-.046 to .096) n=2,008 
An 
Not PHG 
Hessian matrix not positive 
definite; n = 71 
No AN 
PHG 
-.087 (-.203 to .029) n = 281 
An 
PHG 
Hessian matrix not positive 
definite; 
n = 55 
An.CG^ No An 
Not CG 
.004 (-.058 to .066) n = 2,226 
 An 
Not CG 
.146 (-.098 to .390) n = 101 
 No AN 
CG 
Not positive definite; n = 63 
 An 
CG 
Not positive definite; n = 25 
^ Sub-subgroups are nominated by reference to the subgroup  
abbreviations and a full-stop between these abbreviations. E.G.,  
E.PHG is the sub-subgroup formed from the subgroup  
Persistently High GAS, within the subgroup Education. 
 
 
At Table 7.2, the DV was DSB, and the CVs remaining in significant association within 
the fully adjusted model (Chapter Six), were: education, and anxiolytics (consumed at 
baseline). Again, education was dichotomised about its mean to facilitate compound 
subgrouping with each of persistently high GAS and chronic GAS. The compound models 
for: lower education and chronic GAS; higher education and chronic GAS; anxiolytics but 
not persistently high GAS; anxiolytics and persistently high GAS, were all invalid, due either 
to a “not positive definite” report or because the model did not converge. In each case the cell 
size was small. Other compound subgroups were non-significant. 
The subgrouping on anxiolytics was repeated for the alternative temporal treatments 
time-lagged and autoregressive. Results were non-significant.  
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More extensive investigation of the anxiolytics subgroups for the standard temporal 
treatment, appears at Section 7.3.2. 
The “yes” subgroup for Dr Re Memory, was reported for a subgroup of 66 participants 
and there was a moderately large increase in expected DSB score, with significance of p = 
.022.  
 
Table 7.3 
Results for Subgroups for Association of GAS with StW 
Subgroups by StW 
Education (E) Low -.090 (-.245 to .064) n=1,061 
High .024 (-.049 to .100) n = 1,234 
Physical Health (PH) Low -.112 (-.234 to .010) n = 826 
High .060 (-.026 to .146) n = 1588 
Harmful consumption 
of Alcohol (HA) 
No .441 (-.165 to 1.047) n= 2,269 
Yes .007 (-.068 to .082) n= 143  
Persistently High GAS 
(PHG) 
No -.018 (-.100 to .064) n = 2,080 
Yes .002 (-.137 to .141) n = 1,348 
Chronic GAS (CG) No .003 (-.071 to .078) n = 2,328 
Yes -.131 (-.355 to .093) n = 89 
 
At Table 7.3, the DV was StW. The subgrouping CVs from Table 6.1 were education, 
physical health, and a harmful level of consumption of alcohol at baseline. There was no 
significant result. Compound subgroups were not investigated. 
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